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Introduction
This nation is losing the battle to protect its most precious
resource-its children. In Oklahoma alone, the number of chil-
dren dying from child abuse has nearly doubled in seven years.
In 1981, 10,109 incidents of child abuse were reported. Of those,
3,733 were confirmed by the Oklahoma Department of Human
Services. Thirteen children died. In 1988, 23,179 abuse incidents
were reported; 7,522 were confirmed, and twenty-three children
died.'
These are statistics we can live without. Congress and the
Oklahoma legislature have passed laws authorizing public law
proceedings to protect physically abused, sexually abused, and
neglected children. 2 Unfortunately, law schools offer few, if any,
courses in juvenile law. As a result, lawyers find themselves in
juvenile court with little practical knowledge of the law in the
area. Even juvenile court judges may have no experience and
still be assigned a juvenile docket.
The purpose of this article is to guide lawyers and judges
through the maze of overlapping and sometimes conflicting
I. OKLA. Dmr. oF HUmAN SERVS., ComaplwsoN or CmD ABusE RaPoRTS-SFY
1981 TnRouoH SFY 1988 at 1 (1988).
2. Examples include the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,
Pub. L. 96-272; Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-608, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-
1963; Oklahoma Juvenile Code, 10 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1101-1506; Oklahoma Indian Child
Welfare Act, Id. §§ 40-40.9.
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legislation, and the interpretation of that legislation by the
courts.
Starting with an overview of the fundamental nature of the
parent-child relationship, the article next examines the philoso-
phy that spawned the juvenile court system, and explains the
special needs of Indian children. The article then takes the reader
through a step-by-step analysis of juvenile court proceedings,
concluding with suggested changes in the law.
History and Philosophy
The Fundamental Nature of the Parent-Child Bond
Parents have a natural and fundamental interest in the care,
custody, and control of their children.3 Derived from the com-
mon law, the care, custody and control of one's child is a
fundamental interest protected by both the United States and
Oklahoma Constitutions.4 One aspect of this fundamental inter-
est is the right to rear and retain custody of one's children.s
In Stanley v. Illinois the United States Supreme Court stated:
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the
family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children
have been deemed "essential," "basic civil rights of man"
and "[r]ights far more precious ... than property rights."
"It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." The integrity of the family unit
has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the Ninth Amendment.6
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has adopted the United States
Supreme Court's view of the fundamental integrity of the family
unit,7 not only by citing the United States Constitution, but also
by recognizing that the companionship, care and management
of one's child is a fundamental right protected by the Oklahoma
Constitution.8 This right emanates from the constitutional right
3. In re T.H.L., 636 P.2d 330, 332 (Okla. 1981).
4. Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1109 n.33 (Okla. 1985).
5. Zabloski v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
6. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citations omitted).
7. A.E. v. State, 743 P.2d 1041, 1048, n.30 (Okla. 1987); In re Wright, 524 P.2d
790, 792 (Okla. 1974).
8. In re Adoption of Blevins, 695 P.2d 556, 558 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting
In re Adoption of Darien Todd H., 615 P.2d 287, 290 (Okla. 1980)).
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to privacy,9 and is recognized by the Oklahoma legislature.' 0
A presumption exists that the child's best interest is served
by leaving the child in the care of natural parents," who are
expected to have the strongest bond of love and affection and
best able to provide for their own child.'2
Unfortunately, some parents betray that trust. In re Jerry L.'3
relates the tragic story of a three-year-old child who was sexually
molested by his parents. The child was forced to perform sexual
acts with his parents, resulting in the child contracting anal
gonorrhea. As a result of such abuse, there is a growing trend
away from considering parental rights as paramount to those of
a helpless child. Parental rights are entitled to protection, but
must be balanced against those of the child. Where parental
rights and the rights of a child conflict, the child should be
protected.' 4 A child has the right to proper care. The parents
have an obligation to honor that right. If they fail to do so,
parents cannot complain if the State takes steps to protect the
child's rights. 5 As the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated in In
re T.H.L.:
The interest of children in a wholesome environment has a
constitutional dimension no less compelling than that the
parents have in the preservation of family integrity. In the
hierarchy of constitutionally protected values both interests
rank as fundamental and must hence be shielded with equal
vigor and solicitude.' 6
A Duty to Report Child Abuse
It is the policy of the State of Oklahoma to protect children
from abuse and negleCt'17 such as non-accidental physical or
mental injury by a person responsible for the child's health or
welfare;' sexual abuse 9 (including rape, incest and lewd or
9. Id.
10. 10 OLA. STAT. § 1135(A) (Supp. 1986).
11. In re T.H.L., 636 P.2d 330, 332 (Okla. 1981); In re Meekins, 554 P.2d 872,
874 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
12. Meekins, 554 P.2d at 874; York v. Halley, 534 P.2d 363, 365-66 (Okla. 1975).
13. 662 P.2d 1372 (Okla. 1983).
14. In re Stacy W., 623 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980).
15. Id.
16. T.H.L., 636 P.2d at 334 (citations omitted).
17. 21 Oi A.. STAT. § 845(A) (Supp. 1985).




indecent acts or proposals2°) by a person responsible for the
child's welfare;21 sexual exploitation (including allowing a chid
to engage in prostitution, or permitting the lewd, obscene or
pornographic photographing, filming, or depicting of a child in
those acts22-so-called "kiddie porn"); and negligent treatment
or maltreatment, including the failure to provide adequate food,
clothing, shelter or medical care.2 Every person has the duty to
report child abuse.2 Those who make a report of child abuse
in good faith are immune from civil or criminal liability.2
The child abuse report should be made promptly to the county
office of the Department of Human Services (DHS) in the county
where the suspected injury occurred. 26 The DHS then has the
responsibility to investigate the report.27 If the DHS finds evi-
dence of abuse and neglect, it forwards its findings to the district
attorney's office in the county where the suspected injury oc-
curred, and its recommendation as to disposition.28 The district
attorney then makes the decision whether to file a deprived child
proceeding.
Philosophy of the Juvenile Court
The philosophy of the juvenile court system is rooted in social
welfare philosophy, rather than in the corpus juris.29 Its pro-
ceedings are civil, not criminal.30 The power to disrupt a family
relationship and interfere with a child's personal liberty is placed
20. Id. § 845(B)(3).
21. Id.
22. Id. § 845(B)(4).
23. Id. § 845(B)(1).
24. 21 O=aA. STAT. § 846(A) (Supp. 1987). While everyone has the duty to report
abuse and neglect, the legislature emphasized the special duty of physicians, surgeons,
doctors of medicine and dentistry, osteopathic physicians, residents and intern, registered
nurses, and teachers.
25. 21 OKu. STAT. § 847 (Supp. 1984). This section also states:
Any person participating in good faith and exercising due care in the making of a
report pursuant to the provisions of [21 OKLA. STAT. § 845 (Supp. 1985)] or [21
OKLA. STAT. § 846.1 (Supp. 1984)] shall have immunity from any liability, civil or
criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Any such participant shall
have the same immunity with respect to participation in any judicial proceeding
resulting from such report.
26. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 846 (Supp. 1987). The DHS maintains a Child Abuse Hotline
twenty-four hours a day at 1-800-522-3511.
27. DHS has the responsibility to provide intake, probation and parole services for
juveniles. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1141 (Supp. 1982).
28. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 846(A) (Supp. 1987).
29. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
30. Id.
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in the courts." The purpose of juvenile law is to facilitate the
state's intervention into the family domain to protect abused
and neglected children.3 2
The history of the juvenile justice system evolved simultane-
ously with the child welfare system. 33 Before the nineteenth
century, children who received inadequate care from their fam-
ilies were assisted by local communities and churches as charity
cases. 34 The emerging child welfare system was seen in various
innovative trends in the nineteenth century such as shelters for
dependent, neglected, or abandoned children, and the establish-
ment of a juvenile court by Illinois in 1899.35
In Oklahoma, legislative concern for neglected and abused
children predates statehood.3 6 In 1905, the Legislative Assembly
of the Territory of Oklahoma created the Children's Aid Society
and prescribed methods for protecting dependent, neglected and
ill-treated children within the territory.3 7 Laws dealing with state
power to intervene through the judicial process to adjudicate a
child's deprived status are entirely of statutory origin. 38 In Davis
v. Davis the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated, "None of these
legal norms existed at common law." 39 The main body of law
concerning dependent and neglected children is found in title
10, chapter 51 of the Oklahoma Statutes, commonly referred to
as the Juvenile Code.40 Special courts within the county court
system designated by the Oklahoma Legislature as "juvenile
courts" were created in 1909 to administer legal process under
this new body of law.41 Until 1968, the county courts were vested
with jurisdiction over all cases falling within the terms of the
Juvenile Code.42 Oklahoma then revised its constitution and
reorganized the judicial branch of government. 43 County courts
31. Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals, 595 P.2d 416, 421 (Okla. 1979).
32. A.E. v. State, 743 P.2d at 1041, 1051 (Okla. 1987) (Opala, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 1050 n.12.
34. Id.
35. Id. See 1899 Ill. Laws 131. The Illinois Juvenile Court Act marked the first
implementation of a separate judicial framework whose sole concern was directed to
the problems of youth.
36. Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Okla. 1985).
37. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1105, n.8. See 1905 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 14 at 201.
38. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1105.
39. Id.
40. 10 Ox.A. STAT. §§ 1101-1506 (1981).
41. 1909 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 14 at 185. See also Davis, 708 P.2d at 1116.
42. 1909 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 14 § 2 at 186; 10 OKLA. STAT. § 102 (1960); Davis,
708 P.2d at 1106 n.12.
43. Former article VII of the Oklahoma Constitution, consisting of sections 1-25,
as ratified in 1907, was repealed and present article VII was enacted by State Question
No. 448, Legislative Referendum No. 164 (adopted by election July 11, 1967).
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were abolished,4 and all juvenile cases were transferred to the
district courts 45 Statutes dealing with the juvenile process au-
thorize the state to assume custody of a deprived child and
perform duties as surrogate parents:
This form of government intervention is based upon the
principle of parens patriae (parent of the country). The doc-
trine not only allows the legislature to enact laws affecting
children, but also places on it the duty to do so. Every child
from the moment of its birth, owes allegiance to the govern-
ment of his country, and conversely, is entitled to the pro-
tectioin of that government, both in his person as well as his
property.46
Before the Juvenile Code's enactment, the state could not
interfere by public action with the parental management of a
child.47 The Juvenile Code was designed to enable the state to
intercede by judicial proceedings whenever public protection for
an underage citizen was deemed necessary.4
Under the Juvenile Code, the public policy of the State of
Oklahoma is to assure adequate and appropriate care and treat-
ment for every child; to allow for the use of the least restrictive
method of treatment consistent with the treatment needs of the
child; and to protect the rights of every child placed out of
home pursuant to law.49 The purpose of the Juvenile Code is
that the care, custody and discipline of the child approximate,
as nearly as may be, that which should be given by a parent.50
Indian Children
To appreciate why Congress and the Oklahoma Legislature
promulgated Indian Child Welfare Acts, one must understand
44. OKxA. CoNsr. art. VII, § 7(b).
45. Id. § 7(a) provides in part: "[The District Court shall have unlimited original
jurisdiction of all justiciable matters, except as otherwise provided in this Article, and
such power of review of administrative action as may be provided by statute ....-
See also 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 282, § 102, and 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1102 (A) (1981)
(upon the filing of a petition, the District Court shall have jurisdiction of any child
who is alleged to be deprived, who is found within the county).
46. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1106.
47. Id. However, private-law civil actions can be brought for abuse of parental
authority under 10 O.A. STAT. § 9 (1981); for adoption without parental consent under
10 OKA . STAT. § 60.6 (Supp. 1986); and for termination of parental rights under 10
OaLA. STAT. § 1130(D) (Supp. 1987).
48. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1106.
49. 10 OK.A. STAT. § 1129(2) (Supp. 1981).
50. 10 OxLA. STAT. § 1129(1) (Supp. 1982).
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the historical treatment of Indian children. Guidance is provided
by Oklahoma Supreme Court Justice Yvonne Kauger:
Well before this country became a nation, the insensitive
precedent had been cast to destroy Indian culture and tribal
cohesiveness by removing Indian children from their families
and tribal environments. Continuing separation of Indian
children from their heritage is one of the most tragic and
destructive aspects of contemporary Indian life. State intru-
sion into native American parent-child relationships impedes
the ability of the tribe to perpetuate itself, and; ultimately, it
unjustifiably results in a coerced assimilation of the First
Americans into a larger more harmonious society.5'
Well-meaning social workers sometimes seek the removal of
Indian children from their traditional Indian family home be-
cause of what they perceive to be abuse or neglect, when, in
fact, none exists. They simply misunderstand traditional Indian
lifestyles. Justice Kauger provides perhaps the most succinct
explanation of traditional Indian lifestyles:
Indian lifestyles differ markedly from those of the non-Indian
world. Continuing tribal traditions result in a world view and
a concept of group identity which create a culture within a
culture, the values of which generally are unknown, unnot-
iced, or unrecognized by those who are unacquainted with
tribal customs. The significant differences in tribal values
concerning heritage, kinship, concepts of time, scheduling
seasonal activities, geographical location, race, religions, ec-
onomics, language, historicity, sexual mores, and family prac-
tice and structure must be recognized, notwithstanding their
apparent incompatibility with middle class mores.... In the
case of Native Americans, it must be realized that the rela-
tionship of Indian tribes to American society is, and always
has been, an especially unique relationship premised not upon
race, but upon law created by the United States Constitution,
and perpetuated by treaties [albeit more often breached than
honored] between sovereign nations. To those who fear that
a child of mixed blood will not be stamped with the impri-
matur of the dominant society, the answer is, the dominant
society will impact on minority traditions and mores, but the
heritage of the Indian people will not be transmitted and
51. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1072 (Okla. 1985) (Kauger,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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assimilated by its youth in the absence of exposure within the
tribal community.. 2
Hearings were held before the United States Senate Subcom-
mittee on Indian Affairs in 1974 and in 1977, regarding state
juvenile courts' handling of the special needs of Indian children,
their families, and their tribes. Congress recognized the vital
relationship between Indian tribes and their children. Congress
specifically found that there is no resource that is more vital to
the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their
children.53 Congress further found that an alarmingly high per-
centage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often
unwarranted, of their children from them by non-tribal public
and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of
such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes
and institutions.s4
Congress appreciated the culture shock and underlying trauma
in removing a child from an Indian environment and placing
the child in a non-Indian environment.5 Testimony presented to
Congress indicated that misunderstanding of Indian family con-
cepts by state social workers prompted many of the removals . 6
Further, lack of understanding of legal concepts by the Indian
parents resulted in unknowing waiver of rights.57 Congress de-
clared that the policy of the United States is to protect the best
interests of Indian children and promote the stability and security
of Indian tribes and families. This is accompanied by the estab-
lishment of minimum federal standards for the removal of
Indian children from their families and the placement of such
children in foster and adoptive homes which will reflect the
unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance
to Indian tribes in the operation of child and family service
programs. 58 Congress then enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978 (ICWA).59
The Supreme Court of Kansas describes ICWA as "complex
federal legislation."' 6 Yet the statutory language of ICWA is
52. Id. at 1074-75 (emphasis in original; brackets in original).
53. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3).
54. Id. § 1901(4).
55. In re Adoption of D.M.J., 741 P.2d 1386, 1989 (Okla. 1985).
56. H.R. RE. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmw. Naws 7530.
57. Duncan v. Wiley, 657 P.2d 1212, 1213 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982).
58. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
59. Id. §§ 1901-1963.
60. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 174 (Kan. 1982).
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only the beginning. Congress granted the Secretary of the In-
terior authority to promulgate rules and regulations which are
binding on state courts.6 The purpose of the rules and regula-
tions, as with the ICWA itself, is to protect Indian children
from arbitrary removal from their heritage by requiring states
to follow procedures designed to prevent the breakup of Indian
families.62
In addition to ICWA and the Secretary of the Interior's rules
and regulations, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) has prom-
ulgated guidelines for state courts. 63 Unlike ICWA and the rules
and regulations, the BIA guidelines are the Department of In-
terior's interpretation of the federal act, and do not have binding
legislative effect. 64 Indeed, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
held the guidelines are not binding on Oklahoma courts. 65 The
policy of the guidelines is to keep Indian children with their
families, defer to tribal judgment on matters concerning the
custody of tribal children, and to place Indian children who
must be removed from their home within their own families or
Indian tribes. 66
In 1982, the Oklahoma legislature heard testimony regarding
ICWA and concluded that it was necessary to provide supple-
mental procedural safeguards. 67 It did so by enacting the Okla-
homa Indian Child Welfare Act (OICWA).O Its purpose is to
clarify policies and procedures regarding state implementation
of ICWA,6 9 and to cooperate fully with Indian tribes in Okla-
homa to ensure that the intent and provisions of ICWA are
enforced.70 The OICWA applies when the ICWA applies.7' Fi-
nally, in 1984, the Oklahoma Supreme Court promulgated Rule
61. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1952; 25 C.F.R. §§ 13.1-13.6,
23.1-23.93 (1988).
62. 25 C.F.R. § 23.3 (1988).
63. Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg.
67,584-67,595 (1979) [hereinafter Guidelines].
64. Guidelines, supra note 63, at 67,584.
65. In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863, 867 (Okla.. 1988).
66. Guidelines, supra note 63, at A (policy).
67. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1076 (Okla. 1985) (Kauger, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. 1982 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 107, §§ 1-10 (effective Apr. 6, 1982) (now codified
as 10 OKI.A. STAT. §§ 40-40.9 (Supp. 1982)).
69. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 40.1 (Supp. 1982); In re J.W., 742 P.2d 1171, 1172 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1987).
70. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 40.1 (Supp. 1982); In re Adoption of D.M.J., 741 P.2d 1386,
1388 (Okla. 1985).
71. Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d at 1063; D.M.J., 741 P.2d at 1388.
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8.2,72 which requires all relevant final orders to contain a finding
of compliance with the ICWA. Where federal and state law
differ, the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child enjoys
the benefit of the higher standard of protection of either federal
or state law.73
In summary, in order to understand Oklahoma juvenile court
proceedings, especially those involving Indian children, one must
have a working knowledge of the United States Constitution,
the Oklahoma Constitution, ICWA, the Secretary of Interior's
mandatory rules and regulations, the BIA-recommended guide-
lines, the Oklahoma Juvenile Code, OICWA, the general pro-
visions of Title 10 of the Oklahoma Statutes (including the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act), Rules for the District
Courts of Oklahoma, and a plethora of federal and state cases.
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals has recognized the heavy
burden this places on district judges and implicitly on counsel:
"Although the trial court's charge to meld the protections of
the ICWA with those of the state statutes to ensure the maximum
protection to parents and their children is a heavy one, it is
incumbent upon the trial court to provide all constitutional and
statutory protections." 7 4
The Secret World of Juvenile Court Proceedings
The juvenile court process is shrouded in secrecy. All child
abuse records are confidential and are open to inspection only
to persons duly authorized by the Uiiited States or the State of
Oklahoma in connection with the performance of their official
duties.7 1 Children's cases must be heard separately from the trial
of adults.76
Juvenile hearings are private unless specifically ordered by the
court to be conducted in public27 Only persons having a direct
interest in the case are admitted. The transcript of the hearing
72. OKLA. DIsT. CT. R. 8.2.
73. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1921:
In any case where state or federal law applicable to a child custody proceeding under
state or federal law provides a higher standard of protection to the rights of the
parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child than the rights provided under this
subchapter, the state or federal court shall apply the state or federal standard.
74. J.W., 742 P.2d at 1177.
75. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 846(A) (Supp. 1987); 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1109(D) (Supp. 1989).
76. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1111 (1981).
77. Id. However, if the juvenile hearing is conducted in public, what transpires
cannot be subject to prior restraint. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430
U.S. 308, 311 (1977).
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is not open to inspection except by order of the court.78 There
are restrictions on the disclosure of information by foster care
review board members and their staff29 The court's records are
not open to public inspection except by order of the court, and
then only to persons demonstrating a legitimate interest.80 Re-
cords of law enforcement officers on juveniles must be main-
tained separate from arrest records and are not open to public
inspection, nor may their contents by disclosed, except by order
of the court.81 In those counties having juvenile bureaus, all
information obtained in discharge of official duty by any officer
or other employee of the court is privileged, and cannot be
disclosed to anyone other than the judge and those entitled
under the Juvenile Code to receive such information, unless
otherwise ordered by the court.82 Even the published opinions
of the appellate courts of the State of Oklahoma are limited to




Jurisdictional conflicts arise between courts of different
nations, courts of different states, and between state and tribal
courts. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)
is designed to resolve jurisdictional conflicts between courts of
different nations and states." The ICWA is designed to resolve
jurisdictional conflicts between state and tribal courts.8"
The authority of a court to hear and determine a deprived
child proceeding is dependent upon competent jurisdiction. The
elements of competent jurisdiction are: (1) jurisdiction of the
subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties, and (3) juris-
dictional power to pronounce the particular judgment rendered,
78. 10 OLA. STAT. § 1111 (1981).
79. Id. § 1116.4.
80. 10 OCLA. STAT. § 1125 (Supp. 1989).
81. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1127(a) (1981). However, a child's adjudication in juvenile
court may be used to show the bias, if any, of the child should the child be a witness
in any civil or criminal action, either while a child, or after the child has reached the
age of majority. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
82. 10 Ox"A. STAT. § 1203(b) (1981).
83. Id. § 1123.1.
84. Id. § 1601-1627.
85. Id. §§ 40-40.9.
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i.e., the point to be decided must be within the court's power
as defined by statutes and raised by the pleadings. 86
In Oklahoma, the district court has the authority to exercise
jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma.8 7
The Oklahoma Constitution vests original jurisdiction in the
district court.8 Jurisdiction over the subject matter occurs upon
the filing of the petition. 89 Once the district court has obtained
jurisdiction over a deprived child, it may be retained until the
child becomes 18 years of age. 0
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
To avoid jurisdictional conflicts between courts of different
nations and states in matters of child custody, all 50 states and
the District of Columbia have enacted the Uniform Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA).91
The UCCJA is a long-awaited 9 and much-needed device for
resolving a number of troubling problems in the area of domestic
relations. The main problems the UCCJA addresses are child
snatching and multi-state jurisdictional squabbles.9 3 The UCCJA
seeks to resolve these problems primarily by limiting the juris-
diction of courts to act in custody matters.94 The UCCJA has
several purposes:
(1) Avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts
of other states in matters of child custody, which have in the
past resulted in the shifting of children from state to state
86. In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863, 866 n.2 (Okla. 1988); Exparte Lewis, 188 P.2d 367,
369, 85 Okla. Crim. 322, 338 (1948); Isenhower v. Isenhower, 666 P.2d 238, 241 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1983).
87. 12 Ol a.. STAT. § 2004(F) (Supp. 1988).
88. OKRA. CoNsr. art. VII, § 7: "The District Court shall have unlimited original
jurisdiction of all justiciable matters, except as otherwise provided in this article, and
such power of review of administrative action as may be provided by statute .... "
89. 10 Oxa.A. STAT. § 1102(A) (1981): "Upon the filing of a petition, the District
Court shall have jurisdiction of any child who is or is alleged to be... deprived, who
is found within the county." See also N.L., 754 P.2d at 866 n.2.
90. 10 OI=.A. STAT. § 1102(A) (1981). This is referred to as the so-called "maximum
age jurisdiction."
91. 10 OxA. STAT. §§ 1601-1627 (1981). The UCCJA does not apply to purely
intrastate controversies. See Barnett v. Klein, 765 P.2d 777 (Okla. 1988).
92. The Oklahoma Legislature did not adopt the Uniform Child Custody Act until
1980. 1980 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 285, §§ 1-27, (effective Oct. 1, 1980).
93. Holt v. District Court, 626 P.2d 1336, 1340 (Okla. 1981).
94. Id. See also Commissoners Prefatory Note, UN. CmLD CUSTODY JuhusDIcTloN
AcT, 9 U.L.A. 111, 114 (master's ed. 1979).
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1990
16 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
with harmful effects on their well-being;
(2) Promote cooperation with the courts of other states to
the end that a custody decree is rendered in that state which
can best decide the case in the interest of the child;
(3) Assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child
take place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his
family have the closest connection, and where significant
evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and per-
sonal relationships is most readily available, and that courts
of this state decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child
and his family have a closer connection with another state;
(4) Discourage continuing controversies over child custody in
the interest of greater stability of home environment and of
secure family relationships for the child;
(5) Deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children
undertaken to obtain custody awards;
(6) Avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other states and
this state insofar as feasible;
(7) Facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other
states;
(8) Promote and expand the exchange of information and
other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this
state and those of other states concerned with the same child;
and
(9) Make uniform the laws of the states which enact it29
There are four alternative prerequisites for jurisdiction under
the UCCJA. 96 If the requirements of any one of the four are
met, the court has jurisdiction.97 First, in most instances the
proper forum is the "home state" where the child has lived for
the preceding six consecutive months. 98 A second alternative
95. 10 OKRA. STAT. § 1602 (1981).
96. Id. § 1605(A)(1-4).
97. Holt, 626 P.2d at 1341.
98. 10 OgTA. STAT. §1605 (1981) provides:
A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has
jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree
if: (1) this state: (a) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of
the proceeding, or (b) has been the child's home state within six (6) months before
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent'from this state because of
his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other reasons, and
a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this state.
"Home state" is defined in Id. §1604 as:
The state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with his
parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six (6) consecutive
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss1/2
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applies when it is "in the best interests of the child" for the
forum to take jurisdiction.99 There must be a "significant con-
nection" under the second alternative by the presence of at least
one parent and the child within the forum.' ° There must also
be substantial evidence available in that forum concerning the
child's care, protection, training and personal relationships. It
is not necessary for the child to be physically present within the
state.'0' The third alternative jurisdictional basis is where the
child is physically present in this state and the child has been
abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the
child because the child has been subjected to or threatened with
mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or dependent.102
Finally, jurisdiction may be exercised if no other state could or
would assume jurisdiction.0 3
Even if one or more of the four alternative prerequisites to
jurisdiction is satisfied, it may not be proper for the court to
exercise its jurisdiction. The appropriate approach for a court
in determining whether it should exercise jurisdiction is: First,
does the court have jurisdiction under UCCJA, and second, if
so, should the court exercise its jurisdiction?104 The UCCJA sets
forth three grounds, one mandatory and two discretionary, where
a court must or should decline to exercise jurisdiction.
First, the court must decline to exercise jurisdiction if at the
time of the filing of the petition in Oklahoma, a child custody
months, and in the case of a child less than six (6) months old, the state in which
the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. Periods of temporary
absence of any of the name persons are counted as part of the six-month or other
period.
99. 10 Oxu. STAT. § 1605(A)(2) (Supp. 1982).
100. Id. § 1605(A)(2)(a).
101. Roundtree v. Bates, 630 P.2d 1299, 1302 n.15 (Okla. 1981). 10 O.A. STAT. §
1605(A)(2) (1981) provides:
It is in the best interests of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction
because: (a) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have
a significant connection with this state, and (b) there is available in this state
substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training,
and personal relationships ....
102. 10 OuA. STAT. § 1605(A)(3)(a)-(b) (1981).
103. Id. § 1605(A)(4) provides:
(a) It appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites sub-
stantially in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 or 3 of this subsection, or, another
state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more
appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (b) it is in the best
interest of the child that this court assume jurisdiction.
104. Holt, 626 P.2d at 1341.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1990
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 15
proceeding was already pending in the court of another state,
properly exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with
the UCCJA. 105 Second, the court may, in its discretion, decline
to hear the case on the equitable grounds of forum non con-
veniens.10 Third, the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction
under the equity doctrine of "unclean hands" where the peti-
tioner has snatched the child, improperly retained custody after
visitation, or engaged in other reprehensible conduct. 10 7
Jurisdiction Under the ICWA
The determination of whether a state court or tribal
court has jurisdiction over an "Indian child"' 08 is governed by
ICWA.'°9 Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the
Indian tribe retains exclusive jurisdiction over the child, regard-
less of the child's residence or domicile." 0
105. 10 O.. STAT. § 1608(A) (Supp. 1982), provides:
A court of this state shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this act if at the time
of the filing of the petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was
pending in a court of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity
with this Act, unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state because
this state is a more appropriate forum or for other reasons.
106. 10 OaA. STAT. § 1609 (1981). The district court may decline to exercise its
jurisdiction if it finds that it is "an inconvenient forum to make a custody determination
under the circumstances of the case and that the court of another state is a more
appropriate forum." Section 1609(C) provides five factors for the court's consideration
in determining whether to invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Section 1609(D)
requires the Oklahoma district courts to communicate with the courts of its sister states
to determine which state should exercise jurisdiction.
107. Holt, 626 P.2d at 1341. 10 O.A. STAT. § 1610 (1981) provides:
(A) If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the chid from another
state or has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct, the court may decline to
exercise jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the circumstances.
(B) Unless required in the interests of the child, the court shall not exercise its
jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner, without
consent of the person entitled to custody, has improperly removed the child from
the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has improperly retained
the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of physical custody. If the
petitioner has violated any other provision of a custody decree of another state, the
court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the
circumstances.
108. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) defines an Indian child
as "fa]ny unmarried person who is under age 18 and is either (a) a member of an
Indian tribe, or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe."
109. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.
110. Id.
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The ICWA does not divest state courts of their jurisdiction
over children of Indian descent living off the reservation."' If
the Indian child neither resides nor is domiciled within the Indian
tribe's reservation and is not a ward of the tribal court, the
state court exercises concurrent jurisdiction. In contrast to the
UCCJA's discretionary declination of jurisdiction, the ICWA
forbids state courts fron exercising jurisdiction where the peti-
tioner has "unclean hands."1 12 Title 25 U.S.C. § 1920 provides
that where a petitioner in an Indian child custody proceeding in
a state court has improperly removed the child from the custody
of the child's parents or Indian custodian, or has improperly
retained custody after a visit or other temporary relinquishment
of custody, the state court has a mandatory duty to decline
jurisdiction and must return the Indian child to a parent or
Indian custodian, unless the return of the child would subject
the child to a substantial and immediate danger or threat of
danger." 3
Due Process
Before a court can exercise personal jurisdiction, due process
demands that a method of notification be used which is reason-
ably calculated to provide knowledge of the proposed exercise
of jurisdiction and an opportunity to be heard. 14 Further, due
process ordinarily demands that the party have sufficient mini-
mum contacts with the forum state so that traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice are not violated."$ However,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the status of a child
vis-a-vis the child's parents is a proper subject for exercise of
111. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AnmI. NEws, 7530, 7541. Indeed, Congress intended the Indian Child Welfare
Act to establish minimum procedural standards for state courts handling child custody
proceedings involving Indian children. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Lewis, 77 F.2d
587, 591 n.4 (10th Cir. 1985). The United States Supreme Court has recently addressed
exclusive tribal jurisdiction when Indian children are domiciled in Indian Country. See
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989). The Court
found that an Indian child's domicile is the same as the domicile of its parents. As the
children were therefore domiciled on the reservation of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians, the state court was without jurisdiction to enter an adoption decree.
112. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1920.
113. Guidelines, supra note 63, at B.8 (improper removal from custody and accom-
panying commentary).
114. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950);
Dana P. v. State, 656 P.2d 253, 255 (Okla. 1982); Bomford v. Socony Mobil Oil Co.,
440 P.2d 713, 718 (Okla. 1968).
115. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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jurisdiction by the court of the child's domicile." 6 Therefore,
personal jurisdiction over a noncustodial parent is not deemed
necessary for the state's pursuit of its interests in the child.7
Overview of Juvenile Code Deprived Child Proceedings
Before proceeding with a detailed analysis of each stage of a
deprived child proceeding, it may be helpful to survey the
juvenile court process. First, all contests instituted under the
Juvenile Code must be screened to determine whether the inter-
ests of the public or child require that court action be taken ."8
The purpose of this screening is to determine whether a deprived
child petition should be filed." 9 If formal court action is nec-
essary, a verified petition is filed 20 and the court's jurisdiction
is invoked.'2' In an emergency, the court may make a summary
determination of the child's custody pendente lite (pending the
suit).12 Summons are issued,'23 and the court conducts an ad-
judicatoriy hearing to determine whether the allegations of the
deprived child petition are supported by the evidence, and whether
the child should be adjudged "deprived" and made a ward of
the court. 24 The Rules of Evidence apply.' z A jury trial may
be demanded. 2 6 If the child is adjudged "deprived"' 27 and made
a ward of the court'2, a "dispositional hearing" is held to
determine what disposition ought to be made of the child. 29
The strict Rules of Evidence do not apply at the dispositional
hearing. All evidence helpful in determining the proper dispo-
sition best serving the interests of the child may be admitted 3 0
In certain extreme cases, the court may hold a hearing to
determine whether parental rights should be terminated.' Ter-
mination goes beyond mere disposition of an adjudicated child.
116. In re Adoption of J.L.H., 737 P.2d 915, 918 n.8 (Okla. 1987).
117. Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Okla. 1985).
118. 10 OiLA. STAT. § 1101(10) (Supp. 1988).
119. Id.
120. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1103(B) (Supp. 1982).
121. 10 OxrA. STAT. § 1102(A) (1981).
122. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1107.1 (Supp. 1988).
123. Id. § 1104.
124. Id. § 1101(8).
125. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 111 (1981).
126. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1110 (Supp. 1986).
127. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1101(4) (Supp. 1988).
128. 10 OxiA. STAT. § 1114 (Supp. 1986).
129. 10 OdA. STAT. § 1101(9) (Supp. 1988).
130. 10 OK.A. STAT. § 1115 (1981).
131. 10 OLA. STAT. § 1130 (Supp. 1987).
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A termination hearing is itself an adjudication which results in
absolute and permanent termination of all a parent's natural
and legal rights to a child.3 2 The child is then freed for pro-
spective adoption. 3 3
Preliminary Inquiry: Screening the Case to Determine
Whether Formal Court Action is Necessary
Not every report of suspected child abtise or neglect results
in formal court adjudication. There is a screening process, called
"preliminary inquiry" or "intake ' '3 4 that determines whether
the filing of a petition is necessary. Preliminary inquiry is a
mandatory, pre-adjudicatory interview of the child and, if avail-
able, the child's parents, legal guardian, or other custodian. 35
Its purpose is to determine: (1) whether the child is deprived;
(2) whether nonadjudicatory alternatives are available and ap-
propriate; and (3) whether the filing of a petition is necessary.'3 6
The Juvenile Code authorizes the court to designate who shall
make the preliminary inquiry.' 37 Under Oklahoma Senate Joint
Resolution 13,'1s the Oklahoma Department of Human Services
provides intake services for the district courts of every county
except those counties with duly constituted juvenile bureaus.3 9
132. 10 OLA. STAT. § 1132 (1981).
133. Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1112 (Okla. 1985).
134. 10 OaA. STAT. § 1101(10) (Supp. 1988).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 10 OxLA. STAT. § 1103(A) (Supp. 1982).
138. S.J. Res. 13, 35th Leg., 1975 Okla. Sess. Laws 760-61.
139. 10 OKra. STAT. § 1103(A) (Supp. 1982) provides in relevant part that where
intake is to be provided by the DHS under contract with the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
or under the provision of rules issues by the Supreme Court, the preliminary inquiry
shall follow the uniform contractual procedures as agreed to by the Supreme Court and
the DHS. See Okla. Sup. Ct. & Dep't of Human Servs. Intake, Probation and Parole
Guideline, Jan. 1983 (published in accordance with 10 OKLA. STAT. § 602(1), (3) (1981)).
See also 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1141 (1981) ("Intake, Probation and Parole Services Provided
by DHS"). For counties with juvenile bureaus, see id. § 1204 ("Investigations and
Reports"). Compare Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1108-09, where the Oklahoma
Supreme Court states, in dicta, that judges must determine whether an informal ad-
justment or diversion is preferable to the institution of juvenile proceedings: "All contests
instituted under the [Juvenile] Code must first be judicially examined or 'screened' for
'intake' before they are allowed to proceed. The court, sitting in the administration of
the so-called juvenile process, functions as the legally trained discretionary authority
charged with the duty of balancing societal interests with those of the child." In making
that statement, the Oklahoma Supreme Court relied on a 1977 decision of the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals, State v. Juvenile Division, Tulsa County District Court,
560 P.2d 974, 975-76 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977). At that time, section 1103(A) required
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If it is determined that no further action need be taken, the
person making the preliminary inquiry, or the court, may make
such informal adjustment as is practicable without a petition. 140
The Deprived Child Petition
If an informal adjustment is not practicable, a petition is
filed. Historically, in Oklahoma, any reputable person who knew
a child in the county who appeared to be dependent or neglected
was authorized to file a petition. 14' By judicial construction, the
county attorney was placed in charge of prosecuting the case as
dominus litis (master of the suit).142
The statutes were amended in 1968 to expressly limit the role
of private individuals in initiating proceedings by requiring in
each case a preliminary judicial inquiry to determine whether
forensic action was warranted. Only by leave of court was a
private individual then permitted to file a petition. 43 The county
attorney (now district attorney) was still charged with the duty
of preparing and prosecuting the case.'"*
In 1977 the direct participatory role of private individuals was
completely eliminated when the legislature again amended the
Juvenile Code. 41 It now provides that only the district attorney
or the person who is authorized to make the preliminary inquiry
may file a petition.'" Regardless of whether the petition is filed
the court to make the preliminary inquiry, and further required the court to authorize
the filing of a juvenile petition. See 10 OLA. STAT. § 1103(A) (Supp. 1976). Section
1103 was amended after the Court of Criminal Appeals decision. See 1977 Okla. Sess.
Laws ch. 259, § 3 (effective Oct. 1, 1977). Apparently the Oklahoma Supreme Court
did not realize the statute had been amended.
140. 10 OxiA. STAT. § I103(A) (Supp. 1982).
141. 1909 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 14 at 187; 10 OKuA. STAT. § 105 (1961).
142. Exparte Lewis, 85 Okla. Crim. 322, 188 P.2d 367, 380 (1948); Davis, 708 P.2d
at 1107, n.23.
143. 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 282, § 103 (effective Jan. 13, 1969) (codified as 10
OKLA. STAT. § 1103(A) (Supp. 1988)); Davis, 708 P.2d at 1107, n.23.
144. 10 OK.A. STAT. § 1109(C) (Supp. 1986); Davis, 708 P.2d at 1107, n.23.
145. 1977 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 259, § 3 (now codified as 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1103(B)
(Supp. 1982)); Davis, 708 P.2d at 1107, n.23. In 1977 the legislature expressly authorized
employees of a duly constituted juvenile bureau to prepare and file cases. 1977 Okla.
Sess. Laws ch. 259, § 10 (effective Oct. 1, 1977). The legislature withdrew that author-
ization in 1979. See 1979 Okla. Sss. Laws ch. 257, § 3 (no Department of Human
Services employee is authorized to file a juvenile petition or sign as petitioner, but may
verify the petition).
146. Compare Davis, 708 P.2d at 1107, where the Oklahoma Supreme Court states
in dicta that only the public prosecutor has standing to bring cases under the terms of
the Juvenile Code. Apparently the court was unaware of sections 1103(B) and 1141.
However, the Intake, Probation and Parole Guidelines prohibit any DHS employee
from filing a petition, although they are authorized to verify petitions.
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by the district attorney or the person who is authorized to make
the preliminary inquiry, it is clearly the responsibility of the
district attorney to prepare and prosecute any deprived child
proceeding.147
The petition must conform to certain statutory require-
ments.'48 Since deprived child proceedings are public law, the
private-suit style is procedurally foreign to contests authorized
under the Juvenile Code. Lawsuits involving private parties are
typically captioned in the adversarial alignment, that is, plaintiff
v. defendant. The Juvenile Code 49 directs that the petition be
entitled "In the matter of (name of child), an alleged deprived
child.' ' 50 The petition must be verified and may be made upon
information and belief. 51 It must set forth: (1) with particularity,
facts demonstrating that the child is a deprived child; (2) the
name, age, and residence of the child; (3) the names and resid-
ences of the child's parents; (4) the name and residence of the
child's legal guardian, if there is one; (5) the name and residence
of the person or persons having custody or control of the child;
(6) the name and residence of the nearest known relative, if no
parent or guardian can be found; and (7) the relief requested. 52
If termination of parental rights is sought, it must be stated in
the petition and summons.1 13 If an order for the payment of
funds for the care and maintenance of the child is sought, it
must also be stated in the petition and summons.'5 4 If any of
the above facts are not known to the petitioner, the petition
must so state, along with the reasons why the facts are not
known.'55
The petitioner must also include in its initial pleading (or in
an affidavit attached to the pleading) specific information con-
cerning the UCCJA.'. 6 The petitioner must disclose the child's
present address, the places where the child has lived within the
147. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1109(E) (Supp. 1986).
148. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1103(B) (Supp. 1982).
149. Id.
150. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1107.
151. 10 OKLA. STAT. §1103(B) (Supp. 1982).
152. Id.
153. If termination of parental rights is requested in the petition, the issue of
termination must be deferred until after the initial petition to determine the child's
deprived status has been adjudicated if the grounds for termination are 10 OKLA. STAT.
§ 1130(A) 3, 7, or 8 (Supp. 1987). See In re R.J.W., 789 P.2d 233 (Okla. 1990). Davis,
708 P.2d at 1106; In re J.L., 578 P.2d 349, 351 (Okla. 1978).
154. 10 OKLA. STAT. §1103(B) (Supp. 1982).
155. Id.
156. 10 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1601-1627 (1981).
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last five years, and the names and present addtesses of the
persons with whom the child has lived during that period. 5 7
The petitioner must also disclose: (1) whether the petitioner has
participated, as a party, witness, or in any other capacity, in
any other litigation concerning the custody of the child in this
or any other state; (2) whether the petitioner has information
of any custody proceeding concerning the child pending in a
court of this state or any other state; and (3) whether the
petitioner knows of any person not a party to the proceedings
who has physical custody of the child or claims to have custody
or visitation rights with respect to the child.' The court may
require the petitioner to provide additional information under
oath. 5 9 Finally, the petitioner has a continuing duty to inform
the court of any custody proceedings concerning the child in
this or any other state of which the petitioner obtains infor-
mation during the juvenile court proceedings. 16°
"Custody proceeding," as that term is used in the UCCJA,
includes child neglect or dependency proceedings.16' Child neglect
or dependency proceedings are referred to in the Juvenile Code
as "deprived child proceedings.'162
Filing the petition invokes the jurisdiction of the district court
over any child alleged to be deprived who is found within the
county, and of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the
child, regardless of where the parent, guardian, or legal custo-
dian is found. 63 Personal jurisdiction over a noncustodial parent
is not deemed necessary for the state's pursuit of its interests in
the child.'6
Emergency Proceedings
In an emergency, it may be necessary to immediately remove
the child from the home to protect the child from abuse even
before a petition is filed. Unfortunately, the Juvenile Code
contains no precise statutory procedure on how the child is to
be removed from the home. Instead, only scattered sections of
the Juvenile Code provide a suggestion of what is to be done.
157. Id. § 1611(A).
158. Id.
159. Id. § 1611(B).
160. Id. § 1611(C).
161. Id. § 1604(3).
162. 10 OKLRA. STAT. § 1101(4) (Supp. 1988).
163. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1102(A) (1981).
164. Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Okla. 1985).
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When the Oklahoma Department of Human Services receives
a report of suspected child abuse, the county office where the
child lives must investigate that report. 165 If the child appears
to be in danger, the DHS social worker contacts the police,
who have the authority to immediately take the child into
custody if the child's surroundings endanger his or her wel-
fare. 66 If a police officer takes a child into protective custody,
the officer must immediately report the fact of the child's
detention to a judge of the district court in the county in which
the child was taken into custody. 167 The social worker may also
contact the district attorney requesting that a motion be made
to a judge for an emergency order to take the child into
protective custody.
If taken into protective custody, the child cannot be detained
beyond the next judicial day unless the court so orders after a
detention hearing to determine if there exists probable cause
to detain the child for the child's own protection.
The parents or guardian of the child are entitled to a "show
cause" hearing within 48 hours after the child is taken into
custody. 68 Its purpose is to give the parents an immediate post-
deprivation hearing where the State must justify why the child
was taken into custody and why custody should not be re-
manded to the parents.169 The parents may present evidence
that the child is not deprived and that the emergency removal
was improvident. The rules of evidence do not apply to juvenile
emergency "show cause" hearings. 7 0
165. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 846(A) (Supp. 1987).
166. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1107(C) (Supp. 1982).
167. Id.
168. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1104.1(C) (Supp. 1984).
169. The constitutional imperative of an immediate post-deprivation hearing was
made clear in York v. Halley, 534 P.2d 363 (Okla. 1975) where the district court
removed children from their home based upon an ex parte order. The parents requested
a "show cause" hearing, but the request was denied by the trial judge. The parents
suffered the removal of their children from their home and custody for a period of two
months without a meaningful hearing at which they could present testimony and evidence
to support their position that the allegations of the deprived child petition were untrue,
and that the order for removal was issued improvidently. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
held that the failure of the trial court to schedule a hearing for almost two months
after depriving the parents of the custody of their children was an impediment to the
continuance of the parent-child relationship, and an unconstitutional denial of due
process.
170. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2103(B) (Supp. 1986) provides: "The rules set forth in this
Code [sections 2101-3103 of the Evidence Code], except those that relate to privileges,
do not apply in ... juvenile emergency show cause hearings."
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Under the UCCJA, the district courts of Oklahoma possess
"emergency jurisdiction" over any child who is physically pres-
ent in this state if the child has been abandoned, or if it is
necessary to protect the child because of real or threatened
abuse or the child is otherwise deprived.' 7 ' The emergency
jurisdiction provision of the UCCJA is reserved for extraor-
dinary circumstances. 72 While the emergency jurisdiction pro-
vision must not be abused, the provision is vital because it
reaffirms the state's parens patriae responsibility for children
in need of immediate protection. 73 If a genuine emergency
exists, there should be evidence demonstrating the gravity of
the situation, such as medical reports, or professional testimony
from doctors, nurses, police officers or social workers. 174
Ordinarily, the due process clauses of the United States and
Oklahoma Constitutions mandate that a person must be af-
forded an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of a
protected interest. 75 In the parent-child context, due process
ordinarily demands that the parent be afforded a hearing before
the state interferes with the parent's constitutionally protected
interest in the care, custody, control, and companionship of
the child. However, due process is a flexible concept and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular facts and
circumstances demand. 76
The United States Supreme Court recognizes that there are
extraordinary situations in which a valid governmental interest
171. 10 OxLA. STAT. § 1605(A) (Supp. 1982): "A court of this state which is
competent to decide child custody has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination
by initial or modification decree if ... (3) the child is physically present in this state,
and: (a) the child has been abandoned, or (b) it is necessary in an emergency to protect
the child because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse,
or is otherwise neglected or dependent."
172. Holt v. District Court, 626 P.2d 1336, 1345 (Okla. 1981).
173. Id. The Oklahoma Supreme Court cited with approval Professor Brigitte Bod-
enheimer, the reporter for the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, concerning this
provision: "This exceptional jurisdiction exists in very few cases. Naturally, there will
be attempts to circumvent the Act by 'shouting fire' in every conceivable situation.
Emergency jurisdiction must be denied, however, when it is invoked as a pretext in
order to reopen a custody controversy. Unless judges and attorneys are constantly alert
to the dangers inherent in misuses of emergency jurisdiction to circumvent the Act, the
exception could tear such a large hole in the Act that custody decrees made in one state
would again be relitigated in other states; and the interstate chaos that the act was
intended to remedy could be revised and perhaps intensified." See Commissioners Note,
UNEt. CHID CUSTODY JURsDICSTION AcT § 3, 9 U.L.A. 123, 124 (master's ed. 1979).
174. Roberts v. District Court of Larimer Cty., 596 P.2d 65, 68 n.1 (Colo. 1979)
(en banc).
175. U.S. CoNs-. amend. XIV, § 1; OKLA. CoNST. art. II, § 7.
176. Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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is at stake that justify postponing a hearing until after an
event. 177 In an emergency removal from the home, the "valid
governmental interest" is the interest of the child in a whole-
some environment free from abuse and neglect:178
The interest of children in a wholesome environment has a
constitutional dimension no less compelling than that the
parents have in the preservation of family integrity. In the
hierarchy of constitutionally protected values both interests
rank as fundamental, and must hence be shielded with equal
vigor and solicitude. 179
Therefore, it is constitutionally permissible, in an emergency,
to remove an endangered child from the home if the parents
are afforded an immediate post-deprivation hearing.
The police may immediately take into protective custody any
child whose surroundings are such as to endanger the child's
welfare.18 0 The police officer who takes the child must imme-
diately report the child's detention to a judge of the district
court in the county where the child was taken into custody.18'
In certain limited circumstances, the police officer has the au-
thority to authorized medical examination and treatment of the
child. 82
177. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 848 (1977) (quoting
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972), and Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
178. In re T.H.L., 636 P.2d 330, 334 (Okla. 1981).
179. In re Jerry L., 662 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Okla. 1983).
180. 10 Ox.A. STAT. § 1107(C) (Supp. 1982):
Nothing in Ch. 51 of this title [the Juvenile Code] shall be construed as forbidding
any peace officer or any employee of the court from immediately taking into custody
any child who is found violating any law or ordinance, or whose surroundings are
such as to endanger his welfare, or who is willfully and voluntarily absent from his
home without the consent of his parent or guardian or legal custodian, for a
substantial length of time or without intent to return ....
181. Id.:
In every such case the officer or employee taking the child into custody shall
immediately report the fact of his detention to a judge of the district court in the
county in which the child was taken into custody. If no judge is available locally,
then the detention shall be reported immediately to the presiding judge of the judicial
administrative district; but if the later cannot be reached, then any judge regularly
serving within the judicial administrative district, and the case shall then proceed
with as provided in Ch. 51 of this title [the Juvenile Code] ....
182. Id. § 1107(D):
When any child is taken into custody pursuant to this title [Title 10] and it reasonably
appears to the peace officer or employee of the court that the child is in need of
medical treatment to preserve his health, any peace officer or any employee of the
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The court's authority to issue an immediate detention order
or warrant authorizing the child to be taken into custody is
scattered among four sections of the Juvenile Code. First, section
1104 provides that if it appears the child is in such condition
or surroundings, and that the child's welfare requires custody
be immediately assumed by the court, the court may immediately
issue a detention order or warrant authorizing the taking of the
child into custody.'83 Second, section 1106 provides that in any
case where it appears the child should be taken into immediate
custody by the court, a warrant may be issued against the parent
or guardian or against the child.'" Third, section 1130(B) states
in relevant part: "Nothing contained herein shall prevent a court
from immediately assuming custody of a child and ordering
whatever action may be necessary, including medical treatment,
to protect his health or welfare." ' s Finally, section 1131(A)
provides in relevant part: "Nothing in this section shall prevent
a court from immediately taking custody of a child and ordering
whatever action may be necessary to protect his health or wel-
fare." 8 6
If the court orders the emergency removal of a child, it must
make a specific finding that the continuation of the child at the
home is contrary to the child's welfare. The court must also
make a finding whether the absence of efforts to prevent removal
of the child is reasonable under the circumstances if such re-
moval is due to an alleged emergency and is for the purpose of
providing for the safety of the child.'1 The court may also order
medical treatment to protect the child's health or welfare. 88
court shall have the authority to authorize medical examination and medical treatment
for any child found to be in need of medical treatment as diagnosed by a competent
medical authority in the absence of a parent or guardian who is competent to
authorize medical treatment. The officer or the employee of the court shall authorize
said medical treatment only after exercising due diligence to locate the parent,
guardian or other person legally competent to authorize said medical treatment. The
parent, guardian or custodian of the child shall be responsible for such medical
expenses as ordered by the court. No peace officer or employee of the court
authorizing such treatment in accordance with the provisions of this section for any
child found in need of such medical treatment shall have any liability, civil or
criminal, for giving such authorization.
183. 10 OxRA. StAT. § 1104(D) (Supp. 1988).
184. 10 Oi-At. STAT. § 1106 (1981).
185. 10 OxcaA. STAT. § 1130(B) (Supp. 1987).
186. 10 OKmA. STAT. § 1131(A) (Supp. 1986).
187. 10 OmA. STAT. § 1104.1(D)(2) (Supp. 1984).
188. 10 OraA. STAT. § 1105 (1981); 10 QcLA. STAT. § 1130(B) (Supp. 1987).
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The child cannot be detained in protective custody beyond
the next judicial day unless the court holds a detention hearing
and determines that probable cause exists to detain the child.'8 9
The child is detained only if detention is necessary to assure the
appearance of the child in court or for the protection of the
child or the public.19
A child taken into custody as a deprived child must be taken
to a shelter, hospital, foster home or other appropriate place
designated by the court.19' The child may also be taken imme-
diately before a judge to obtain a temporary order for protective
custody.' 92 The child cannot be confined in any jail, adult lockup
or adult detention facility, nor can the child be placed in a
juvenile detention facility or in secured detention. 93 The child
must be placed In shelter care or foster care, or be released to
the custody of parents or another responsible party.'1
If a child is taken into custody before a petition is filed, the
petition must be filed and summons issued within five judicial
days. 195 Otherwise the child must be returned to the child's
parent, guardian, or legal custodian. 196 However, if a child is
taken into custody upon allegations of cruelty on the part of a
parent, guardian or legal custodian, the petition must be filed
in a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty days.'97
Emergency Removal of an Indian Child
State courts have no authority to issue an order for the
emergency removal of an Indian child from the child's reser-
vation. The tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over any child custody
proceeding involving an Indian child within the tribe's reserva-
tion. 98 However, if the Indian child is temporarily located off
189. 10 OLA. STAT. § 1107(C) (Supp. 1982).
190. Id. § 1107.1(A).
191. Id. § 1107(B).
192. Id.
193. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1107.1 (Supp. 1988).
194. Id. §§ 1107.1(A)(2)-(3); 1107.1(B).
195. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1104.1(A) (Supp. 1984).
196. Id.
197. Id. § 1104.1(B).
198. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a):
An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child
custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the
reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the
State by existing Federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the
Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or
domicile of the child.
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the reservation, the state court has authority to issue an emer-
gency order removing the child from a parent or Indian custo-
dian in order to prevent imminent physical harm to the child.' 99
The OICWA requires that if the state court authorizes the
emergency removal of an Indian child from a parent or Indian
custodian, the order must be accompanied by an affidavit con-
taining information about the parent's offending conduct that
has caused the child's removal.2
The information contained in the affidavit, which must in-
clude a specific and detailed account of the circumstances leading
to removal of the child, is the first notice parents ordinarily
receive of the grounds for the impending juvenile proceeding.
The affidavit's importance is made clear, when, as is often the
case, the emergency order is obtained in an ex parte proceed-
ing.201 The state authority, official or agency involved in remov-
199. Id. § 1922:
Nothing in this subchapter [Indian Child Welfare Act] shall be construed to prevent
the emergency removal of an Indian child who is a resident of or domiciled on a
reservation, but temporarily located off the reservation, from his parent or Indian
custodian or the emergency placement of such child in a foster home or institution,
under applicable State law, in order to prevent imminent physical damage or harm
to the cild ....
200. In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863, 872 (Okla. 1988) (Opala, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Section 40.5 of the OICWA provides:
A. When a court order authorizes the emergency removal of an Indian child from
the parent or Indian custodian of said child in accordance with 25 U.S.C. § 1922,
the order shall be accompanied by an affidavit containing the following information:
1. The names, tribal affiliations, and addresses of the Indian child, the
parents of the Indian child, and Indian custodians, if any;
2. A specific and detailed account of the circumstances that led the agency
responsible for the removal of the child to take that action; and
3. A statement of the specific actions that have been taken to assist the
parents or Indian custodian so that the child may safely be returned to
their custody.
10 OxLA. STAT. § 40.5(A).
201. N.L., 754 P.2d at 873. Guideline B.7 suggests that whenever an Indian child
is removed from the physical custody of the child's parents or Indian custodians pursuant
to the emergency removal or custody provisions of state law, the agency responsible for
the removal action shall immediately cause an inquiry to be made as to the residence
and domicile of the child. When a court order authorizing continued emergency physical
custody is sought, the petition for that order should be accompanied by an affidavit
containing the following information: the name, age and last known address of the
Indian child; the name and address of the child's parents and Indian custodians, if any.
If such persons are unknown, a detailed explanation of what efforts have been made
to locate them should be included; facts necessary to determine the residence and the
domicile of the Indian child and whether either the residence or domicile is on an Indian
reservation. If either the residence or domicile is believed to be on an Indian reservation,
the name of the reservation shall be stated; the tribal affiliation of the child and of the
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ing the child from the home must ensure that the emergency
removal or placement terminates immediately when the removal
or placement is no longer necessary to prevent imminent physical
harm to the child, and must expeditiously initiate a child custody
proceeding subject to the provisions of ICWA, transfer the child
parent and/or Indian custodians; a specific and detailed account of the circumstances
that led the agency responsible for the emergency removal of the child to take that
action; if the child is believed to reside or be domiciled on a reservation whether the
tribe exercises exclusive jurisdiction over child custody matters, a statement of efforts
that have been made and are being made to transfer the child to the tribe's jurisdiction;
and finally, a statement of the specific actions that have been taken to assist the parents
or Indian custodian so the child may safely be returned to their custody. If the Indian
child is not restored to the parents or Indian custodian, or jurisdiction is not transferred
to the tribe, the agency responsible for the child's removal must promptly commence a
state court proceeding for foster care placement. If the child resides or is domiciled on
a reservation where the tribe exercises exclusive jurisdiction over child custody matters,
such placement must terminate as soon as the imminent physical damage or harm to
the child which resulted in the emergency removal no longer exists, or as soon as the
tribe exercises jurisdiction over the case - whichever is earlier. Absent extraordinary
circumstances, the Guidelines recommend that temporary emergency custody shall not
be continued for more than 90 days without a determination by the court, supported
by clear and convincing evidence, and the testimony of at least one qualified expert
witness, that custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result
in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. Guidelines, supra note 63, at
67,589-90. The commentary to B.7 suggests that since jurisdiction under the ICWA is
based on domicile and residence, rather than simple presence, there may be instances
in which action must be taken with respect to a child who is physically located off the
reservation, but is subject to exclusive tribal jurisdiction. In such instances the tribe will
usually not be able to take swift action to exercise its jurisdiction. For that reason
Congress authorizea the states to take temporary emergency action. Since emergency
action must be taken without the careful advance deliberation normally required,
procedures must be established to assure that the emergency actions are quickly subjected
to review. Section 1922 of the ICWA provides procedures for prompt review of such
emergency actions. It presumes the state already has such review procedures that shall
be followed in cases involving Indian children. The legislative history clearly states that
placements under such emergency procedures are to be as short as possible. If the
emergency ends, the placement shall end. State action shall also end as soon as the
tribe is ready to take over the case. Subsection (d) refers primarily to the period between
when the petition is filed and when the trial court xenders its decision. The ICWA
requires that, except for emergencies, Indian children are not to be removed from their
parents unless a court finds clear and convincing evidence that the child would be in
serious danger unless removed from the home. Unless there is some kind of time limit
on the length of an "emergency removal" (that is, any removal not made pursuant to
a finding by the court that there is clear and convincing evidence that continued parental
custody would make serious physical or emotional harm likely), the safeguards of the
act could be evaded by use of long-term emergency removals. Subsection (d) recommends
what is, in effect, a speedy trial requirement. The courts shall be required to comply
with the requirements of the ICWA and reach a decision within 90 days unless there
are "extraordinary circumstances" that make additional delay unavoidable.
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to the jurisdiction of the appropriate Indian tribe, or restore the
child to the parent or Indian custodian.20
The OICWA further mandates what is, in effect, a speedy
trial requirement. 203 No pre-adjudicatory custody order can re-
main in force for more than thirty days without a determination
by the court, supported by clear and convincing evidence and
the testimony of at least one qualified expert witness, that
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely
to result in serious emotional or physical harm to the child. 2 4
The court may, for good cause shown, extend the effective
period of the order for an additional sixty days.205
The purpose of the expert testimony is to provide the court
with knowledge of the social and cultural aspects of Indian life
to diminish the risk of cultural bias.206 The Guidelines for State
Courts provide that professional people with substantial educa-
tion and experience in the area of their specialty may be qualified
expert witnesses." The Oklahoma Supreme Court has placed a
judicial gloss on the meaning of "a qualified expert witness,"
holding that where cultural bias is clearly not implicated, expert
witnesses who do not possess special knowledge of Indian life
may provide the necessary proof that continued custody of the
child by the parent will result in serious emotional or physical
harm to the child.m In the event the trial court errs and mis-
applies section 1922 of the ICWA or section 40.5 of the OICWA,
such misapplication may not defeat the jurisdiction of the trial
court.
2 09
Oklahoma's district courts are empowered to assume jurisdic-
tion where an emergency exists and a child may be endangered. 210
Further, the court has the duty to take evidence on the issue of
abuse to determine whether it should assume emergency juris-
diction. 21' After determining that it has jurisdiction, the court
must then decide whether to exercise jurisdiction. 2 2 This multi-
202. Indian Child welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1922.
203. 10 OiaA. STAT. § 40.5(B) (Supp. 1982).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863, 867 (Okla. 1988) (quoting State ex rel. Juvenile
Department v. Tucker, 76 Or. App. 673, 710 P.2d 793, 799 (1985)).
207. Guidelines, supra note 63, at D.4(b)(iii) (qualified expert witnesses).
208. N.L., 754 P.2d at 868.
209. Id. at 866.
210. 10 OKA. STAT. § 1605(A)(3)(b) (1981).
211. Holt v. District Court, 626 P.2d 1336, 1345-46 (Okla. 1981); Makers v. Makers,
645 P.2d 1039, 1040 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982).
212. Smith v. Smith, 40 Or. App. 257, 594 P.2d 1292, 1294 (1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss1/2
No. 1] PROTECTING ABUSED CHILDREN 33
step approach is endorsed by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
213
After the petition has been filed, the district court has the
authority to issue any temporary order or grant any interlocutory
relief authorized by the Juvenile Code, even if another district
court within the state has jurisdiction of the child, or has
jurisdiction to determine the custody or support of the child. 214
After the petition is filed, the court may order the child to
be examined and evaluated by a physician or qualified mental
health professional to aid the court in making a proper dispo-
sition.215 In an emergency, the court may cause the child to be
placed in a public hospital or institution for treatment or special
care, or in a private hospital or institution which will receive
the child for treatment or special care and consent to emergency
treatment or surgery. 216 If the child appears to be in need of
nursing, medical or surgical care, the court may order the parent
or other person responsible for the child to provide it. If the
parent or other person does not provide such care, the court
may, after due notice, enter an order that the care be provided.
When approved by the court, expenses are a charge upon the
county, but the court may adjudge that the person having the
duty under the law to support the child pay part or all of the
expense of such care. 217
The OICWA requires that if an Indian child is removed from
the home, the state court must follow placement preferences
specified in the ICWA.2 18 Section 1915 of the ICWA mandates
presumptive placement priorities for Indian children among In-
dians. 219 An Indian child removed from home based on an
emergency must be placed in the least restrictive setting which
most approximates a family, and in which the child's special
needs, if any, may be met. The child must also be placed within
reasonable proximity of the home, taking into account any
special needs of the child. A preference is given, in the absence
of "good cause to the contrary," to placing the child with:
(i) a member of the Indian child's extended family;
(i) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the
213. Holt, 626 P.2d at 1341. The policy considerations which the court must take
into account when deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction are stated in 10 OrA. STAT.
§ 1609 (Supp. 1981).
214. 10 OY,.A. STAT. § 1102(B) (1981).
215. 10 Og-A. STAT. § 1120(A) (Supp. 1986).
216. Id. § 1120(C).
217. Id.
218. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 40.6 (Supp. 1982).
219. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1915.
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Indian child's tribe;
(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an au-
thorized non-Indian licensing authority; or
(iv) an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe
or operated by an Indian organization which has a program
suitable to meet the Indian child's special needs. 0
The child's tribe has the option of modifying the presumptive
placement priorities and establishing a different order of pref-
erence.22' The standards applied in meeting the placement pref-
erence requirements are the prevailing social and cultural
standards of the Indian community in which the parent or
extended family members maintain social and cultural ties.2
The state is required to maintain records of each such place-
ment.
A finding of "good cause to the contrary" is predicated upon
the court's consideration of the presumptive placement priori-
ties.224 The "good cause" exception is designed to allow state
courts flexibility in rendering Indian child custody decisions.M
A determination of "good cause" not to follow the presumptive
placement priorities may be based on one or more of the fol-
lowing considerations:
The court should give preference to confidentiality requests
by parents in making placements: "(i) the request of the bio-
logical parents or the child when the child is of sufficient age." 226
The intent is to permit parents to ask that the presumptive
placement priorities not be followed because it would prejudice
confidentiality. The wishes of an older child are important in
making an effective placement. In a few cases the child may
need highly specialized treatment services that are unavailable
in the community where the families who meet the preference
criteria live.227 Therefore, good cause may exist due to "(ii) the
extraordinary physical or emotional needs of the child, as es-
tablished by testimony of a qualified expert witness."M A dili-
gent attempt should be made to find a suitable family meeting
220. Id. § 1915(b)(i-iv).
221. Id. § 1915(c).
222. Id. § 1915(d).
223. Id. § 1915(e).
224. In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863, 870 (Okla. 1988) (Opala, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
225. Id. at 876.
226. Guidelines, supra note 63, at F.3 (commentary).
227. Id.
228. Id. at F.3(a)(ii).
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the presumptive preference criteria before considering a nonpre-
ference placement. If no such family can be found, good cause
not to follow the placement preferences may exist: "(iii) the
availability of suitable families for placement after a diligent
search has been completed for families meeting the preference
criteria." 29 A diligent attempt to find a suitable family includes,
at a minimum, contact with the child's tribal social services
program, a search of all county or state listings of available
Indian homes and contact with nationally-known Indian pro-
grams with available placement resources. 0
The burden of establishing the existence of "good cause" not
to follow the presumptive placement priorities should be on the
party urging that the preferences not be followed.Y'
Amendments to the Petition and Subsequent Pleadings
The court may order amendments to the petition at any time
before an order of adjudication is made, as long as the parties
are given sufficient time to prepare for the hearing.232 Juvenile
actions are special statutory proceedings. 3 No pleading after
the petition is required. 4 The filing of any motion or pleading
cannot delay the holding of the adjudicatory hearing.- No
defensive pleadings are necessary. 6 As the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held in In re Christina T.:
Juvenile actions are not, and were never intended to be, the
sort of proceeding capable of resolution upon a flurry of
pleadings. No answer to the petition is required. The petition
is deemed controverted in all respects upon its filing because
the legal presumption is that the best interest of children are
served by their parents. The burden of proving otherwise is
on the petitioner seeking to interrupt and restrict that rela-
tionship. 7
229. Id. at F.3(a)(iii).
230. Id. at F.3 (commentary).
231. Id.
232. 10 OxLA. STAT. § 1103.1(B) (1981).
233. In re Christina T., 590 P.2d 189, 192-93 (Okla. 1979): "[J]uvenile actions ...
are special statutory proceedings within the meaning of 12 Okla. Stat. (1971) § 5."
Although section 5 was repealed with the adoption of the Oklahoma Pleading Code,
(1984 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 164, § 32 (eff. Nov. 1, 1984)), juvenile actions remain
special statutory proceedings. See 12 Oxu. STAT. § 2001 (Supp. 1985) and the accom-
panying committee comment to § 2001.
234. 10 OnaA. STAT. § 1103.1(A) (1981).
235. Id.
236. Davis v. Davis, 590 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Okla. 1985).
237. Christina T., 590 P.2d at 192.
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A hearing on the juvenile petition is mandatory.28 Therefore,
summary judgment is not applicable to juvenile court proceed-
ings. Since the purpose of summary judgment is to avoid a
useless trial and can be granted as a matter of law only when
there is no substantial controversy as to any material fact,2 9
"[ihe very nature of juvenile proceedings renders the whole
concept of summary judgment inappropriate and impermissi-
ble."m
A petition is deemed to have been amended to conform to
the proof where the proof does not change the substance of the
act, omission or circumstance alleged."i However, the court
cannot amend the adjudicatory category prayed for in the pe-
tition.247 Ii other words, the court cannot change the nature of
the proceedings from a "deprived child" proceeding into a
proceeding to determine whether the child is "delinquent, 2 43
"in need of supervision," ' 244 or "in need of treatment." 4s
238. id. at 191.
239. OxAu. Disr. CT. R. 13.
240. Christina T., 590 P.2d at 192 (district couit's sustention of the state's motion
for summary judgment deprived the parents and the child of their right to due process
of law).
241. 10 Oru. STAT. § 1103.1(B) (1981).
242. rd.
243. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1101(2) (Supp. 1988) defines "delinquent child," to mean a
child who:
(a) has violated any federal or state law or municipal ordinance, except a traffic
statute or traffic ordinance, or any lawful order of the court made pursuant to the
provisions of Sections 1101 through 1506 of the title, or (b) has habitually violated
the traffic laws or traffic ordinances.
244. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1101(3) (Supp. 1988) defines "child in need of supervision"
to mean a child who:
(a) has repeatedly disobeyed reasonable and lawful commands or directives that his
parent, legal custodian, or other custodian, or
(b) is willfully and voluntarily absent from his home without the consent of his
parent, legal guardian or other custodian for a substantial length of time, or without
intent to return, or
(c) is willfully and voluntarily absent from school for fifteen (15) or more days or
parts of days within a semester or four (4) or more days or parts of days within a
four week period without a valid excuse as defined by the local school boards, if
said child is subject to compulsory school attendance.
245. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1101(5) (Supp. 1988) defines "child in need of treatment"
to mean:
any child who is afflicted with a substantial disorder of the emotional processes,
thought, or cognition, which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to rec-
ognize reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life appropriate to the
age of the child. The term "child in need of treatment" shall not mean a child
afflicted with epilepsy, mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, physical handi-
caps, or brief periods of intoxication caused by such substances as alcohol or drugs
unless the child also meets the criteria for "child in need of treatment."
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Service of Process: Providing Notice to Interested Parties
Personal jurisdiction is based on valid service.m Procedural
due process requires reasonable steps be taken to give interested
parties notice of the pendency of proceedings and an opportunity
to be heard.247 If these fundamental requirements are not met,
the court lacks jurisdiction, the judgment is void, and the judg-
ment is subject to direct and collateral attack. 48 Of course, the
parties may voluntarily appear before the court and thus confer
personal jurisdiction.2 9 Otherwise, process must be served.20
After the petition is filed, summons must be issued unless the
parties voluntarily appear. The summons must recite briefly the
nature of the proceeding with the phrase "as described more
fully in the attached petition" and require the person who has
custody or control of the child to appear personally and bring
the child before the court at a time and place stated. The
summons must also state the relief requested. If termination of
parental rights is sought, it must be stated in the summons. If
an order for the payment of funds for the care and maintenance
of the child is desired, it must be stated in the summons. The
summons must also set forth the rights of the child, parents,
and other interested parties to have an attorney present at the
hearing on the petition.2' A copy of the petition must be
attached to and delivered with the summons . 2
The summons must be served on the person who has actual
custody of the child and, if the child is at least twelve years
old, a copy must be served on the child. If the person who has
actual custody of the child is other than a parent or guardian
of the child, a copy of the summons must be served on the
parent or guardian or both. A copy of the summons must be
served on each parent. If no parent or guardian can be found,
a summons must be served upon such other person as the court
designates.2 3
246. Tammie v. Rodriquez, 570 P.2d 332, 334 (Okla. 1977).
247. Id.
248. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 311 (1985);
Bomford v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 440 P.2d 713, 716 (Okla. 1968); Tammie, 570 P.2d
at 334.
249. 10 OYLA. STAT. § 1104(a) (Supp. 1988); 12 Or.A. STAT. § 2004(C)(5) (Supp.
1988).
250. 10 OYRA. STAT. § 1104(a) (Supp. 1988).
251. Id.; 10 OxiA. STAT. § 1103(B) (Supp. 1982).
252. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1103(D) (Supp. 1982).
253. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1104(b) (Supp. 1988).
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No notice is required to a parent where, after a hearing, the
court finds:
(1) the parent does not have custody of the child and has
never established or has not maintained a substantial rela-
tionship with the child nor manifested a significant interest
in the child for a period of not less than one year preceding
the filing of the petition; or
(2) the parent does not have custody of the child and has
willfully failed to contribute to the support of the child as
provided in a decree of divorce or in some other court order
during the year preceding the filing of the petition, or in the
absence of such order, consistent with the parent's means and
earning capacity.254
The Oklahoma Legislature added these exceptions to the no-
tice provisions of the Juvenile Code in 1988.2 5 In order to
understand the legislature's decision, one must appreciate the
novel context and legal problems arising from the parent-child
relationship.
The institution of marriage has played a critical role in de-
fining the legal entitlement of family members. State laws express
an appropriate preference for the formal family unit, perhaps
the most fundamental social institution of our society.256
Of course, not everyone chooses to live the traditional family
lifestyle where mother, father and children all live together.
Parents of children born outside the traditional family unit may,
in fact, have little or no custodial, personal, or financial rela-
tionship with the child. The mere existence of a biological link
does not merit lofty constitutional protection:27
The importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals
involved and to the society extends from the emotional at-
tachment that derives from the intimacy of daily association,
and from the role it plays in promoting a way of life through
the instruction of children as well as from the fact of blood
relationship.2 8
The existence of a substantial relationship between parent and
child is a relevant criterion in evaluating the rights of the parent
254. Id. § 1104(b)(1), (2).
255. 1988 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 318, § 2 (emergency effective July 6, 1988).
256. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983).
257. Id. at 261.
258. Id. (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977),
quoting in turn Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
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and the best interests of the child.2 9 The significance of a
biological connection is that it offers natural parents the op-
portunity to develop a relationship with their offspring. If par-
ents fail to grasp that opportunity and accept some measure of
responsibility for their child's future, the United States Consti-
tution does not automatically compel a state to listen to their
opinion of where the child's best interests lie.
2 6
In a quartet of cases, the United States Supreme court has
examined the extent to which a natural, unwed father's biological
relationship with his child receives protection under the United
States Constitution's due process clause: Stanley v. Illinois,261
Quillion v. Walcott,262 Cabana v. Mohammed,263 and Lehr v.
Robertson.264 In Stanley, the unwed father had lived with his
children for their entire lives and with the children's mother for
eighteen years. He "sired and raised" his children and supported
them all of their lives. He had the special kind of relationship
that is developed by custodial responsibilities. It was his custody
of his children, not his biological connection alone, that gave
him an interest of the same stature as that of any other custodial
parent.2 s
In Cabana the unwed father did not have current custody of
his children. However, there still existed a developed relation-
ship. The father had lived with his two children, born out of
wedlock, and their mother for several years. The natural parents
had maintained joint custody of their children from the time of
their birth until they were two and four years old respectively.
The Court held that the unwed father's current emotional ties
with his children created by a past custodial relationship merited
constitutional protection. 26
In contrast, the unwed father in Quillion never had or even
sought actual or legal custody of his child, nor had he consis-
tently supported the child.26 Similarly, in Lehr, the unwed father
never had any significant custodial, personal, or financial rela-
tionship with the child. It was only after the child was two years
old and only after the natural mother had remarried and filed
259. Id. at 266-67.
260. Id. at 262 (discussing the rights of the putative father).
261. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
262. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
263. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
264. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
265. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1066 (Okla. 1985).
266. Cabana, 441 U.S. at 389.
267. Quillion, 434 U.S. at 249-51.
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a petition for adoption that the father sought visitation rights
and filed a petition for legitimation. The Court held that the
natural father's rights under the due process and equal protection
clauses of the United States Constitution were not violated by
failure to receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before
the child was adopted.2 1
These cases make it clear that it is constitutionally permissible
for the state to decline to notify or allow participation by unwed
fathers, under certain circumstances, even though they have
never been established officially as being without an interest.
Further, the state may even deny them participation in the
preliminary stage, determining that they are withcibt an inter-
est. 269
A similar stance was adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in In re Adoption of Baby Boy D. 270 In Baby Boy D. the
unwed father knew that the mother was pregnant. However, he
made no attempt to provide for the mother during pregnancy,
nor did he attempt to learn when and where the child was to
be born. He did not pay, nor attempt to make any arrangements
for the payment of, expenses relating to the birth and care of
the child or mother. He abandoned the support and care of the
mother and child during pregnancy, at birth and after birth. He
failed to assume any parental responsibility. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that the unwed father did not have the
right to notice and opportunity to be heard regarding the sub-
sequent adoption of the child. In so holding the court stated:
The constitution protects only parent-child relationships of
biological parents who have actually committed themselves to
their children and have exercised responsibility for rearing
their children. This principle has its basis in the theory that
the process of defining which relationships are constitutionally
significant includes a consideration of how the competing
interests are served by protection. Parents who commit them-
selves to their children and take responsibility for rearing their
children share the state's interest in assuming proper care for
their children.
However, the paramount interest to be considered is the
child's best interest. Children are not static objects. They
grow and develop, and their growth and development require
268. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 248-49.
269. Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d at 1066-67.
270. Id. at 1059.
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more than day-to-day satisfaction of their physical needs.
Their growth and development also require day-to-day satis-
faction of their emotional needs, and a primary emotional
need is for permanence and stability. Only when their emo-
tional needs are satisfied can children develop the emotional
attachments that have independent constitutional significance.
This Court recognizes that a child's need for permanence and
stability, like his or her other needs, cannot be postponed. 271
The Oklahoma Supreme Court went a step further by holding
that a summons need not be served upon a noncustodial par-
ent.
272
The Juvenile Code authorizes service "by certified mail to the
person's last known address, requesting a return receipt from
the addressee only." 273 In the alternative the Juvenile Code
authorizes service of summons as provided for in service for
civil actions.274 The method of service of process in civil actions
is found in the Oklahoma Pleading Code,275 which authorizes
service of process by a sheriff or deputy sheriff, a person licensed
to make service of process in civil cases, or a person specially
appointed for that purpose.276 The Oklahoma Pleading Code
also authorizes service by certified mail, return receipt requested
and delivery restricted to the addressee.27 If service cannot be
made by personal delivery or by mail, the Oklahoma Pleading
Code authorizes service by court order upon individuals who
are at least fifteen years of age or older "in any manner which
is reasonably calculated to give [the individual] actual notice of
the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard." 278 This pro-
vision gives the court discretion to fashion a method of service
appropriate to particular circumstances as long as specified stan-
dards are met. 279
As a last resort, if the address of the person to be summoned
is not known, or if the mailed summons is returned, both the
Juvenile Code ° and the Oklahoma Pleading Code' authorize
271. Id. at 1067.
272. Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1102 (Okla. 1985).
273. 10 OKrA. STAT. § 1105 (1981).
274. Id.
275. 12 OKlA. STAT. § 2001-2027 (Supp. 1984).
276. 12 OKuA. STAT. § 2004(C)(1)(a) (Supp. 1988).
277. Id. § 2004(C)(2)(b).
278. Id. § 2004(C)(5).
279. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
280. 10 OLA. STAT. § 1105 (1981).
281. 12 OKuA. STAT. § 2004(C)(3)(a) (Supp. 1988) provides:
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service by publication. The Juvenile Code provides: "Where the
address of the person to be summoned is not known, or if the
mailed summons is returned, the court may order that notice of
the hearing be published once in a newspaper of general circu-
lation in the county. 2 2
"Actual notice is the preferred method of satisfying due
process requirements, but is has long been recognized that actual
notice is not always feasible."' 3 As the United States Supreme
Court said in Mulane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.:
This Court has not hesitated to approve of resort to publi-
cation as a customary substitute ... where it is not reasonably
possible or practicable to give more adequate warning. Thus
it has been recognized that, in the case of persons missing or
unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably
futile means of notification is all that the situation permits
and creates no constitutional bar to the final decree foreclos-
ing their rights.2 84
Oklahoma District Court rules; 5 require an inquiry, either in
open court or in chambers, to determine judicially whether the
petitioner made a diligent and meaningful search of all reason-
ably available sources at hand to locate the whereabouts or
mailing address of the person to be served.286 This information
is often presented to the judge in the form of an affidavit for
service by publication. The court may also entertain sworn
testimony at the hearing.W The court should include a recital
281. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2004(C)(3)(a) (Supp. 1988) provides:
Service of summons upon a named defendant may be made by publication when It
is stated in the petition, verified by the plaintiff or his attorney, or in a separate
affidavit by the plaintiff or his attorney, filed with the court, that with due diligence
service cannot be made upon the defendant by any other method.
282. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1105 (1981). For the method of publication service authorized
by the Oklahoma Pleading Code, see 12 OxL.A. STAT. § 2004(C)(4)(c) (Supp. 1988).
283. Dana P. v. State, 656 P.2d 253, 255 (Okla. 1982).
284. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1985).
285. OKLA. DisT. Cr. R. 16.
286. Id.
287. See also 12 Oxr.A. STAT. § 2004CC)(3)Ce) (Supp. 1988):
Before entry of a default judgment or order against a party who has been served solely
by publication under this subsection, the court shall conduct an inquiry to determine
whether the plaintiff, or someone acting in his behalf, made a distinct and meaningful
search of all reasonably available sources to ascertain the whereabouts of any named
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss1/2
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of its findings in the journal entry of judgment.28 As a practical
matter, service by publication is the method of notice least
calculated to bring a party's attention to the pendency of judicial
proceedings.2 9 The United States Supreme Court held in Mulane,
"Publication may theoretically be available for all the world to
see, but it is too much in our day to suppose that [everyone]
examine[s] all that is published to see if something may be
tucked away in it that affects [their] ... interests."1290 Further,
the court said in McDonald, "Great caution should be used not
to let fiction deny the fair play that can be secured only by a
pretty close adhesion to the fact."2'9 The court has also said
what is required is "notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections. '292
A striking example of the abuse of the resort to publication
by the Oklahoma Department of Human Services is found in
parties who have been served solely by publication under this subsection.
The committee comment to § 2004(C)(3)(e) states:
Subparagraph e of paragraph 3 of subsection C of § 2004 requires a judicial
investigation of the sufficiency of the search to ascertain the whereabouts of parties
served solely by publication. This incorporates the provisions of Oklahoma District
Court Rule 16, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Bomford v. Socony Mobil Oil Co.,
440 P.2d 713 (Okla. 1968) that the due process provision of the United States
Constitution requires a hearing on a default judgment after service by publication
to include an evidentiary showing of due diligence in attempting to accomplish actual
notice to the defendant. Stating that before a plaintiff may resort to publication
process, he must make a diligent search of all available sources, the court indicated
that due diligence requires at least a search of local tax rolls, deed records, judicial
and other official records, telephone directories, city directories, and the like. The
facts of such hearing need not be set out in the affidavit, but must be proved at
the hearing on a default judgment. Implicit in the hearing requirement is the provision
that where a search reveals the identity and location of a defendant, publication will
no longer be an acceptable form of service. The Supreme Court in Mulane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950), stated that in order to
meet the due process requirement of "notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action ... the
means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." The court held that publication service
did not meet that standard with respect to parties with known residences.
288. Dana P. v. State, 656 P.2d 253, 257 n.4 (Okla. 1982); OKaA. D=sr. CT. R. 16.
289. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971); In re Del Moral Rodriguez,
552 P.2d 397, 400 (Okla. 1976).
290. Mulane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 320 (1950).
291. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
292. Mulane, 339 U.S. at 314.
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Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma v. Rader. 9 3 In Rader, Mark Litke,
an agent of the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, filed
an affidavit for service by publication with the District Court
of Oklahoma County. The affidavit recited: "That the present
whereabouts of the father of said child is unknown to your
petitioner; that after due search and diligent inquiry your affiant
has been unable to ascertain an address at which personal service
may be given, and that affiant wishes to obtain service by
publication." 294
Notice to the father was given solely by publication. In fact,
no diligent efforts were made to locate the father. Litke did not
gather the information in the praecipe or the petition filed in
the Oklahoma County District Court. He did not talk to any
caseworker on the case. His affidavit was not based on any
independent information gathered by him. He did not know
what efforts, if any, were made by the protective service office
or the caseworker to locate the father. Instead Litke relied on
an investigative report from an intake worker in preparing the
praecipe, petition and affidavit for service by publication.
The intake worker testified his job was to determine if there
had been child abuse. He was not involved in preparation of
the affidavit for publication. He said that the natural mother
told him that the father's home was "Mexico" and no other
whereabouts were given. He asked if she knew a specific address
and she said that she did not, just that the father was in Mexico.
He did not ask the mother if she still communicated with the
father, or he with her. The mother did not tell the intake worker
where the father's family or relatives were. The intake worker
said that the whereabouts of a person were unimportant to him
if the person was not involved in child abuse, and in this case
he would not look further beyond what he learned from his
conversation with the mother. The person who prepared the
petition for the Oklahoma County District Court did not contact
the intake worker.
In fact, the father's identity, at least as the putative father,
was known to the DHS. One month before the father's parental
rights to his child were terminated, DHS knew that the father's
sister lived next door to the mother. The DHS case worker
assigned to the child testified that although she was aware that
the father's sister lived next door to the mother, she never asked
the sister where he could be found. More troubling, the case
293. 822 F.2d 1493 (10th Cir. 1987).
294. Id. at 1494.
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worker did not inform the court that the father's sister could
be easily located or that the father had recently called the natural
mother wanting to see his son. The case worker's own case
status report noted that approximately one month before the
father's rights were terminated, the mother stated that the father
had called from Texas wanting to see his child, and that the
father's sister lived next door. Finally, shortly before the ter-
mination hearing, DHS knew the whereabouts of the paternal
grandparents.
In affirming the United States district court's ruling that the
father's parental rights to his child were terminated in violation
of the due process clause, and that there must be a redetermi-
nation on the custody and placement of the child by the state
courts, the Tenth Circuit stated:
We are cognizant of the cautionary note sounded by Justice
Jackson in Mulane that "[a] construction of the due process
clause which would place impossible or impractical obstacles
in the way could not be justified. But when notice is a person's
due, process which is mere gesture is not due process." We
do not hold that the due process clause requires DHS to make
extreme efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of parents. Nev-
ertheless, in light of the critical parental rights at stake, we
are convinced that due process clearly requires that DHS exert
diligent efforts to locate parents before their rights are ter-
minated .... Here, the efforts expended to locate [the father]
to ascertain his whereabouts or address were manifestly in-
sufficient to satisfy the demands of the due process clause.19
Therefore, publication must be used only as a last resort.
Otherwise, the state court proceeding will be invalidated.
Additional Notice Requirements Under the UCCJA
In addition to the service of process requirements of the
Juvenile Code, the UCCJA provides certain persons with the
right to notice and opportunity to be heard:
Before making a decree under this act [UCCJA], reasonable
notice and an opportunity to be heard shall be given to the
contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not been
previously terminated and any person who has physical cus-
tody of the child. If any of these persons is outside this state,
295. Id. at 1499-1500 (citations omitted).
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notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given pursuant
to Section 7 of this act [§ 16071.26
Furthermore, the UCCJA states:
If the court learns ... that a person not a party to the
custody proceeding has physical custody of the child or claims
to have custody or visitation rights with respect to the child,
it shall order that person to be joined as a party and to be
duly notified of the pendency of the proceeding and of his
joinder as a party. If the person joined as a party is outside
[the State of Oklahoma], he shall be served with process or
otherwise notified in accordance with Section 6 of this act [§
1606] .297
Special Notice Requirements for State Court
Proceedings Involving Indian Children
To determine the applicability of ICWA and OICWA two
questions must be answered: (1) What type of proceeding is
being conducted in state court?298 and (2) Is the child an "Indian
child"? 29 ICWA applies to state court proceedings for foster
care placement, termination of parental rights, preadoptive
placement, and adoptive placement of an Indian child.3 °°
ICWA defines "foster care placement" to mean any action
removing an Indian child from a parent or Indian custodian for
temporary placement in a foster home or institution, or the
home of a guardian or conservator where the parent or Indian
custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand, but
where parental rights have not been terminated. 0' ICWA defines
"termination of parental rights" as any action resulting in the
termination of the parent-child relationship. 302
Given a purely technical reading, ICWA does not apply to
Oklahoma state court public law deprived child proceedings
unless and until a party either seeks to remove an Indian child
involuntarily from a parent or Indian custodian, or requests the
296. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1607 (1981).
297. Id. H9 1606, 1612.
298. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(17).
299. Id. §-1903(4).
300. Id. § 1903(1)(l). Excluded are juvenile delinquency proceedings and divorce
proceedings where custody of the Indian child is awarded to one of the parents. In
contrast, the OICWA includes juvenile delinquency proceedings if a request is made to
terminate parental rights. See 10 OICIA. STAT. § 40.3(A)(2) (Supp. 1982).
301. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(l)(i).
302. Id. § 1903(l)(ii).
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court to terminate the parent-child relationship. Accordingly,
there may be significant state involvement and interaction with
the Indian child and parent or Indian custodian without ever
triggering the protections afforded under ICWA. For example,
state agents may receive a report of abuse, investigate the child's
home environment, make an initial determination whether the
report of abuse is substantiated, and, if substantiated, attempt
an informal adjustment by offering relevant services to the
family such as parenting classes or assistance in obtaining food,
clothing, shelter, job training, education, medical care or mental
health services. If an informal adjustment is not practicable, the
district attorney may even file a deprived child petition on behalf
of the Indian child in state court without triggering ICWA's
protections as long as no request is made to remove the Indian
child from the home.
However, such a technical reading of ICWA is neither nec-
essary nor desirable. The public policy of the State of Oklahoma
is to keep families together when possible. Invocation of ICWA's
protections may assist in attaining that goal. Therefore, the
filing of a petition to adjudicate the child's deprived status
should trigger the applicability of both ICWA and OICWA.
The involvement of the Indian child's parent or Indian custodian
and the Indian child's tribe at the earliest possible stage of a
deprived child proceeding may prevent the need to remove the
child from the home. Even if it is necessary to temporarily
remove the child, the early involvement of the parent or Indian
custodian and the Indian child's tribe will assist the state court
in properly placing the child. Therefore, the notice required
under the ICWA and OICWA should be sent by the petitioner
no later than the filing of the deprived child petition.
ICWA requires that in any involuntary proceeding in a state
court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an
Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care place-
ment of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child
must notify the parent or Indian custodian and the child's tribe
by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending
proceedings and their right of intervention. 301 ICWA's notice
requirements are mandatory in involuntary actions.2 4 Further,
OICWA applies when ICWA applies."'
303. Id. § 1912(a).
304. Duncan v. Wiley, 657 P.2d 1212, 1213 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982).
305. 10 OKIA. STAT. § 40.3 (Supp. 1982); In re Adoption of D.M.J., 741 P.2d 1386,
1388 (Okla. 1985).
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OICWA requires that in any involuntary Indian child custody
proceeding, including review hearings, the court must "send
notice to the parents or to the Indian custodians, if any, to the
tribe that may be the tribe of the Indian child, and to the
appropriate BIA area office, by registered mail, return receipt
requested." 3°6 The notice requirements mandated by the OICWA
differ from those mandated by ICWA. In some respects they
are duplicative and potentially confusing. For example, OICWA
and ICWA differ as to who has the responsibility of giving
notice of the pendency of the proceedings, the persons or entities
entitled to receive notice, content of the notice and the minimum
time limit granted the parties to prepare for the hearing.
Recognizing that the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian
child is entitled to the protection afforded under federal or state
law, whichever provides the higher standard of protection, this
article will first address the notice requirements under ICWA
and then discuss the notice requirements under OICWA.
Notice Requirement Under the ICWA
Section 1912 of the ICWA provides in relevant part:
In any involuntary proceeding in state court, where the court
knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved,
the party seeking the foster care placement of, or termination
of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent
or Indian custodian and the Indian child's tribe by registered
mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings
and of their right of intervention .... 07
As previously discussed, a technical reading of the ICWA
would require that notice be given only when a request is made
to involuntarily remove an Indian child from a parent or Indian
custodian. However, in keeping with the spirit and intent of the
ICWA, the party who initiates the state court proceedings should
give the required notices at the time of the filing of the deprived
child petition. In Oklahoma, this means that the district attorney
should give the notices required under the ICWA at the time
the deprived child petition is filed.
Congress did not define precisely what it meant in section
1912 when it mandated notice "where a court knows or has
reason to know that an Indian child is involved."30 8 However,
306. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 40.4 (Supp. 1982).
307. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912.
308. Id. § 1912(a).
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the Guidelines for State Courts recommend that state courts
routinely inquire whether (1) the child involved is a member of
an Indian tribe, or (2) a parent of the child is a member of an
Indian tribe and the child is eligible for membership. 309 That
inquiry should be made of all participants in all involuntary
child custody proceedings.
The Guidelines list circumstances where a court may have
reason to believe the child is Indian:
(i) Any party to the case, Indian tribe, Indian organization,
or public or private agency informs the court that the child
is an Indian child.
(ii) Any public or state-licensed agency involved in child
protection services or family support has discovered infor-
mation which suggests that the child is an Indian child.
(iii) The child who is the subject of the proceedings gives the
court reason to believe he or she is an Indian child.
(iv) The residence or the domicile of the child, his or her
biological parents, or the Indian custodian is known by the
court to be or is shown to be a predominantly Indian com-
munity.
(v) An officer of the court involved in the proceeding has
knowledge that the child may be an Indian child.310
While this listing is not intended to be complete, it does suggest
the most common circumstances giving rise to a reasonable belief
that the child may be an Indian.
When a state court has reason to believe a child involved is
an Indian, the Guidelines recommend the court seek verification
of the child's status from either the child's tribe or the BIA.311
The Guidelines also note that "the best source of information
on whether a particular child is Indian is the tribe itself. It is
the tribe's prerogative to determine membership criteria and to
decide who meets those criteria. ' 312 One should not equate
membership in an Indian tribe with enrollment in that tribe:
Enrollment is not always required in order to be a member
of a tribe. Some tribes do not have written rolls. Others have
rolls that list only persons that were members as of a certain
date. Enrollment is the common evidentiary means of estab-
309. Guidelines, supra note 63, at B.5 and accompanying commentary.
310. Id. at B.l(c).
311. Id. at B.1(a).
312. Id. at B.1 (commentary).
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lishing Indian status, but it is not the only means, nor is it
necessarily determinative. 313
The tribe's determination that a child is a member of the tribe,
or is eligible for membership in the tribe, or that the biological
parent is a member of the tribe, is conclusive. 314
The court may also contact the BIA, which has extensive
experience in determining who is an Indian for a variety of
purposes. The determination of the BIA is entitled to great
deference.3 15 Absent a contrary determination by the tribe, the
BIA's determination is conclusive.316
The ICWA defines an "Indian child" as "any unmarried
person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of
an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in and Indian
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe." 31 7 The ICWA defines an "Indian tribe" as "any Indian
tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of
Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided to Indians
by the Secretary [of the Interior] because of their status as
Indians, including any Alaskan native village as defined in [43
U.S.C. § 1602(c)]." 318
The ICWA defines "parent" as "any biological parent or
parents of an Indian child, or any Indian person who has
lawfully adopted an Indian child, including adoptions under
tribal law or custom. '31 9 Congress specifically excluded from
the definition of "parent" unwed fathers whose "paternity has
not been acknowledged or established. ' 320 Such unwed fathers
are not entitled to the notice provisions contained in the ICWA. 32'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed this precise issue in
In re Adoption of Baby Boy D.322 in which the Court held the
ICWA is not applicable until such time as the unwed father
acknowledges or establishes paternity:
313. Id. See also United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1979).
314. Guidelines, supra note 63, at B.1(b)(i).
315. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 27, 28 (1913); Guidelines, supra note 63,
at B.A (commentary).
316. Guidelines, supra note 63, at B.I(b)(ii).
317. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
318. Id. § 1903(8).
319. Id. § 1903(9). The ICWA defines "Indian" as any person who is a member of
an Indian tribe, or who is an Alaska native and a member of a regional corporation
(as defined in 43 U.S.C. § 1606). 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3).
320. Id. § 1903(9).
321. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okla. 1985).
322. 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985).
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Congress has by this language evidenced its intent not to
extend the ICWA to the child born out of wedlock, as in the
instant case, whose father has never had custody and has not
acknowledged or established paternity. We take this to mean
acknowledged or established through the procedures available
through the tribal courts consistent with tribal customs, or
through procedures established by state law. Until paternity
is acknowledged or established, an unwed Indian father has
failed to lay legal claim to the child, and the ICWA is not
applicable.32
The ICWA defines an "Indian custodian" as "any Indian
person who has legal custody of an Indian child under tribal
law or custom or under State law, or to whom temporary
physical care, custody, and control has been transferred by the
parent of such child." 3 4 Finally, the ICWA defines an "Indian
child's tribe" as:
(a) the Indian tribe in which an Indian child is a member or
eligible for membership or (b) in the case of an Indian child
who is a member of or eligible for membership in more than
one tribe, the Indian tribe with which the child has the more
significant contacts.32
Notice Where the Child May Be
a Member of More Than One Tribe
The state court should notify all tribes that are potentially
the "Indian child's tribe" so that each tribe may assert its claim
to that status.3m The Guidelines suggest that Congress, in defin-
ing the term "Indian child's tribe," provided a criterion for
determining which tribe is the tribe, indicating Congressional
intent that there be only one such tribe for each child in state
court proceedings. 32 7 Notification of all the tribes is also neces-
sary so the state court can consider the views and comparative
interest of each tribe in the child's welfare in making its deci-
sion.32
Where an Indian child is a member of more than one tribe
or is eligible for membership in more than one tribe but is
323. Id. at 1064.
324. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(6).
325. Id. § 1903(5).
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not a member of any of them, the [state] court is called upon
to determine with which tribe the child has more significant
contacts .32
9
Of course, a state court may, "if it wishes and state law permits,
permit intervention by more than one tribe. '330
Notice should be sent to each potential tribe. The notice
should identify the other tribe or tribes that are being considered
as the child's tribe, and invite each tribe to submit its view on
which tribe should be designated as "the Indian child's tribe. " 331
The court's determination of which tribe shall be designated
the "Indian child's tribe" should be set out in a written docu-
ment stating the reasons for the decision and the reasons should
be made a part of the record of the proceedings. 32 Copies of
the decision should be sent to all parties and to each person or
government agency that received notice of the proceedings. 3 3
If the child is a member of only one tribe, that tribe should
be designated the "Indian child's tribe" even though the child
is eligible for membership in another tribe 3 4 If a child becomes
a member of one tribe during or after the proceeding, that tribe
should be designated as the "Indian child's tribe" with respect
to all subsequen actions related to the proceeding. 35 If the child
becomes a member of a tribe other than the one designated by
the state court as the "Indian child's tribe," actions taken based
329. Id. at B.2.
330. Id. at B.2 (commentary).
331. Id. at B.2. The guidelines further suggest:
In determining which tribe shall be designated the Indian child's tribe, the court
should consider, among other things, the following factors:
(i) length of residence on or near the reservation of each tribe and frequency
of contacts with each tribe;
(ii) child's participation in activities of each tribe;
(iii) child's fluency in the language of each tribe;
(iv) whether there has been a previous adjudication with respect to the
child by a court of one of the tribes;
(v) residence on or near one of the tribe's reservations by the child's
relatives;
(vi) tribal membership of custodial parent or Indian custodian;
(vii) interest asserted by each tribe in response to the notice specified In
subsection B.2.(b) of these Guidelines; and
(viii) the child's self-identification ....
332. Id. at B.2(d).
333. Id.




upon the state court's determination prior to the child's becom-
ing a tribal member continue to be valid.
3 6
The ICWA requires notice be sent by registered mail with
return receipt requested.3 7 If the identity or location of the
parent or Indian custodian and the tribe cannot be determined,
notice must be given to the Secretary of the Interior who then
has fifteen days after receipt to provide the requisite notice to
the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe.338 The notice should
be sent to the appropriate BIA area office by registered mail
with return receipt requested. 3 9 Notice to the BIA must include
the following information, if known:
(1) the name of the Indian child, birth date, and birth place,
(2) the Indian child's tribal affiliation,
(3) the names of the Indian child's parents or the Indian
mother's maiden name, and
(4) a copy of the petition, complaint, or othek document by
which the proceeding was initiated. 3
40
Upon receipt of the notice, the BIA must make a diligent
effort to locate and notify the Indian child's tribe and the Indian
child's parents or Indian custodian.34' The BIA may send the
notice by registered mail with return receipt requested or by
personal service.3 42 The notice from the BIA to the tribe and
parents must include: (1) the name of the Indian child, the
Indian child's birth date and birth place, the Indian child's tribal
affiliation; (2) the names of the Indian child's parents or Indian
custodians, including the mother's birth date, birth place, and
maiden name; (3) a copy of the petition, complaint, or other
document by which the proceeding was initiated; (4) a statement
of the right of the biological parents, Indian custodians, and
336. Id.
337. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).
338. Id.
339. 25 C.F.R. § 23.11(a) (1988). For proceedings in the western Oklahoma counties
of Alfalfa, Beaver, Beckham, Blaine, Bryan, Caddo, Canadian, Cimarron, Cleveland,
Comanche, Cotton, Custer, Dewey, Ellis, Garfield, Grant, Greer, Harmon, Harper,
Jackson, Kay, Kingfisher, Kiowa, Lincoln, Logan, Major, Noble, Oklahoma, Pawnee,
Payne, Pottawatomie, Roger Mills, Texas, Tillman, Washita, Woods, and Woodward
notice should be sent to: Anadarko Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs, P.O. Box
368, Anadarko, OK 73005. Id. § 23.11(b)(4). For proceedings in all other Oklahoma
counties, notice should be sent to: Muskogee Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Federal Building, Muskogee, OK 74404. Id. § 23.11(b)(8).
340. Id. § 23.11(c).
341. Id. § 23.11(d).
342. Id.
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the Indian tribe to intervene in the proceedings; (5) a statement
that if the parents or Indian custodian are unable to afford
counsel, counsel will be appointed to represent them; (6) a
statement of the right of the parents, the Indian custodian, and
the child's tribe to have, upon request, up to twenty additional
days to prepare for the proceedings; (7) the location, mailing
address, and telephone number of the state court in which the
proceedings are pending; (8) a statement of the right of the
parents, Indian custodians, and the Indian child's tribe to pe-
tition the state court for transfer of the proceedings to the
child's tribal court, and their right to refuse to permit the case
to be transferred; (9) a statement of the potential legal conse-
quences of the proceedings on the future custodial and parental
rights of the parents or Indian custodian; and (10) a statement
that, since child custody proceedings are usually conducted on
a confidential basis, tribal officials should keep confidential the
information contained in the notice concerning the particular
proceeding and not reveal it to anyone who does not need the
information in order to exercise the tribe's rights under the
ICWA.343
The BIA has only ten days after receipt of the notice from
the person initiating the state court proceeding to notify the
child's tribe and parents or Indian custodian and to send a copy
of the notice to the state court.344 If within the ten-day time
period the BIA is unable to verify that the child is in fact an
Indian, or meets the criteria of an Indian child, 345 or is unable
to locate the parents or Indian custodian, the BIA must so
inform the state court prior to initiation of the proceeding and
specify how much more time, if any, it will need to complete
the search.346 The BIA must complete its search efforts even if
those efforts cannot be completed before the state child custody
proceedings begin.347 Upon request from a potential participant
in an anticipated Indian child custody proceeding, the BIA must
attempt to identify and locate for the person making the request
the Indian child's tribe, parents or Indian custodians.3 48
Any Indian tribe entitled to notice may designate a service
agent.349 The name and address of designated service agents for
343. Id.
344. Id. § 23.11(e).
345. Id. § 1903(4).
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. § 23.11(f).
349. Id. § 23.12.
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Indian tribes is published annually in the Federal Register.35 0 A
current listing of service agents is also available through the BIA
area office.35'
The ICWA requires that persons entitled to receive notice be
advised that (1) state court proceedings are pending and (2) they
have the right to intervene.352 The notice should contain the
following information:
(i) The name of the Indian child.
(ii) His or her tribal affiliation.
(iii) A copy of the petition, complaint or other document by
which the proceeding was initiated.
(iv) The name of the petitioner and the name and address of
the petitioner's attorney.
(v) A statement of the right of the biological parents or Indian
custodians and the Indian child's tribe to intervene in the
proceeding.
(vi) A statement that if the parent or Indian custodians are
unable to afford counsel, counsel wil be appointed to rep-
resent them.
(vii) A statement of the right of the natural parents or Indian
custodians and the Indian child's tribe to have, on request,
twenty days (or such additional time as may be permitted
under state law) to prepare for the proceedings.
(viii) The location, mailing address and telephone number of
the court.
(ix) A statement of the right of the parents or Indian custo-
dians or the Indian child's tribe to petition the court to
transfer the proceeding to the Indian child's tribal court.
(x) The potential legal consequences of an adjudication on
future custodial rights of the parents or Indian custodians. 33
(xi) A statement in the notice to the tribe that since child
custody proceedings are usually conducted on a confidential
basis, tribal officials should keep confidential the information
contained in the notice concerning the particular proceeding
and not reveal it to anyone who does not need the information
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. § 1912(a).
353. Guidelines, supra note 63, at B.S. The guidelines recommend that parents "be
notified if termination of parents rights is a potential outcome since it is their relationship
to the child that is at stake.... Indian custodians must be notified of any action that
could lead to the custodian's losing custody of the child." Id. at B.5 (commentary).
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in order to exercise the tribe's rights under the Indian Child
Welfare Act.354
A copy of each notice sent should be filed with the state
court, together with any return receipts or other proof of
service.5 s Personal service may be substituted for service by
mail. 35 6 If there is "reason to believe that a parent or Indian
custodian is not likely to understand the contents of the notice
because of lack of adequate comprehension of written English,"
the petitioner should send a copy of the notice to the BIA area
office nearest to the residence of that person requesting BIA
personnel "arrange to have the notice explained to that person
in the language that he or she best understands. ' 35 7 While
"notice to both parents and Indian custodians may not be
required in all instances" under a literal reading of the ICWA
or the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, "pro-
viding notice to both is in keeping with the spirit of the Act. ' 358
Section 1912 of the ICWA guarantees the parent, Indian
custodian, and tribe a minimum time period to prepare for the
deprived child proceeding.3 59 What the section is trying to say
is that each of these parties is entitled to a minimum of ten
days to prepare. An additional twenty days is available upon
their request. Unfortunately, the section was drafted in such a
way that a potential inconsistency exists. For example, if the
state court petitioner does not know the name or location of
the parent, Indian custodian or tribe, the petitioner can fulfill
the notice obligation under the ICWA by simply serving the
Secretary of Interior, who then has fifteen days to give the
requisite notice to the parent, Indian custodian, and tribe. 360 At
the same time, section 1912 permits the state court to proceed
with the foster care placement or termination of parental rights
hearing after the expiration of only ten days in the event that
no request for an extension of time is made.3 6' Therefore, it is
possible that the state court proceedings can be concluded even
before the parent, Indian custodian, or tribe receive notice.
354. Id. at B.5(b).
355. Id. at B.5(d).
356. Id. at B.5(e).
357. Id. at B.5(g).
358. Id. at B.5 (commentary).
359. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912.




Notice Requirements Under the OICWA
The OICWA mandates additional notice in deprived child
proceedings. First, the OICWA applies to "any involuntary
Indian child custody proceeding ... including review hear-
ings." 3 62 Unfortunately, the OICWA defines neither the term
"involuntary Indian child custody proceeding" nor the term
"review hearings." However, because the purpose of the OICWA
is to clarify state policies and procedures regarding implemen-
tation of the ICWA,3 63 the term "involuntary Indian child cus-
tody proceeding" is probably a reference to "child custody
proceeding" as that term is defined in the ICWA.3 6 Therefore,
the OICWA is triggered when a party seeks the involuntary
removal of an Indian child from a parent or Indian custodian,
on either a temporary or permanent basis. The term "review
hearing" is probably a reference to the Oklahoma Juvenile
Code,365 which requires the district court to conduct a review
hearing in every deprived child case in which the child is removed
from the custody of parents. The better practice is simply for
the district court to inquire of participants in all deprived child
proceedings whether the child is an Indian.
TheOICWA requires the district court to seek a determination
of the Indian status of a child under the following circumstances:
1. The court has been informed by an interested party, an
officer of the court, the tribe, an Indian organization, or a
public or private agency that the child is Indian; or
2. The child who is the subject of the proceeding gives the
court reason to believe he [or she] is an Indian child; or
3. The court has reason to believe the residence or domicile
of the child is a predominantly Indian\community. 366
The district court must then seek verification of the Indian
status of the child from the Indian tribe or the BIA.367 A
determination of membership by an Indian tribe is conclusive 68
A determination of membership by the BIA is conclusive in the
362. 10 OxLA. STAT. § 40.4 (Supp. 1982).
363. Id. § 40.1.
364. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(l).
365. 10 OKRA. STAT. § 1116.1 (Supp. 1983).
366. Id. § 40.3(C)(1-3) (Supp. 1982). Compare Guidelines, supra note 63, at
B.l(c)(i),(iii), (iv). The Oklahoma Legislature has made these suggested guidelines man-
datory in Oklahoma state district court proceedings.
367. 10 OK.A. STAT. § 40.3(D) (Supp. 1982).
368. Id.
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absence of a contrary determination by the Indian tribe.36 9 The
determination of the Indian status of a child must be made as
soon as practicable to ensure compliance with the notice require-
ments of the OICWA. 370
The OICWA imposes on the district court the duty of sending
notice.371 In addition, the ICWA imposes the duty of sending
notice on the party seeking foster care placement of the Indian
child or termination of parental rights to the Indian child .37
This "double notice" is unfortunate, duplicative, and potentially
confusing. It places an unnecessary burden on an already over-
burdened state court system, and it places the court in the
position of being an advocate. The OICWA notice provision
should be revised to conform with the ICWA.
The OICWA, like the ICWA, requires notice by registered
mail, return receipt requested . 73 However, the OICWA simpli-
fies who is to receive notice by requiring that the following
persons receive notice:
1. The parents or Indian custodians, if any;
2. The tribe that may be the tribe of the Indian child; and
3. The appropriate BIA area office.37 4
The OICWA notice procedure is superior to that provided in
the ICWA in that all parties are given notice at once.375 The
OICWA mandates that the notice be written in clear and un-
derstandable language and that the notice include the following
information:
1. The name and tribal affiliation of the Indian child;
2. A copy of the petition by which the proceeding was initi-
ated;
3. A statement of the rights of the biological parents of
Indian custodians, and the Indian tribe:
a. to intervene in the proceeding,
b. to petition the court to transfer the proceeding to the
tribal court of the Indian child, and
369. Id. Compare Guidelines, supra note 63, at B.1(a), (b)(i)-(ii). Here again, the
Oklahoma Legislature has made the suggested guidelines mandatory state law.
370. 10 OimA. STAT. § 40.3(E) (Supp. 1982). The inquiry should be made by the
court at the initial appearance.
371. Id. § 40.4.
372. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).
373. 10 OaLA. STAT. § 40.4 (Supp. 1982).
374. Id.
375. Compare Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912.
[Vol. is
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c. to request an additional twenty (20) days from receipt of
notice to prepare for the proceeding; further extensions of
time may be granted with court approval;
4. A statement of the potential legal consequences of an
adjudication on the future custodial rights of the parent or
Indian custodians;
5. A statement that if the parents or Indian custodians are
unable to afford counsel, counsel will be appointed to rep-
resent them; and
6. A statement that tribal officials should keep confidential
the information contained in the notice.37 6
OICWA grants the biological parents or Indian custodians and
the Indian tribe the right to an additional twenty days from
receipt of the notice of hearing to prepare for the proceeding.
3v
They may request further extensions of time which are granted
at the court's discretion.3 78
Judicially-Created Exception to the Applicability of the ICWA
Congress clearly anticipated that state courts might have to
determine, in the first instance, whether ICWA applies in a
given case.379 For example, assume that a child is born out of
wedlock to a non-Indian mother, the child has never been a
resident or domiciliary of any Indian reservation, and the child
has never been a member of any Indian home or culture. Also
assume that the biological father of the child is a member of
an Indian tribe and that the child is eligible for membership in
that tribe.
Do the provisions of ICWA apply? State courts are divided
on this issue. Some states reject the notion of a judicially-created
exception to ICWA.380 They.reject the suggestion that there must
be an "existing Indian family unit" to trigger the applicability
of ICWA.3 1 However, in In re Adoption of Baby Boy L.,38 2
376. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 40.4(1-6) (Supp. 1982). Compare Guidelines, supra note 63,
at B.5(b) (i), (ii), (iii), (v), (vi), (vii), (ix), (x), (xi). The Oklahoma Legislature has
codified these recommended guidelines and made them mandatory state law.
377. 10 OxLA. STAT. § 40A(3)(c) (Supp. 1982).
378. Id.
379. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912.
380. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587, 591 (10th Cir. 1985); A.B.M.
v. M.H., 651 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Alaska 1982); In re Junious M., 144 Cal. App. 3d 786,
796, 193 Cal. Rptr. 40 (Cal. App. Dist. 1983); In re Custody of S.B.R., 43 Wash. App.
622, 719 P.2d 154, 156 (1986).
381. Id.
382. 231 Kan. 199, 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
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the Kansas Supreme Court held ICWA does not apply unless a
state court or agency attempts to remove an Indian child from
the child's existing family unit.38 3 According to the Kansas court,
"The overriding concern of Congress and the proponents of the
Indian Child Welfare Act was the maintenance of the family
and tribal relationships existing in Indian homes and to set
minimum standards for the removal of Indian children from
their existing Indian environment." 314 The Kansas Supreme Court
reasoned:
[In adopting the Indian Child Welfare Act, it was not the
intent of Congress] to dictate that [a child born out of
wedlock] who has never been a member of an Indian home
or culture, and probably never would be, should be removed
from his primary cultural heritage and placed in an Indian
environment over the express objection of its non-Indian
mother. 35
The Kansas Supreme Court also stated:
[T]he underlying thread that runs throughout the entire [In-
dian Child Welfare] Act [is] ... that the Act is concerned
with the removal of Indian children from an existing Indian
family unit and the resultant break-up the Indian family....
The [Federal Indian Child Welfare] Act principally applies to
cases where a state court or agency attempts to remove an
Indian child from his or her Indian home on grounds of the
alleged incompetence or brutality of the parents. 85
While Kansas may have been the first state to create an
exception to ICWA, it has not been the last. In 1985, a sharply
divided Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the Kansas view in
a pair of cases handed down on the same day: In re Adoption
of D.M.J. 3 7 and In re Adoption of Baby Boy D.388 D.M.J. was
a ten-year-old, half-Indian girl whose custody was awarded to
her non-Indian mother in the 1976 divorce of her parents. Her
father is a fullblood Cherokee Indian. In 1982, with the consent
of the mother, an adoption was arranged with a married couple
383. Id.
384. Id. at 175.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 175-76. The decision of the Kansas Supreme Court in In re Adoption of
Baby Boy L. was collaterally attacked in federal court. See Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma
v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587 (10th Cir., 1985).
387. 741 P.2d 1386 (Okla. 1985).
388. 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985).
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who were also non-Indian. Both the father and the Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma objected to the adoption and demanded
that the state court follow the provisions of ICWA and OICWA.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that neither ICWA nor
OICWA applied because the child was not being removed from
the custody of an Indian parent, and was not being removed
from an Indian environment. The court reasoned that the un-
derlying concerns of the ICWA are the removal of Indian
children from existing Indian family units and the resultant
breakup of Indian families. The court emphasized that pursuant
to the decree of divorce, the custodian of the child was the non-
Indian mother and the child was not being removed from a
home practicing the Indian lifestyle or the Indian culture. The
court therefore reasoned that there was no breakup of the Indian
family or interruption of the continued custody of the child by
an Indian parent. The court stated:
Congress appreciated, as do we, the culture shock and un-
derlying trauma in yanking a child from an Indian environ-
ment and placing the child in a non-Indian one. In like
manner, it provided no mandate that a child such as D. be
uprooted from a non-Indian environment and placed in an
Indian one .... The Indian Child Welfare Act applies only
in those situations where Indian children are being removed
from existing Indian family environments 289
The same day the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided D.M.J.,
it also handed down its decision in In re Adoption of Baby Boy
D.390 Baby Boy D was born out of wedlock to a seventeen-year-
old non-Indian girl. The father was alleged to be a member of
the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma. Even though the father knew
that his girlfriend was pregnant, he made no commitment to the
mother or the baby. He made no attempt to provide for the
mother during pregnancy. He offered neither financial support
nor marriage. The father knew the approximate date when the
baby was to be born. The mother specifically told the father
that once the baby was born she was going to put the baby up
for adoption. The father made no objection or response nor did
he attempt to learn when and where the baby was to be born.
He did not pay nor attempt to make any arrangements for the
payment of expenses related to the birth, nor the care of either
the mother or the child. Even after the baby's birth, the father
389. In re Adoption of D.M.J., 741 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Okla. 1985).
390. 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985).
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did not assume any parental responsibilities. He did not tele-
phone the mother until weeks after the child was born.
The mother consented to the baby's adoption by a married
couple. No notice of the adoption was given to the father, nor
was his consent obtained. The mother first learned that the
father wanted the baby when he filed suit to vacate the adoption.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the putative father
did not have standing under ICWA or OICWA to vacate the
decree of adoption. The court found that the purpose of ICWA
is to protect Indian children from the destruction of Indian
family units by child welfare agencies and courts. ICWA em-
phasized congressional intent to protect Indian children by set-
ting minimum federal standards for their removal from existing
Indian family units. In the instant case, the court reasoned, the
child's mother was a non-Indian and the child had never resided
with an Indian family. The court concluded the father lacked
standing to invoke the provisions of ICWA and OICWA.
The creation of a judicial exception by Kansas, Oklahoma,
and other states391 is most unfortunate. They misinterpret ICWA
and its legislative history. Their interpretation deprives Indian
children of their Indian heritage. The exception also deprives
the tribe of a potentially useful and productive member and
threatens the very existence of the tribe.
Congress was very specific in defining exactly when ICWA
applies.3 92 The act applies to all "child custody proceedings."
The act does not apply to divorce proceedings where custody of
the child is awarded to one of the parents, or to juvenile
delinquency proceedings. Further, even assuming an ambiguity
exists, that ambiguity should be interpreted for the benefit of
Indians.393 Indeed, the four dissenters in Adoption of D.M.J.
would extend the coverage of ICWA to the Indian child's ex-
tended family members-aunts, uncles, grandparents, nieces,
nephews, sisters or brothers-in-laws, step-parents, and first or
second cousins. 394 The creation of this exception amounts to
391. See, e.g., In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 303 (Ind. 1988); In re
S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 609 (Mo. App. 1986); Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650,
654 (S.D. 1987).
392. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. 1903(1).
393. Ahboah v. Housing Authority of the Kiowa Tribe, 660 P.2d 625, 631 (Okla.
1983); D.M.J., 741 P.2d at 1391 (Okla. 1985) ( Hodges, Lavender, Opala & Kauger,
JJ., dissenting).
394. D.M.J., 741 P.2d at 1390; Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C.
1903(2); H.R. REp. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 20 (1977).
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judicial legislation. Congress, not the courts, has the responsi-
bility to legislate.
Indian's Right to Intervene in State Court Proceedings
The ICWA provides that the Indian custodian of an Indian
child and the Indian child's tribe have the right to intervene at
any point in state court proceedings for the foster care
placement395 of or termination of parental rights396 to an Indian
child.3 97
Transfer of the Case from State Court to Tribal Court
As previously discussed, the Indian tribe has exclusive juris-
diction as to any state over any Indian child who is a ward of
the tribal court. 398 In addition, the Indian tribe has exclusive
jurisdiction over any child custody proceeding involving an In-
dian child who resides or is domiciled on the tribe's reservation,
except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the state
by existing federal law.3 9 However, in those cases where the
Indian child is not a ward of the tribal court or a resident or
domicile within the tribe's reservation, the state court exercises
concurrent jurisdiction with the tribal court.4
While recognizing this concurrent jurisdiction, the ICWA grants
Indian tribes the prerogative of presumptive jurisdiction over
nondomicilary Indian childrene1 and provides a procedure for
395. Indian Child welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. 1903(1)(i). "Foster care place-
ment" means any action removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian
for temporary placement in a foster home or institution or the home of a guardian or
conservator where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have the child returned upon
demand, but where parental rights have not been terminated.
396. Id. 1903(l)(i). "Termination of parental rights" means any action resulting in




400. The Guidelines recommend that in any Indian child custody proceeding in state
court, the state court should determine the residence and domicile of the child. If either
the residence or domicile is on a reservation where the tribe exercises exclusive jurisdiction
over child custody proceedings, the proceedings in state court should be immediately
dismissed due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, except in emergency situations. If
the Indian child has previously resided or been domiciled on the reservation, the state
court should contact the tribal court to determine whether the child is a ward of the
tribal court. Again, if the child is a ward of a tribal court, the state court proceedings
should be immediately dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, except in
emergency situations. See Guidelines, supra note 63, at B.4 and accompanying com-
mentary.
401. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989).
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transferring cases from state court to tribal court. Title 25
U.S.C. § 1911(b) provides:
In any state court proceeding for the foster care placement
of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child not
domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian
child's tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the
contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of
the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the petition
of either parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian child's
tribe, provided that such transfer shall be subject to decli-
nation by the tribal court of such tribe.4 2
ICWA authorizes only a parent, Indian custodian, or the
Indian child's tribe to petition the state court to transfer. 43 The
request should be made promptly after receiving notice of the
pendency of the state court proceeding.4 If the petition to
transfer is made orally it should be reduced to writing by the
state court and made a part of the record. 405
Upon receipt of a petition to transfer the case, the state court
must transfer unless: (1) either parent objects to the transfer,
(2) the tribal court declines to accept the transfer, or (3) the
state court finds "good cause" to deny the transfer exists.406
In effect, ICWA grants parents and the tribal court an ab-
solute veto over transfers. When a state court receives a petition
to transfer, it should notify the tribal court in writing of the
proposed transfer. 407 The tribal court should be afforded at least
twenty days from the date of receipt of the notice of the
proposed transfer to make its decisions.4°8
Parties should file with the tribal court any arguments they
wish to make regarding whether the tribal court should accept
or decline transfer.40 If the tribal court accepts transfer, "the
state court should provide the tribal court with all available
information on the case. "410 If the tribal court declines transfer,
or if either parent objects to the transfer, the state court cannot
transfer the case. 411
402. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. 1911(b).
403. Id. 1911(b).
404. Id.
405. Guidelines, supra note 63, at C.1.
406. Id. at C.2(a).
407. Id. at G.4(b).
408. Id. at C.5(b).
409. Id. at CA(c).
* 410. Id. at CA(d).
411. Id. at C.2 (commentary).
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Good Cause Not To Transfer
Even if the tribal court is willing to accept transfer and neither
parent objects, the state court may deny the petition to transfer
if there is "good cause" to retain the case.4 2 If the state court
believes or any party asserts that "good cause" exists, the
reasons for such belief should be stated in writing and made
available to the parties. The petitioners should then have an
opportunity to present the state court with their views on whether
"good cause" to deny transfer exists.4 13 "Good cause" exists if
the Indian child's tribe does not have a tribal court as defined
in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(12). 414 "Good cause" may also exist if the
state court proceeding is "at an advanced state when the petition
to transfer [is] received and the petitioner did not file the petition
promptly after receiving notice of the hearing." 415
"Good cause" to deny the transfer may occur where the
Indian child is over twelve years of age and objects to the
transfer.4 6 or where the Indian child is over five years of age,
the child's parents are unavailable, and the child has had little
or no contact with his or her tribe.4 7 The guidelines
encourage the prompt exercise of the right to petition for
transfer in order to avoid unnecessary delays. Long periods
of uncertainty concerning the future are generally regarded as
harmful to the well-being of children. For that reason, it is
especially important to avoid unnecessary delays in child cus-
tody proceedings.4 18
The burden rests upon the state to show "good cause" why the
proceeding should not be transferred to the tribal court.419
412. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. 1911(b).
413. Guidelines, supra note 63, at C.2(b).
414. Id. at C.3(a).
415. Id. at C.3(b)(i). When a party who could have petitioned earlier waits until the
case is almost complete to ask that it be transferred to another court, and retried, good
cause exists to deny the request. See id. at C.1 (commentary). If a transfer petition
must be honored at any point before judgment, a party could wait to see how the trial
is going in state court, and then obtain another trial if it appears the other side will
win. Delaying a transfer request could be used as a tactic to wear down the other side
by requiring the case to be tried twice. The ICWA was not intended to authorize such
tactics, and the "good cause" provision is ample authority for the state court to prevent
such action. Id.
416. Id. at C.3(b)(ii).
417. Id. at (iv).
418. Id. at C.3 (commentary).
419. In re Adoption of R.R.R., 763 P.2d 94 (Okla. 1988); In re N.L., 754 P.2d
863, 869 (Okla. 1988); In re GLOC, 205 Mont. 352, 668 P.2d 235, 237 (1983); In re
M.E.M., 195 Mont. 329, 635 P.2d 1313, 1317 (1981).
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ICWA's legislative history indicates that the "good cause"
exception was also designed to allow state courts to apply a
"modified doctrine of forum non conveniens. ' '420 As modified
for the Indian child custody context, forum non conveniens
requires the state court to determine whether the tribal court is
a less convenient forum. The state court should consider the
rights of the Indian parents, the Indian custodian (if any), the
Indian child, and the tribe.421 The state courts have uniformly
applied forum non conveniens when deciding whether "good
cause" to deny a transfer exists. 422 If virtually all the witnesses
and parties reside in the county of a state court and have no
contact with the tribal court, then transfer may be denied for
"good cause." 423
The state court may also deny transfer for "good cause" if
the state has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the
best interests of the child would be injured by the transfer. 424
In In re N.., 42 1 the mother sought to transfer the proceedings
from the state court of Okmulgee County, Oklahoma, to the
tribal court located in Kay County, Oklahoma. All of the wit-
nesses and the child resided in Okmulgee County. The mother
resided in Oklahoma County, Oklahoma.
The court held that the presence of witnesses and parties in
Okmulgee County constituted "good cause" to deny the trans-
fer. The court also held that "good cause" to deny transfer
exists where all of the parties and witnesses reside in the county
of the state court and have no contact with the tribal court.426
Finally, the court held that the best interests of the child may
prevent transfer of jurisdiction to a tribal court.427 The court
found that "good cause" to deny the transfer existed because
the child was well cared for under the supervision of the state
court, the child had established "roots" in Okmulgee County,
and the state court was working hard towards the goal of getting
420. See H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmv. NEws 7543; see generally In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863 (Okla.
1988) (Opala, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
421. N.L., 754 P.2d at 876 (Opala, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
422. Id. See also In re J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d 311, 317 (Iowa 1984).
423. Id. See also In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. 199, 643 P.2d 168, 178
(1982).
424. Id., See also In re M.E.M., 195 Mont. 319, 635 P.2d 1313, 1318 (1981).
425. 754 P.2d 863 (Okla. 1988).
426. Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. at 210, 643 P.2d at 171; In re Bird Head, 213 Neb.
741, 331 N.W.2d 785, 790 (1983).
427. M.E.M., 195 Mont. at 329, 635 P.2d at 1317.
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the mother back with the child. The court therefore held that
the best interests of the child prevented transfer of jurisdiction
to the tribal court.42
Reasonable Efforts to Keep the Child in the Home
Every reasonable effort should be made to keep the child
safely in the home pending further court proceedings. The Ju-
venile Code provides that no order of the court removing an
alleged or adjudicated deprived child from home shall be entered
unless the court finds that the continuation of the child in the
home is contrary to the child's welfare.429 The court's order
removing the child must contain either:
(1) a determination as to whether reasonable efforts have been
made to prevent the need for the removal of the child from
its home and, as appropriate, reasonable efforts have been
made to provide for the return of the child to home; or
(2) a determination as to whether or not an absence of efforts
to prevent the removal of the child from home is reasonable
under the circumstances, if the removal is due to an alleged
emergency and is for the purpose of providing for the child's
safety.4 0
If the child is an "Indian child," the party seeking to remove
the child from home bears the burden of proving to the state
court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial
services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the
breakup of the Indian family and that those efforts have proven
unsuccessful. 431 As discussed in more detail later, no foster care
placement may be ordered for an Indian child unless the state
court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, including testi-
mony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody
of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result
in the serious emotional or physical harm to the child.42
428. N.L., 754 P.2d at 869.
429. 10 OY-LA. STAT. § 1104.1(D) (Supp. 1984).
430. Id. Under federal law the DHS cannot be reimbursed for the cost of the child's
out-of-home placement unless the "reasonable efforts" requirement is met. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(15), 672(a)(1).
431. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). The reasonable efforts made in order to prevent the need
for removal of the child from home should take into account the prevailing social and
cultural conditions and way of life of the Indian child's tribe. They should also involve
and use the available resources of the extended family, the tribe, Indian social service
agencies and the individual Indian care givers. See Guidelines, supra note 63, at D.2.
432. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e).
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Guardian Ad Litem and Court Appointed Special Advocates
When a petition is filed alleging that a child is deprived, the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the child and the
court must appoint a guardian ad litem upon the request of the
child or the child's attorney.433 The court may also appoint a
"court appointed special advocate," also known as a CASA
volunteer. 4 4 A CASA volunteer is a responsible adult, other
than an attorney for the parties, who represents a child where
a juvenile petition has been filed until discharged by the court.
It is the duty of the CASA volunteer to be an advocate for the
best interests of the child and to assist the child in obtaining a
permanent, safe homelike placement. 45
Adjudication
The Deprived-Status Adjudicatory Hearing
The Juvenile Code recognizes two types of hearings: adjudi-
catory and dispositional. 4 6 The adjudicatory hearing is the heart
of the deprived child proceeding. Its purpose is to determine
whether the allegations of the deprived child petition are sup-
ported by the evidence and whether the child should be adjudged
a ward of the court. 4 7 If the child is adjudged "deprived" the
court holds a separate dispositional hearing. 48
Time for Holding the Adjudicatory Hearing
The Juvenile Code provides a minimum time period that must
be observed before the adjudicatory hearing is held. The court
may not hold the adjudicatory hearing until at least forty-eight
hours after service of summons, except with the consent of the
parent or guardian; until at least five days if served out of state;
433. 10 Oi.A. STAT. § 1109(C) (Supp. 1988). The guardian ad litem cannot be the
district attorney, an employee of the office of the district attorney, an employee of the
court, an employee of a juvenile bureau, or an employee of any public agency having
duties or responsibilities towards the child, but the guardian ad litem may be a court
appointed special advocate.
434. Id. § 1109(D).
435. Id. The CASA volunteer serves without compensation, enjoys a statutory prima
facie presumption of acting in good faith, and is immune from civil liability. The CASA
volunteer is entitled to access to the court file and all records, reports, and examinations.
436. A.E. v. State, 743 P.2d 1041, 1047 (Okla. 1987).
437. 10 Oxra. STAT. § 1101(8) (Supp. 1988).
438. Id. § 1101(9).
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and until at least ten days if served by publication.4 39 The
purpose of the waiting period is to give parties time to prepare
for the adjudicatory hearing and to prevent a hearing that does
not comport with due process." 0 However, the hearing must be
conducted timely."'
Trial Court's Duty to Inquire Under the UCCJA
Before conducting the adjudicatory hearing, the court must
examine the pleadings and other information supplied by the
parties, including each party's mandatory UCCJA pleading or
affidavit,42 consult the child custody registry maintained by the
court clerk" 3 to determine if there is a case concerning the child
pending in another state, and determine if other juvenile pro-
ceedings alleging the child to be deprived, in need of supervision,
or delinquent are pending or have been adjudicated.4" If the
court has reason to believe that proceedings may be pending in
another state, the Oklahoma court directs an inquiry to the state
court administrator or other appropriate official of the other
state." 5 If the Oklahoma court is advised that a proceeding
concerning the custody of the child was pending in another state
before the Oklahoma court assumed jurisdiction, the Oklahoma
court stays its proceedings and communicates with the court in
439. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1105 (1981). If one or more persons must be served by
publication, and if it appears that the court must order the child to be held in a place
of detention in order to meet the requirement of section 1105 with respect to the time
for holding the adjudicatory hearing, when a party can be served only by publication,
the court, may advance the date of the hearing, with reasonable notice to the other
persons who have been served or are properly and legally notified, to any date that the
court determines to be reasonable and may proceed with the action. However, an order
determining that a child is deprived shall not become final until 30 days after the date
of publication of the notice.
440. York v. Halley, 534 P.2d 363, 365 (Okla. 1975).
441. York, 534 P.2d at 365.
442. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1611 (1981).
443. See id. § 1618:
The clerk of each district court shall maintain a registry in which he shall enter the
following:
1. certified copies of custody decrees of other states received for filing;
2. communications as to the pendency of custody proceedings in other states;
3. communications concerning a finding of inconvenient forum by a court of
another state; and
4. other communications or documents concerning custody proceedings in another
state which may affect the jurisdiction of a court of this state or the disposition to
be made by it in a custody proceeding.
444. 10 OKRA. STAT. § 1608(B) (Supp. 1982).
445. Id.
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which the other proceeding is pending so that the child custody
proceeding may be litigated in the more appropriate forum, and
exchange information."4 If the Oklahoma court has made a
custody decree before being informed of a pending proceeding
in a court of another state, the Oklahoma court immediately
informs the court of the fact. 447 If the Oklahoma court is
informed that a proceeding was commenced in another state
after Oklahoma assumed jurisdiction, it informs the other court
so that the issue may be litigated in the more appropriate
forum.4
Right to Assistance of Counsel
In Oklahoma, the child, parents, and other interested parties
have the right to be represented by counsel.449 However, the
reality of deprived child proceedings is that few of the parties
have the financial resources to hire their own lawyer. The ques-
tion then becomes whether a poor litigant is entitled to court-
appointed counsel. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv-
ices,450 the United States Supreme Court addressed this question
in the context of a parent's right to counsel in a proceeding to
terminate parental rights. In analyzing the sixth amendment right
to counsel451 and the fourteenth amendment due process xight
to "fundamental fairness,1 4 2 the Court stated that an indigent's
right to appointed counsel exists only where the litigant may
lose physical liberty. It is the defendant's interest in personal
freedom which triggers the right to appointed counsel. 413
In the context of a deprived child proceeding, it is not the
parents' personal freedom that is at risk, but rather the parents'
right to the companionship, care, custody and management of
their child.45 Deprived child proceedings infringe upon that
right; proceedings to terminate parental rights threaten to end
it. Nevertheless, the Court declined to find a federal constitu-
446. Id. § 1608(C); see also 10 Ox.A. STAT. § 1621 (1981).
447. 10 Ox. STAT. § 1608(C) (Supp. 1982).
448. Id.
449. 10 OLA. STAT. § 1104(a) (1981).
450. Lassiter v. Dep't. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
451. U.S. Co~sT. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to ... the assistance of counsel for his defense."
452. Id. amend. XIV: "IN]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... "
453. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967). In juvenile delinquency proceedings
in which the juvenile's freedom may be curtailed, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires that the juvenile have the right to appointed counsel.
454. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (1981).
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tional right to court appointed counsel. Instead, the Court left
the decision to state courts to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
The Court suggested that wise public policy might require higher
standards than the minimally tolerable ones found in the United
States Constitution.455
Oklahoma shows a high degree of sensitivity to the plight of
impoverished litigants involved in deprived child proceedings.
4 6
In 1968 the Oklahoma Legislature enacted statutes providing for
appointment of counsel in juvenile proceedings. 4 7 Concerning
the child, the legislature made no requirement that the child or
the child's parents be indigent for counsel to be appointed. The
court must appoint separate and independent counsel, other than
a district attorney, to be counsel for the child and represent the
interests of the child.4 8 Counsel for the child must be appointed,
regardless of any attempted waiver by the parents or other legal
custodian of the child of the right of the child to be represented
by counsel, unless the child is already represented by counsel. 459
The policy favoring independent counsel for the child is sup-
455. Id. at 33.
456. In re Rich, 604 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Okla. 1979).
457. See 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 163, § I (now codified as 10 OKLA. STAT. § 24
(Supp. 1989)); 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 282, § 109 (effective Jan. 13, 1969) (now
codified as 10 OumA. STAT. § 1109(B) (Supp. 1986)). Title 10 OKA. STAT. § 24(A)
(Supp. 1989) provides:
When it appears to the court that the minor or his parent or guardian desires counsel
but is indigent and cannot for that reason employ counsel, the court shall appoint
counsel. In any case in which it appears to the court that there is such a conflict of
interest between a parent or guardian and the child that one attorney could not
properly represent both, the court may appoint counsel, in addition to counsel
already employed by a parent or a guardian or appointed by the court to represent
the minor or parent or guardian, provided that in all counties having public defenders,
said public defender shall assume the duties of representation in proceedings such
as above.
10 OKLA. STAT. § 1109(B) (Supp. 1986) provides:
If the parents, guardian or other legal custodian of the child requests an attorney,
and if found to be without sufficient financial means, counsel shall be appointed by
the court if a petition has been filed alleging the child is a deprived child.. .or if
termination of parental rights is a possible remedy, provided that the court may
appoint counsel without such request if it deems representation by counsel necessary
to protect the interests of the parents, guardian or other legal custodian. If the child
is not otherwise represented by counsel whenever a petition is filed pursuant to the
provisions of section 1103 of this Title, the court shall appoint a separate attorney,
who shall not be a district attorney, for the child regardless of any attempted waiver
by the parent or other legal custodian of the child of the right of the child to be
represented by counsel.
458. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1109(B) (Supp. 1986).
459. Id.
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ported by the Uniform Juvenile Court Act adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1968, which provides in Rule 26(a)
for separate counsel in juvenile proceedings if the interests of
two or more parties conflict:4"
The matter of independent representation by counsel, so that
a child may have his own attorney when his welfare is at
stake, is the most significant and practical reform that can
be made in the area of children and the law. Tlie rights and
sometimes the interest of children are frequently jeopardized
in court proceedings because of the best interes§ of a child
are determined without the resort to an independent advocate
for the child. Courts may fail to perceive childien and the
interests of other parties require that the child have separate
counsel. Too often the judge assumes the child's interests are
adequately protected by the DHS. This position is undermined
when DHS is challenged and as such it becomes an interested
part, the source of the inquiry.46'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has interpreted the Juvenile Code
to require the state to be responsible for assuring that the child
is adequately represented, and that such representation not de-
pend upon financial ability.462
While the Juvenile Code guarantees the parent, guardian or
other legal custodian the right to counsel, their right to court-
appointed counsel is expressly predicated upon financial need. 463
Implicit in the right to counsel is the indigent's right to notice
that counsel will be provided without expense. 46 Parties are first
advised of their right to counsel in the summons. 465 Unfortu-
nately, the Juvenile Code does not require the summons to state
on its face that if a party is financially unable to hire an attorney,
one will be appointed by the court at no expense. However, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court recommends that judges advise all
parties of their right to counsel and the procedure for requesting
court-appointed counsel. 46 Counsel must be appointed for in-
digents unless knowingly and intelligently waived. 467
460. In re T.M.H., 613 P.2d 468, 470 (Okla. 1980).
461. Id. at 470.
462. A.E. v. State, 743 P.2d 1041, 1044 n.6 (Okla. 1987); In re Christopher W.,
626 P.2d 1320, 1322-23 (Okla. 1980).
463. A.E., 743 P.2d at 1044 n.6; Christopher W., 626 P.2d at 1322.
464. In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983, 986 (Okla. 1978).
465. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1104(a) (1981) provides in relevant part: "T]he summons
shall . . . set forth the right of the child, parents, and other interested parties to have
an attorney present at the hearing on the petition."
466. In re F.K.C., 742 P.2d 774, 776 (Okla. 1980).
467. In re J.W., 742 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).
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Right to Assistance of Counsel for Indian Children
There are special rights to counsel in deprived Indian child
proceedings. ICWA provides that if the state court determines
indigency, the parent or Indian custodian has the right to court-
appointed counsel in removal, placement and termination pro-
ceedings.468 The state court may, in its discretion, also appoint
counsel to represent the child if the court finds it is in the best
interests of the child.45 9 In states having no law for the appoint-
ment of counsel, the state court must promptly notify the Sec-
retary of Interior upon the appointment of counsel, and the
Secretary, upon certification of the state court presiding judge,
must pay reasonable fees and expenses. 470
The Guidelines recommend that if a parent or Indian custo-
dian appears in court without an attorney, the state court should
immediately inform them of the right to appointed counsel, the
right to request the proceedings be transferred to tribal court
(or to object to such transfer), the right to request additional
time to prepare for the proceeding, and the right ( if the parent
or Indian custodian is not already a party) to intervene in the
proceedings. 471 The Oklahoma Court of Appeals has held that
the right to counsel is an element of procedural due process 472
as well as a mandate of the ICWA.473 Counsel must be appointed
unless knowingly and intelligently waived.474 The assistance of
counsel is a statutory requisite under ICWA.475 As such, the
right does not depend on a specific request. 476
ICWA-Right of Access to Reports
Each party to a foster care placement or termination of
parental rights proceedings under state law involving an Indian
468. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b).
469. Id.
470. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (b) and mandatory
rules promulgated by the Secretary of Interior in 25 C.F.R. § 23.13 (1988) (payment
for appointed counsel in state Indian child custody proceedings). Funds may be appro-
priated under 25 U.S.C. § 13.
471. Guidelines, supra note 63, at B.5(f).
472. J.W., 742 P.2d at 1174. The court of appeals did not specify whether it was
referring to the due process clause of the United States Constitution, or the Oklahoma
Constitution's counterpart, found in OKLA. CoNsr. art. II, § 7. However, a fair reading
of the United States Supreme Court decision in Lassiter would suggest that the court
of appeals was referring to the Oklahoma Constitution.
473. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b).
474. J.W., 742 P.2d at 1174.
475. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b).
476. J.W., 742 P.2d at 1174.
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child has the right to examine all reports or other documents
filed with the court, upon which any decision with respect to
such action may be based.47 The Guidelines recommend that no
decision of the state court be based on any report or document
not filed with the court.478
Referees
Judges with juvenile docket responsibility in the larger coun-
ties in Oklahoma (population greater than 100,000) may appoint
specially-qualified lawyers to act as referees.479 The referee hears
the case in the first instance in the same manner provided for
the hearing of cases by the court. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the referee transmits to the court all papers relating to
the case, along with the referee's written findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, and recommendations .4 0 Notice of the referee's
findings, conclusions and recommendations must be given to the
parent, guardian or custodian of the child, or to any other
person concerned whose case has been heard by the referee.4 18
A hearing by the district court must be allowed upon the filing
of a request for such hearing with the court within three days
after service of notice of the referee's findings and recommen-
dations. The purpose of the hearing is to object to all or parts
of the referee's findings and conclusions, and to determine those
objections. Where objections are made to the referee's report,
the court may reopen the matter for further evidence. How-
ever, if the only questions before the court are matters of law,
no evidentiary hearing is required.483 If no hearing is requested,
the referee's findings and recommendations, when confirmed by
court order, become the decree of the court.4 4
Right to Jury Trial
The United States Constitution does not mandate a trial by
jury in juvenile proceedings. 485 While the sixth amendment right
477. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(c).
478. Guidelines, supra note 63, at D.1 and accompanying commentary. The guide-
lines suggest that it was Congress' implicit assumption that the state courts would limit
their consideration to those documents and reports that have been filed with the court.
479. 10 Or.A. STAT. § 1126 (1981).
480. Id. § 1126(a).
481. Id. § 1126(b).
482. In re Ernest James C., 578 P.2d 352, 355 (Okla. 1978).
483. Id.
484. 10 OxLA. STAT. § 1126 (1981).
485. A.E. v. State, 743 P.2d 1041, 1049 (Okla. 1987) (Opala, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss1/2
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to a jury trial in criminal proceedings48 6 is binding on the
states,4 7 juvenile proceedings to determine a child's deprived
status are civil in nature and hence are outside the ambit of the
sixth amendment.4 88 The right to jury trial in suits at common
law preserved by the seventh amendment 4 9 applies only to civil
suits filed in federal court, not state court.49° As for due process
under the fourteenth amendment, the United States Supreme
Court held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania4 91 that the due process
clause does not mandate trial by jury in the adjudicatory phase
of state juvenile delinquency proceeding. 492 The rationale of
McKeiver applies with even greater force to deprived-status pro-
ceedings. Therefore, the question of trial by jury is one of state
law.493
Oklahoma is one of the few states which provides, by con-
stitution and statute, greater safeguards for the rights of juven-
iles than required by the United States Constitution.494 In 1909,
the Oklahoma Legislature enacted a statutory right to trial by
jury in juvenile cases. 495 In a 1968 election, the right was incor-
porated into Oklahoma's Constitution. 49 6 Today, the child or
486. U.S. Corsr. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed."
487. Duncan v. State of Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); Bloom v. State of
Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 200 (1968).
488. A.E., 743 P.2d at 1049 (Opala, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
489. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII: "In suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed $20, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law."
490. Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 (1877); Maryland National Insurance Co.
v. District Court, 455 P.2d 690, 692 (Okla. 1969).
491. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
492. Id. at 545-50.
493. A.E., 743 P.2d at 1045.
494. Alfrod v. Carter, 504 P.2d 436, 439 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
495. 1909 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 14 at 186 (now codified as amended at 10 OKLA.
STAT. § 1110 (Supp. 1986)).
496. The Oklahoma Constitution provides:
The right of trial by jury shall be and remain inviolate, except in civil cases wherein
the amount in controversy does not exceed $100, or in criminal cases wherein
punishment for the offense charged is by fine only, not exceeding $100.00 ....
Juries for the trial of ... juvenile proceedings ... shall consist of 6 persons. In
civil cases and in criminal cases less than felonies, three-fourths of the whole number
of jurors concurring shall have power to render a verdict .... In case a verdict is
rendered by less than the whole number of jurors, the verdict shall be in writing
and signed by each juror concurring therein.
OKRA. CoNsT. art. II, § 19.
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any person entitled to service of summons has the right to
demand a trial by jury or the court may call a jury on its own
motion.49 The right to jury trial applies to two types of adju-
dicatory hearings: the hearing to determine the child's deprived
status, and the hearing to terminate parental rights.4 98
Demand for Jury Trial and Peremptory Challenges
Before 1968, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals inter-
preted Oklahoma's statutory right to jury trial as requiring a
party who wanted a jury trial to demand it. Otherwise, the right
was considered waived. 499 However, now that right to jury trial
has been elevated to constitutional importance, it cannot be
surrendered except by voluntary consent or waiver.5°°
Deprived child proceedings affect three distinct interests: a
parental claim to the child, the state's responsibility to afford
protection to underage citizenry, and the child's claim to a
wholesome milieu free from harm of abuse and neglect.50 1 There-
fore, each of the three sides is entitled to three peremptory jury
challenges.502
The Rules of Evidence
Adjudicatory hearings are conducted according to the rules
of evidence.503 A decision that the child is deprived must be
based on sworn testimony.504 The child must have the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine unless the facts are stipulated. 50s
Of course, applying the rules of evidence in the context of a
deprived child proceeding may present practical problems of
proof. Child abuse often occurs at home behind closed doors.
The child may be the only witness to the abuse, and the child's
testimony is usually crucial to the case. While the child may be
competent to give in-court testimony,506 the trauma of in-court
testimony, including face-to-face confrontation with the alleged
497. 10 OKu. STAT. § 1110 (Supp. 1986).
498. A.E., 743 P.2d at 1046.
499. Ex parte Norris, 268 P.2d 302, 303 (1954) (Syllabus by the Court No. 4); Ex
parte Baeza, 85 Okla. Crim. 76, 185 P.2d 242, 243 (1947) (Syllabus by the Court No.
2).
500. A.E., 743 P.2d at 1048.
501. In re T.R.W., 722 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Okla. 1985) (quoting In re T.H.L., 636
P.2d 330, 332 (Okla. 1981)).
502. 12 OxLA. STAT. § 575.1 (1981); T.R.W., 722 P.2d at 1197.
503. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1111 (1981).
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. 12 OKA. STAT. § 2601 (1981).
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abuser and the rigors of cross examination, may further injure
the child. In an effort to protect the child from being injured
by the search for truth, the Oklahoma Legislature has enacted
three alternatives to in-court testimony for children twelve years
of age or younger.
First, the legislature amended the Oklahoma Evidence Code
to provide an exception to the hearsay rule, under specified
conditions, for statements describing an act of sexual contact
performed with or on a child. 07 Second, the legislature amended
the Juvenile Code to provide for closed circuit television testi-
mony of an alleged abused child °S Finally, the Legislature
amended the Juvenile Code to permit the admissibility of a
video taped deposition of a child alleged to be abused.5 9 In
addition to these special provisions, the trial court retains its
discretion to allow hearsay under the "catch-all" exceptions
under the Oklahoma Evidence Code, sections 2803(24)510 and
2804(5).51
In In re W.D.,512 the state brought an action to adjudicate a
child to be deprived on the ground of sexual abuse by the father.
The petition set forth explicit sexual acts which the father alleg-
edly committed on the child. Although the child disclosed the
sexual contact to a DHS social worker and a psychologist, the
child expressed fear in talking about the incident because the
child believed it was a secret and was afraid of getting himself
or his father in trouble. Pursuant to title 12, section 2803.1 of
the Oklahoma Statutes, 53 the social worker and the psychologist
related the child's statements during their testimony at trial. 1 4
The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the validity of the statute
against a constitutional attack. The court stated that the purpose
of the statute was to protect wholly dependent sexually abused
children.
In proceedings involving the care and custody of abused-
children, the state is vitally interested and is regarded as in the
507. 12 OKnA. STAT. § 2803 (Supp. 1986).
508. 12 OxLA. STAT. § 1148 (Supp. 1984).
509. Id. § 1147, but see Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802 (1988) (holding that a
criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to face-to-face confrontation with an
accuser). Coy may seriously limit alternatives to in-court testimony even in civil deprived
child proceedings.
510. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2303(24) (1981).
511. Id. § 2804(5).
512. 709 P.2d 1037 (Okla. 1985).
513. 12 OKx.A. STAT. § 2803.1 (Supp. 1986).
514. See also L. WRmsity, OKr.Axo Evmi~cn: GumE To nm OKL.HoiHA EvI-
DENCE CODE 91 (Supp. 1988).
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position of parens patriae. The state's duty to protect children
within its borders is neither arbitrary nor capricious, and bears
a substantial rational relationship to an important government
interest.1 5 The court further held that the out-of-court state-
ments of the child are not conclusive upon the trier of fact and
any adversely affected parties may testify and present evidence
in their own behalf, cross-examine any witnesses to whom the
child made statements, deny and refute the accuracy of the
statements, and advance whatever arguments that can be made
to support the party's position. Under these circumstances, the
sensitive and practical considerations involved in confronting a
child of tender years1 6 on a courtroom witness stand mitigate
heavily against stringent notions of procedural importunity, es-
pecially so where the statements complained of bear sufficient
indicia of reliability. 51
The district courts are admonished to carefully apply these
evidentiary exceptions. For example, in In re J.J.J.18 the Okla-
homa Court of Appeals reversed the district court, instructing
on remand that the district court meticulously follow the pro-
cedural requirements of title 12, section 2803.1, and title 10,
sections 1147 and 1148 of the Oklahoma Statutes. 19
Standard of Proof
In litigation, there is always a margin of error representing
error in fact finding, which all parties must take into account. 50
At the adjudicatory hearing to determine a child's deprived
status, the state bears the burden of proof.5 21 The standard of
proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. 5 2
Special Standard of Proof and
Evidentiary Requirements for Indian Child Proceedings
ICWA provides that no foster care placement may be ordered
by the state court in the absence of a determination, supported
515. In re W.D., 709 P.2d 1037, 1042 (Okla. 1985).
516. The statute was amended in 1986 to increase the age limit from 10 to 12 years.
See 1986 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 87, § 1 (effective July 1, 1986).
517. W.D., 709 P.2d at 1043.
518. 741 P.2d 491 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).
519. In re J.J.J., 741 P.2d 491, 492 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987) (citing 12 OMA. STAT.
§ 2803.1 (Supp. 1986) and 10 Oxc.A. STAT. §§ 1147, 1148 (Supp. 1984)).
520. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 525-26 (1958)).
521. See 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1114(A) (Supp. 1986); In re Christopher H., 577 P.2d
1292, 1293 (Okla. 1987).
522. In re J.B., 643 P.2d 306, 308 (Okla. 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss1/2
PROTECTING ABUSED CHILDREN
by clear and convincing evidence, including testimony of qual-
ified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child
by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical harm to the child.52 Evidence showing
only the existence of community or family poverty, crowded or
inadequate housing, alcohol abuse, or nonconforming social
behavior does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that
continued custody is likely to result in serious emotional or
physical harm to the child.54 To be clear and convincing, the
evidence must show the existence of particular conditions in the
home that are likely to result in serious emotional or physical
harm to the particular child who is the subject of the proceed-
ing.5  The evidence must show the causal relationship between
the conditions that exist and the damage that is likely to result.. 26
Congress attributed many unwarranted removals of Indian
children to cultural bias on the part of social workers and state
courts. In many cases children were removed merely because the
family did not conform to the decision-maker's stereotype of
what a proper family should be. Mere nonconformance with
such stereotypes or the existence of other behavior or conditions
that &re considered bad does not justify removing the child from
the home. The focus must be on whether the particular condi-
tions are likely to cause serious harm. 527 The issue on which
qualified expert testimony is required is whether serious harm
to the child is likely to occur if the child is not removed from
the home.528
The Guidelines suggest that the following persons are likely
to meet the requirements of a qualified expert witness:
(i) a member of the Indian child's tribe who is recognized by
the tribal community as knowledgeable in tribal customs as
they pertain to family organization and child-rearing practices;
(ii) a lay-expert witness having substantial experience in the
delivery of child and family services to Indians, and extensive
knowledge of prevailing social and cultural standards in child-
rearing practices within the Indian child's tribe; or
(iii) a professional person having substantial education and
experience in the area of his [or her] specialty.529
523. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(3).
524. Guidelines, supra note 63, at D.3(c).
525. Id.
526. rd.
527. Guidelines, supra note 63, at D.3 (commentary).
528. Id. at D.4 (commentary).
529. Id. at D.4(b)(i)-(iii).
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The court or any party may request the assistance of the
Indian child's tribe or the BIA in locating persons qualified to
serve as expert witnesses.530 Upon request, the BIA is required
to assist the state court and interested parties in identifying
qualified expert witnesses.-31 If a person of Indian descent who
is participating in the deprived child proceeding cannot speak
English, the BIA must assist in helping to identify appropriate
interpreters . 32 The required expert testimony is to provide the
court with knowledge of the social and cultural aspects of Indian
life to diminish the risk of any cultural bias.5 3
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held in In re N.L. 534 that
special knowledge of Indian life is not necessary if a professional
person has substantial education and experience and testifies on
matters not implicating cultural bias.535 Where cultural bias is
clearly not implicated, expert witnesses who do not possess
special knowledge of Indian life may provide the necessary proof
that continued custody of the child by the parent will result in
serious emotional or physical harm to the child.5 36 Social workers
may be qualified expert witnesses if they have substantial edu-
cation and experience in their specialties. 37 However, for social
workers to be qualified expert witnesses, they must possess
"experience beyond the normal social worker qualifications. 5 38
In In re N.L. 539 the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case because there was no expert witness testimony
as to whether the continued custody of the child by the mother
would result in serious emotional or physical harm to the child.50
A court is required to consider the testimony of a qualified
expert witness before placing an Indian child in foster care.54'
530. Id. at D.4(c).
531. 25 C.F.R. § 23.91 (1988).
532. Id. § 23.92.
533. In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863, 867 (Okla. 1988) (quoting State ex rel. Juvenile
Department, 76 Or. App. 673, 710 P.2d 793, 799 (1985)).
534. N.L., 754 P.2d at 867.
535. Id. at 868.
536. Id.
537. Id.; D.W.H. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 706 S.W.2d 840, 843 (Ky. App.
1968); In re J.L.H., 316 N.W.2d 650, 651 (1982).
538. N.L., 754 P.2d at 868; State ex rel. Juvenile Department. v. Charles, 70 Or.
App. 10, 688 P.2d 1354, 1359, n.3 (1984) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95 Cong. 2d
Sess. 22, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNa. & ADmIn. NENvs 7530, 7545).
539. 754 P.2d 863 (Okla. 1988).
540. Id. at 868.
541. Id. at 867.
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The Court's Order at the Conclusion
of the Adjudicatory Hearing
If the court finds that the allegations of the petition are not
supported by the evidence, the court must order the petition
dismissed and the child discharged from any detention or re-
striction previously ordered . 4 - The child's parents, guardian, or
other legal custodian are also discharged from any restriction or
other previous temporary order.5 43 Once the district court's ad-
judicatory order becomes final, the district court has no au-
thority to exercise further jurisdiction over the minor child in
that proceeding: 44
If, however, the court finds that the allegations of the petition
are supported by the evidence, and that it is in the best interests
of the child and the public that the child be made a ward of
the court, the court sustains the petition, makes an order of
adjudication that the child is "deprived," and adjudges the child
a ward of the court.5 4 The court's order must contain the
following findings of fact and findings of compliance:
Findings of Fact:
(1) The child's correct, full legal name, and
(2) the child's date of birth.
Findings of Compliance with:
(1) The Federal Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901-
1963, and
(2) The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, title 10,
section 1601 et. seq. of the Oklahoma Statutes5'
542. 10 OiOA. STAT. § 1113 (1981).
543. Id.
544. In re Ivey, 535 P.2d 281, 283 (Okla. 1975) (Syllabus by the Court).
545. 10 Oiu.. STAT. § 1114(A) (Supp. 1986). Section 1114 plainly demands more
than a finding regarding the truth of the petition's factual allegations. The court must
additionally find that it is in the best interests of the child and the public that the child
be made a ward of the court. In re Christina T., 590 P.2d 189, 192 (Okla. 1979).
546. OnA. DisT. CT. R. 8.2:
[A]II orders of adjudication in juvenile proceedings, [and] termination of parental
rights ... resulting in the adjudication of status, custody or wardship of minor
children, shall contain a finding of compliance with 25 U.S.C.A. 1901 et seq. (Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978), 10 Okla. Stat. section 1601 et seq. (Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act). The trial court shall in all such proceedings make findings
of fact as to the child's correct, full legal name, and date of birth and all instruments
memorializing such decrees, orders and judgments as required by 12 Okla. Stat.
section 32.2 shall recite the findings required hereby.
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Disposition
The Dispositional Hearing
Juvenile proceedings are bifurcated proceedings. If the child
is adjudged "deprived" at the deprived-status adjudicatory hear-
ing, the court conducts a second hearing called the "dispositional
hearing. ' ' 547 Disposition is held separately from adjudication.
The strict rules of evidence do not apply. All evidence helpful
in determining the proper disposition best serving the interests
of the child and the public, including oral and written reports,
may be admitted, and may be relied upon to the extent of their
probative value, even though not competent for purposes of the
adjudicatory hearing. 548
The American Bar Association explains the need for bifur-
cated proceedings:
At the dispositional hearing, the court will be provided with
substantial information about the family and the child. Some
of this information might be very prejudicial if considered at
the adjudicatory stage, for example, a trier of fact might be
influenced by knowing that a family was the recipient of
welfare services or that a parent was a drug addict; yet such
information might be irrelevant on the factual issue of whether
a child has been sexually abused, needed medical care, etc.549
Before making an order of disposition, the court must advise
the district attorney, the parents, guardian, custodian or respon-
sible relative, and their counsel, of the factual contents and the
conclusion of reports prepared for the use of the court and
considered by it, and afford fair opportunity, if requested, to
controvert them. 50 Except where the child's custody is placed with
both parents, the dispositional order must include a specific finding
and order of the court relative to the liability and accountability
of the parents for the care and maintenance of the child. 55
The court may adjourn the dispositional hearing for a reason-
able period of time to receive reports or other evidence. 512 If the
547. 10 Out.A. STAT. § 1115(a) (1981): "After making an order of adjudication, the
court shall hold a dispositional hearing .... "
548. Id.
549. Juvenile Justice Standards Project, American Bar Association Institute of Ju-
dicial Administration, Standards Relating to Abuse and Neglect at 6.1 (1977) (tentative
draft).
550. 10 OxLA. STAT. § 1115(b) (1981) (any party submitting a report to the court
should send copies to all other parties).
551. Id.; id. § 1121.
552. Id. § 1115(c).
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court grants such a continuance, it makes an order for the place-
ment of the child, or releases the child subject to the supervision
of the court.5 53 In scheduling investigations and hearings, the court
gives priority to proceedings in which the child has been removed
from home, before an order of disposition has been made.
5
-
The Juvenile Code does not specify when the dispositional
hearing is to be held. All it requires is that the dispositional
hearing be held after the deprived-status adjudicatory order is
entered s55 When the dispositional hearing is held, it may be
adjourned for a reasonable period.55 6 Certainly the Juvenile Code
does not contemplate an immediate post-adjudicatory hearing
since it authorizes the introduction of oral and written reports
and all other evidence helpful in determining the proper dispo-
sition best serving the interests of the child and the public-
evidence which could require considerable time to garner.
5 5
The Juvenile Code authorizes several alternative dispositional
orders. First, if it is consistent with the welfare of the child,
the child must be placed with a parent or legal guardian, but
if it appears to the court that the conduct of the parent,
guardian, stepparent, or other adult living in the home has
contributed to the child's deprivation, the court may issue a
written order specifying conduct to be followed by the parent,
guardian, stepparent or other adult living in the home with
respect to the child. 558 The conduct specified is such as would
reasonably prevent the child from becoming deprived, 59 de-
linquent, in need of supervision, or in need of treatment. The
court's dispositional order remains in effect for the time spec-
ified by the court, not to exceed one year.56 The order may
be extended or renewed by the court.5 61 Special statutory pro-
visions apply if the child is a truant.5 62
If the court does not place the child back in the home, the
court may place the child with a suitable person elsewhere,
553. Id.
554. Id. § 1115(d).
555. Id. § 1115(a).
556. Id. § 1115(c).
557. In re Stacy W., 623 P.2d 1057, 1061 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980).
558. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1116(A)(1) (Supp. 1989).
559. Id. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has indicated that the district court has
authority to specify the appropriate conduct of a parent. See In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863,
866 n.2 (Okla. 1988).
560. 10 OiuA. STAT. § 1116(A)(1) (Supp. 1989).
561. Id.
562. Id.
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upon such conditions as the court determines.563 The court may
also commit the child to the custody of a private institution
or agency.56 Further, the court may order the child to receive
counseling or other community-based services.561
Finally, the court may commit the child to the custody of
the Department of Human Services. 5 6 It is the responsibility
of DHS to provide care for deprived children who are com-
mitted to its care for custody or guardianship.5 67 If a child is
placed in DHS custody, it is authorized to place the child back
in the child's home, in the home of a relative, in a foster
home, or in any other community-based facility under thejurisdiction or licensure of the DHS established for the care
of deprived children.5 6 However, the child cannot be placed
in an institution operated by the DHS,5 69 A deprived child,
who is also a "child in need of treatment ' 570 and eligible for
residential care and treatment as provided in title 10, section
1116 of the Oklahoma Statutes, may be placed in a DHS
treatment center or other mental health facility. 571
It is the intent of the Oklahoma Legislature that the place-
ment of each child adjudicated to be a ward of the court and
placed in the custody of the Department of Human Services
will assure such care and guidance of the child, preferably in
the child's home, as will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental
563. Id.
564. Id. § 1116(A)(2). This subsection further provides that in committing a child
to a private institution or agency, the court must select one that is licensed by the
Department of Human services or any other state department supervising or licensing
private institutions or agencies; or, if such institution or agency is in another state, by
the analogous department of that state. Whenever the court commits a child to any
institution or agency, it must transmit with the order of commitment a summary of Its
information concerning the child, and the institution or agency must give to the court
such information concerning the child as the court may at any time require.
565. Id. § 1116(A)(3).
566. Id. § 1116(A)(4).
567. 10 OK.A. STAT. § 1136 (Supp. 1982).
568. Id.
569. Id.
570. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1101(5) (Supp. 1988) defines "child in need of treatment"
to mean any child who is afflicted with a substantial disorder of the emotional processes,
thought or cognition, which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize
reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life appropriate to the age of the
child. The term "child in need of treatment" shall not mean a child afflicted with
epilepsy, mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, physical handicaps, or brief
periods of intoxication caused by such substances as alcohol or drugs unless the child
also meets the criteria for a child in need of treatment.
571. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1116 (Supp. 1989); 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1136 (Supp. 1982),
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and physical welfare of the child, and will preserve and
strengthen the family ties of the child, wherever possible, with
recognition of the fundamental rights of parenthood, and with
recognition of the responsibility of the state to assist the family
in providing necessary education and training.5 72 In pursuit of
these goals, it is the intention of the Oklahoma Legislature to
provide for removing the child from the custody of parents
only when the welfare of the child or the safety and protection
of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without re-
moval; and when the child has to be removed from the child's
family, to secure for the child custody, care and discipline
consistent with the best interests and the treatment needs of
the child.73
The Department of Human Services must review and assess
each child committed to it to determine the type of placement
consistent with the treatment needs of the child in the nearest
geographic proximity to the home of the child.5 74 Such review
and assessment must include an investigation of the personal
and family history of the child, and the child's environment,
and any physical or mental examinations considered necessary 75
In making such review, DHS may use any facilities, public or
private, which offer aid to it in the determination of the correct
placement of the child.57 6
If the court places the child outside the child's home, and it
appears to the court that the parent, guardian, legal custodian,
stepparent or other adult living in the home has contributed to
the deprivation of the child, the court may order such person
be made subject to any treatment or placement plan prescribed
by the DHS or other person or agency receiving custody of the
child. 5"7
Placement Plan for Child Placed Outside the Home
The legal custodian of every deprived child must prepare and
file a "placement plan" with the court within thirty days after
the child has been removed from the custody of parents.5 7 1
Unless the court orders otherwise, the placement plan. must
contain, at a minimum, the following information:
572. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1135(A) (Supp. 1986).
573. Id.
574. Id. § 1135(B).
575. Id.
576. Id. § 1135(C).
577. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1116(A)(6) (Supp. 1989).
578. Id. § 1115.1(A).
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1. A history of the child and family;
2. A statement of the conditions that the intervention is
designed to alleviate, and a statement of the methods to be
used to correct those conditions or to achieve permanent
placement of the child;
3. A description of the appropriate special programs available
and to be used by the parent, legal guardian, legal custodian,
stepparent, or other adult living in the home as well as the
child which are in the best interests of the child or will prevent
further harm to the child;
4. A statement as to the unavailability or inappropriateness
of local placement, or other good cause for any placement
more than forty miles from the child's home;
5. A description of acts and conduct that would be expected
of the parent or parents, legal guardian, legal custodian,
stepparent or other adult living in the home before the child
should be returned home; and
6. The name and business address of the attorney representing
the child, if any.5 9
Special provisions apply where a baby is born drug-dependent.58 0
The Juvenile Code requires that the court insure that the
following information accompanies every deprived child placed
outside the home:
1. Demographic information;
2. Type of custody and previous placement;
3. Pertinent family information, including, but not limited
to, the names of family members who, by court order, may
not visit the child;
4. Known or available medical history, including, but not
limited to: (a) allergies, ((b) immunizations, (c) childhood
diseases, (d) physical handicaps, (e) psychosocial information,
and (f) the name of the child's last doctor, if known; and
5. Copies of policies and procedures of the placement agency
which pertain to placement operations of the agency, and
which may be necessary to properly inform the institution,
foster parents or other custodian of the duties, rights and
responsibilities of the custodian.58
The inspiration for these elaborate requirements is the method
of federal reimbursement to states for the cost of a child's out-
579. Id. § 1115.1(B)(1)-(6).
580. Id. § 1115.1(C)-(D).
581. Id. § 1115.2(1)-(5).
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of-home care.58 2 If the court places a deprived child in the legal
care, custody and control of DHS, the court cannot dictate to
DHS the precise placement of the child.583
If a deprived child in DHS custody becomes unmanageable
and uncontrollable, DHS may return the child to the court for
further disposition, or may provide information to the district
attorney and request the filing of a petition alleging the child
to be delinquent or in need of treatment.5 84
Placement Preference for Indian Children
ICWA requires that any Indian child removed from the home
pursuant to a state court order be placed in the least restrictive
setting which most approximates a family, and in which the
child's special needs, if any, may be met.585 The child must be
placed within reasonable proximity to the home, taking into
account any special needs of the child.586 In the absence of good
cause to the contrary, the Indian child's presumptive placement
priority is with:
1. A member of the Indian child's extended family;
2. A foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the
Indian child's tribe;
3. An Indian foster home licensed or approved by an au-
thorized non-Indian licensing authority; or
4. An institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or
operated by an Indian organization which has a program
suitable to meet the Indian child's needs.5 17
The Indian child's tribe may modify the presumptive placement
priorities by resolution, and that modified order of preference
must be followed so long as the criteria are met. 88 The standards
to be applied in meeting the preference requirements are the
prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community
in which the parent or extended family resides, or with which
582. See Adoption and Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-272
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
583. In re Meekins, 554 P.2d 872, 875 n.2 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
584. 10 OaA. STAT. § 1140 (Supp. 1982).
585. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
586. Id.
587. Id. § 1915(bi)-(iv).
588. Id. § 1915(c). See also Guidelines, supra note 63, at F.2.
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the parent or extended family members maintain social and
cultural ties.59
The Guidelines suggest the following as reasons for "good
cause" not to follow the placement preference:
1. The request of the biological parents or the child when the
child is of sufficient age;
2. The extraordinary physical or emotional needs of the child
as established by testimony of a qualified expert witness;
3. The unavailability of suitable families for placement after
a diligent search has been completed for families meeting the
preference criteria.
The burden of establishing the existence of "good cause" not
to follow the placement preference is on the party urging the
preference not be followed590
If a child is committed to the custody of DHS, the court
orders the child delivered by the sheriff to the place designated
by DHS. The cost of transportation is paid from the county's
general fund.59'
The Rights and Duties of a Person or Agency Receiving Custody
of the Child Pursuant to the Court's Dispositional Order
When the court transfers custody of a child under title 10,
section 1116 of the Oklahoma Statutes, 5 z the person, institution,
agency or department receiving custody has the right to, and is
responsible for, the care and control of the child. The person
or entity also has the duty to provide food, clothing, shelter,
589. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1978). Title 25 U.S.C. § 1915(e) provides that a record
of each such placement, under state law, of an Indian child shall be maintained by the
state in which the placement was made, evidencing the efforts to comply with the order
or preference specified in this section. Such record shall be made available at any time
upon request of the secretary, or the Indian child's tribe. For emergency removal of
the Indian child from parent or custodian in Oklahoma, see 10 0a.a. STAT. § 40.5
(Supp. 1982).
590. Guidelines, supra note 63, at F.3. The commentary to the guidelines suggests
that in a few cases the child may need highly specialized treatment services that are
unavailable in the community where the families who meet the preference criteria live.
Such considerations can be considered as good cause to the contrary. A diligent attempt
to find a suitable family meeting the preference criteria should be made before nonpre.
ference placement is considered. A diligent attempt to find a suitable family includes,
at a minimum, contact with the child's tribal social service program, a search of all
county or state listings of available Indian homes and contact with nationally-known
Indian programs with available placement resources.
591. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1143 (Supp. 1981).
592. 10 OKr.a. STAT. § 1116 (Supp. 1986).
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ordinary medical care, education, discipline for the child, and,
in an emergency, to authorize surgical or other extraordinary
care 91 The person or entity having legal custody of the child
pursuant to court order is entitled to notice of court proceedings
regarding the child as provided in title 10, sections 1105 and
1115 of the Oklahoma Statutes 94 to intervene, upon application,
as a party to all court proceedings pertaining to the care and
custody of the child, including, but not limited to adjudication,
disposition, review of disposition, and termination of parental
rights .595
In placing a child in the custody of a person or entity, the
court should select one with the same religious faith as that of
the parents of the child, or in the case of difference in the
religious faith of the parents, then in the religious faith of the
child, or, if the religious faith of the child is not ascertainable,
then of the faith of either of the parents.59 6 However, it is left
to the discretion of the court to place the child where the child's
total needs will best be served.5 9
Parent's Financial Obligation
for a Child Placed Outside the Home
After adjudication, and at the court's request, DHS must
investigate the home conditions and environment of the child,
and the financial ability, occupation and earning capacity of the
parent, legal guardian or custodian of the child,59 The court
has authority to adjudge natural parents, who may be present
at the hearing, or who have been served with notice of the
hearing, liable and accountable for the care and maintenance of
any child, and to order payment for the care and maintenance
of the child.5" The court's order is modifiable, depending upon
593. 10 OCLA. STAT. § 1117(A) (Supp. 1983). The medical care, surgery and extraor-
dinary care is to be charged to the appropriate agency where the child qualifies for such
care under law, rule or regulation or administrative order or decision. Nothing in sectioh
1117 shall abrogate the right of the child to any benefits provided through public funds,
or the parent's statutory duty or responsibility to provide such necessities, Further, no
person, agency or institution shall be liable in a civil suit for damages for authorizing
or not authorizing surgery or extraordinary care in an emergency, as determined by
competent medical authority.
594. 10 OxLA, SrAT. §§ 1105, 1115 (1981).
595. 10 OxIA, STAT. § 1117(B) (Supp. 1983).
596. 10 OxaA, STAT. § 1119 (1981).
597. Id.
598. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1120(D) (Supp. 1986). Upon request by the court of another
state, the DHS may conduct a similar investigation.
599. 10 OxA, STAT. § 1121(A) (1981).
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the needs of the child and ability of the parents to pay.0 Since
the Juvenile Code provides no precise guidance as to the amount
of child support, the court may be guided by the statutory child
support guidelines enacted for divorce proceedings.1°1 Finally, in
the event the DHS has legal custody of an Indian child, there




Federal law requires that, before the federal government re-
imburses a state for providing foster care placement of a child,
the state must have made reasonable efforts to prevent the need
of removing the child from the home in the first place, and
then make reasonable efforts to return the child to the home. 60 3
A case plan must be developed for each child,604 and review
hearings must be conducted either by the agency or by the court
every six months while the child is in placement, and a hearing
to develop a permanent plan must be conducted by the court
eighteen months from the time the child is initially placed. 6 5
In Oklahoma, the Juvenile Code requires that a dispositional
order removing a child from the custody of parents be reviewed
at a hearing by the court at least once every six months until
the child is returned to parental custody.6 The Oklahoma Court
of Appeals has described review hearings as a "critical state"
of the deprived child proceeding. 6° The dispositional order re-
moving a deprived child from the custody of parents must be
reviewed by the court at least once every six months until the
child is returned to the custody of the parents, and the conditions
which caused the child to be adjudicated deprived have been
corrected, or the parental rights of the parents are terminated
and a final adoption decreed. 6°0 The Juvenile Code provides that
review hearings must continue to take place where a child has
been removed from the home even after the child has been
returned to the home until the court orders the case closed.
600. Id. § 1121(B).
601. See 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1277.7-1277.9 (Supp. 1988).
602. See 10 OKA. STAT. § 40.8 (Supp. 1982).
603. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-272
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., in particular §§ 671(a)(15) & 672(a)(15)).
604. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(16), 675(1).
605. Id. §§ 671(a)(16), 675(5).
606. See 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1116(B) (Supp. 1986); 42 U.S.C. §§ 675(5)B).
607. In re J.W., 742 P.2d 1171, 1174 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).




The legal custodian of a child who has been removed from
the custody of parents must prepare for each review hearing a
written report on each child who is the subject of the review
hearing 10 At a minimum, the report must contain a summary
of the physical, mental, and emotional condition of the child,
the conditions existing in the home or institution where the child
has been placed, and adjustment thereto, a report on the child's
progress in school and visitation exercised by the child's parents. 611
If DHS is the child's legal custodian, the report must also
include any efforts on the part of the parents to correct the
conditions which caused the child to be adjudicated deprived.61 2
The report must also contain recommendations, and written
reasons for the following: (1) whether the parental rights of the
parents of the child should be terminated, and the child placed
for adoption, (2) whether the child should remain in the home,
or if placed outside the home of the child's parents, (3) whether
the child should remain outside the home or be returned to the
home from which the child was removed.61 3 If it is determined
that the child should be placed for adoption, foster parents may
be considered eligible to adopt the child.614
The Juvenile Code also places responsibilities on the court.
At the review hearing, the court must specifically inquire as to
the nature and extent of services being provided the child and
parents and must direct additional services be provided if nec-
essary to protect the child from further physical, mental, or
emotional harm. 615 In addition, the attorney representing the
child may submit a report to the court for presentation at the
review hearing to assist the court in reviewing the placement or
status of the child.616
Finally, the Juvenile Code recognizes the emotional stress a
child may undergo if frequently moved from foster home to
foster home. Therefore, the Juvenile Code requires that children
in DHS custody cannot be moved from one foster home to
another, if the child has already been moved once since the last
court hearing, without first obtaining the approval of the court
following a hearing on the reasons and necessity for removing
610. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1116.1(B)(1) (Supp. 1989).
611. Id. § 1116.1(B)(2).
612. Id. § 1116.1(B)(3).
613. Id.
614. Id.
615. Id. § 1116.1(C).
616. Id. § 1116.1(D). The legal custodian of the child shall not deny the child the
right of access to an attorney, and must facilitate such access.
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the child. 6 7 However, the DHS may move any child due to an
emergency, in which case a hearing must be conducted, if re-
quested in writing, within ten days following the moving of the
child on the reasons and necessity for moving the child.618 The
DHS must notify the attorney for the child whenever the child's
placement is changed, and inform the attorney where the child
is now located. 9
No later than eighteen months after placing a child in foster
care and every twelve months thereafter, the court making the
original order of adjudication must conduct another disposi-
tional hearing to determine the future status of the child, and
determine whether:
1. The child should be returned to parents or other family
members;
2. The child should be continued in foster care for a specified
period;
3. The rights of the parents of the child should be terminated,
and the child placed for adoption or legal guardianship; or
4. Whether the child, because of exceptional circumstances,
should remain in foster care on a long-term basis as a per-
manent plan or with a goal of independent living.620
No child who has been adjudged deprived may be placed in a
state training school.67 1 The case is also reviewed by the foster
care review board, which acts in an advisory capacity to the
court. 62
Termlnaling Parental Rights
The Purpose and Effect of Terminating Parental Rights
Terminating parental rights is .the unmitigated cessation of all
natural and legal rights a parent has with a child, and a per-
manent parting of all bonds linking parent to child.62 It ter-
minates the parent-child relationship, including the parents' rights
to the custody of the child; the right to visit the child; the right
to control the child's training and education; the necessity to
consent to the adoption of the child; the right to the earnings
617. Id. § 1116.1(E).
618. Id.
619. Id,
620. See 10 OmA. STAT. § 1116(B) (Supp. 1986); 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C).
621. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1111.6(D) (Supp. 1989).
622. See Id. §§ 1116.2-1116,6; 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B).




of the child; and the right to inherit from or through the child.624
The purpose of terminating parental rights is to emancipate the
child from the offending parents' legal bond in order to set the
child free for future adoption.62
The common law regards the parent-child bond as indestruc-
tible and hence not terminable by judicial decree. 6  Since pa-
rental rights could not be terminated at common law, termination
proceedings did not exist. 6" While, under the common law,
courts were powerless to sever the natural bond between parent
and child, they could in equity restrict the quantum of parental
control. 62 Upon a complaint alleging abuse of parental author-
ity, a private civil action could be brought with a view to freeing
the child from the guilty parent's dominion. 629 The terms of title
10, section 9 of the Oklahoma Statutes60 are declaratory of the
common law norms. 631 Termination of parental rights is purely
a creature of statute.632
Section 1130 of the Juvenile Code,633 which provides grounds
for terminating parental rights, is a statute in derogation of the
common law.634 The impetus for enacting termination statutes
came from the economic pressures placed on public and private
welfare agencies in implementing a multitude of child welfare
programs. Termination statutes accomplish two purposes: they
free children from unfit parents, and thus render them eligible
for adoption, and they ease the financial burden upon state and
foster care agencies. 635
624. 10 OraA. STAT. § 1132 (1981). However, termination of parental rights in no
way affects the right of the child to inherit from the parent.
625. Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1112 (Okla. 1985); Allison v. Bryan, 26 Okla.
520, 109 P. 934, 938-39 (1910); In re Talley's Estate, 188 Okla. 338, 109 P.2d 495, 498
(1941); Alford v. Thomas, 316 P.2d 188, 192 (Okla. 1957); J.D.L. v. State Dep't. of
Inst., 572 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Okla. 1978).
626. Davis, 108 P.2d at 1111.
627. A.E., 743 P.2d at 1046.
628. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1112; see also A.E., 743 P.2d at 1045 ("At common law,
rights and liabilities arising from status-based relationships were determined in equitable
proceedings.").
629. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1112.
630. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 9 (1981).
631. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1112.
632. In re Christopher H., 577 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Okla. 1978).
633. 10 OxLA. STAT. § 1130 (Supp. 1987).
634. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1111.
635. A.E. v. State, 743 P.2d 1041, 1051 (Okla. 1987) (Opala, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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The Oklahoma Legislature first enacted a statutory procedure
for terminating parental rights in 1965.636 The practice before
enactment was for the court to declare a child previously ad-
judicated "deprived" eligible for adoption if the court found
such disposition was necessary for the child's welfare. The sub-
stance of the law was that once a child was a ward of the court,
termination of parental rights was a matter of judicial discre-
tion.60 Enactment of the termination statute was a legislative
attempt to bridle that discretion. 63 8
The integrity of the family unit and preservation of the parent-
child bond command the highest protection in our society.
Intrusion upon the privacy and sanctity of that bond can bejustified by a compelling state concern. 6 9 The United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that freedom of per-
sonal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the fourteenth amendment.m°
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has also recognized that par-
ents have a fundamental, constitutionally protected interest in
continuing the legal bond with their children. The integrity of
familial status is a value to be guarded with great solicitude!"'
The United States Supreme Court instructs us that:
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the
care, custody, and management of their child does not evap-
orate simply because they have not been model parents or
have lost temporary custody of their child to the state. Even
when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital
interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their
family life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution
of their parental rights have a more critical need for proce-
dural protections than do those resisting state intervention
into ongoing family affairs. When the state moves to destroy
weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with
fundamentally fair procedures. 64
Proceedings to terminate parental rights affect three distinct
interests: (1) a parental claim to the child; (2) the state's re-
636. 1965 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 507, §§ 1-5 (now codified as 10 OXLA. STAT. §§
1130-1135 (Supp. 1987)).
637. In re J.F.C., 577 P.2d 1300, 1301 (Okla. 1978).
638. Id.
639. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1109.
640. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (collecting cases).
641. In re Delaney, 617 P.2d 886, 890 (Okla. 1980).
642. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54.
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sponsibility to afford protection to underage citizenry, and (3)
the child's claim to a wholesome milieu free from harm of abuse
and neglect. 64" The interest of children in a wholesome environ-
ment has a constitutional dimension no less compelling than
that the parents have in the preservation of family integrity. In
the hierarchy of constitutionally-protected values, both interests
rank as fundamental and must hence be shielded with equal
vigor and solicitude. 6 " Therefore, state intervention to terminate
the parent-child relationship must be accomplished by procedures
meeting the requisites of the due process clause of the United
States Constitution.645
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that substantive due
process forbids termination of parental rights in the absence of
a compelling state interest in the form of specific findings of
existing or threatened harm to the child.6" Therefore, any state-
action proceeding to terminate parental rights under title 10,
section 1130(A)(3), (7), or (8) of the Oklahoma Statutes requires
either a prior or simultaneous adjudication of the child's de-
prived status. 47 Further, termination based on these grounds
must be deferred until after the initial deprived status petition
has been adjudicated.A"
Pleadings
If termination of parental rights is sought when the petition
to determine the child's deprived status is filed, that fact must
be stated in the verified petition and in the summons.6 9 If the
need for termination becomes fixed after the petition and sum-
mons are filed and issued, no verification of pleading to ter-
minate parental rights is required. 650 The pleading may be filed
in a juvenile action after the child has been adjudicated de-
prived. 61
Notice of Termination of Parental Rights
Procedural due process and the Oklahoma Juvenile Code
require parents receive notice and an opportunity to be heard
643. In re T.R.W., 722 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Okla. 1985).
644. In re T.H.L., 636 P.2d 330, 334 (Okla. 1981).
645. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
646. In re J.N.M., 655 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Okla. 1982).
647. See In re R.J.W., 789 P.2d 233 (Okla. 1990).
648. Id.
649. 10 OxLA. STAT. § 1103(B) (Supp. 1982).
650. In re Ernest James C., 578 P.2d 352, 355 (Okla. 1978).
651. Id.
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when their parental rights might be terminated. 652 The Juvenile
Code requires a parent receive actual notice of any hearing to
terminate parental rights.6 53 However, if the court finds that the
whereabouts of a parent cannot be ascertained, it may order
that notice be given by publication and a copy mailed to the
last known address of the parents. 6 4 The parent is entitled to
sufficient notice to prepare for the termination hearing. 655 There-
fore the Juvenile Code guarantees the parent a minimum of at
least ten days after receipt of notice.6 6 The parent can waive
the waiting period.6 7 If the court authorizes service by publi-
cation, the hearing cannot be held for at least ten days after
the date of publication of the notice. 65 If a parent does not
receive actual notice of the termination hearing, the parent has
six months from the date of the order terminating parental
rights to reopen the proceedings.5 9 The Juvenile Code provides
specific direction as to the notice to be given a father or putative
father of a child born out of wedlock. 66°
Conduct of the Termination Hearing
A termination hearing is an adjudicatory proceeding. 61 The
hearing is conducted according to the rules of evidence." 2 It is
a private hearing unless the court orders otherwise. 663 The finder
of fact must base its decision on sworn testimony with the right
to cross-examine. 664 The matter is heard separately from the trial
of cases against adults. Finally, stenographic notes or other
transcript of the hearing must be kept, but are not open to
inspection except by order of the court."5
652. A.E. v. State, 743 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Okla. 1987). Procedural due process
requirements for termination of parental rights are codified in 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1131
(Supp. 1986). See also Dana P. v. State, 656 P.2d 253, 257 (Okla. 1982); 10 OKLA.
STAT. § 1116(C) (Supp. 1986).
653. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1131(A) (Supp. 1986).
654. Id.; Dana P., 656 P.2d at 257; Tammie v. Rodriguez, 570 P.2d 332, 334 (Okla.
1977); Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma v. Rader, 822 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1987)
(DHS failed to use due diligence in locating parent).
655. Ernest James D., 578 P.2d at 354.
656. 10 OKra. STAT. § 1131(A) (Supp. 1986).
657. Id.
658. Id.
659. Id.; See also Dana P., 656 P.2d at 257.
660. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1131(B) (Supp. 1986).
661. A.E. v. State, 743 P.2d 1041, 1047 (Okla. 1987).
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Right to Counsel
In Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services,6 6 the United States
Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution does not mandate
the appointment of counsel for an indigent parent in every case
where the state seeks to terminate parental rights.60 Instead, the
Court left the decision to the state courts in the first instance,
to be decided on a case-by-case basis subject to appellate re-
view. 6 8 Of course, states are free to afford parties higher pro-
tection. In Oklahoma, children and indigent parents are entitled
to court-appointed counsel. 69
In all public law termination proceedings, potential conflicts
exist between the interests of the child and those of the state
and the parents. Therefore, independent counsel must be ap-
pointed to represent the child whenever tripartite concerns are
expressed in the context of public law litigation.670 The Okla-
homa Supreme Court has held that independent counsel must
be appointed to represent the child in all termination proceedings
regardless of the child's financial status.67' Indigent parents who
"desire" 672 or "request" '6 73 appointment of counsel are entitled
to such representation at no cost.674 Counsel must be appointed
unless knowingly and intelligently waived. 675
Right to Jury Trial In Proceedings
to Terminate Parental Rights
As previously discussed, the question of trial by jury in
juvenile proceedings is one of state law. The Oklahoma Supreme
666. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
667. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
668. Id.
669. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 24 (1981); 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1109(b) (Supp. 1986).
670. Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1110 (Okla. 1985).
671. Id.; In re T.M.H., 613 P.2d 468, 469 (Okla. 1980).
672. 10 OKRA. STAT. § 24(A) (Supp. 1989).
673. Id. § 1109(B).
674. T.M.H., 613 P.2d at 468; In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983, 986 (Okla. 1978). The
Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Chad S. that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment required counsel to be provided without expense to indigent parents. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court went on to hold that counsel must be appointed unless
knowingly and intelligently waived. The court also said that the right to court appointed
counsel carried with it the obligation to advise parents of their rights. Where the
assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does
not depend upon request. However, the continued validity of these holdings by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court are questionable because of the more recent holding by the
United States Supreme Court in Lassiter.
675. In re J.W., 742 P.2d 1171, 1174 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).
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Court in A.E. v. State676 held that the right to jury trial in
proceedings to terminate parental rights is constitutionally man-
dated by the Oklahoma Constitution and the Oklahoma Juvenile
Code.617 The Court also held that the right to jury trial cannot
be surrendered except by voluntary consent or waiver. 678 Since
there are three sides to a proceeding to terminate parental rights
(the child, the parents, and the state), each is entitled to three
peremptory jury challenges. 679
Standard of Proof
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing
error in fact-finding, which all parties must take into account. 618
The function of a standard of proof is to instruct the fact finder
concerning the degree of confidence society thinks the fact finder
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a
particular type of adjudication. 61 In any given proceeding, the
minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment reflects not only the weight of the
private and public interest affected, but also a societal judgment
about how the risk of error should be distributed between the
litigants. 62
As previously discussed, in the deprived status adjudicatory
hearing, the burden of proof is on the state by a preponderance
of the evidence because litigants should share the risk of error
in roughly equal fashion. However, in proceedings to terminate
parental rights, the United States Supreme Court held in San-
tosky v. Kramer8 3 that before a state may sever completely and
irrevocably the parent-child bond, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires that the state support its alle-
gations by at least clear and convincing evidence. In so hold-
676. 743 P.2d 1041 (Okla. 1987).
677. The Oklahoma Supreme Court expressly overruled its previous holdings in J.V.
v. State Dep't of Inst. Social & Rehabilitative Servs., 572 P.2d 1283, 1284-85 (Okla.
1987); In re Keyes, 574 P.2d 1026, 1030 (Okla. 1977); Wilson v. Foster, 595 P.2d 1329,
1331-32 (Okla. 1979) (court refused to recognize a state constitutional right to trial by
jury, and held that a hearing to determine whether parental rights should be terminated
was merely a disposition of a child's previously adjudicated deprived status, and that
termination proceedings were not within the purview of the Juvenile Code).
678. A.E. v. State, 743 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Okla. 1987).
679. In re T.R.W., 743 P.2d 1197, 1197 (Okla. 1985).
680. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
681. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754-55 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 481, 423 (1979)).
682. Id.
683. Id. at 745.
684. Id. at 746.
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ing, the Court stated: "Increasing the burden of proof is one
way to impress the fact finder with the importance of the
decision, and thereby perhaps to reduce the chances that inap-
propriate terminations will be ordered." '685
Even before the Court's decision in Santosky, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that proceedings to terminate parental rights
call for such extreme public law redress that due process under
Oklahoma's Constitution requires the termination-seeking claim-
ant to prove by clear and convincing evidence parental potential
for harm to the child by abuse or neglect. 6 6 Oklahoma case law
defines "clear and convincing evidence" as the measure of proof
which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief
as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.61
In proceedings to terminate parental rights to an Indian child,
Congress requires the state prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt 8 8 The stringency of the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard is usually reserved for criminal actions to deny a
defendant liberty or life, or for juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings.689 Under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, so-
ciety imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself.610
Congress requires evidence "beyond a reasonable doubt" for
termination of Indian parental rights, reasoning that the removal
of an Indian child from a parent is a penalty as great as, if not
greater than, a criminal penalty. 69' ICWA provides that no
termination of parental rights may be ordered in a state pro-
ceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified
expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the
parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional
or physical harm to the child. 692
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals has explicitly held that the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard must be applied in
termination proceedings governed by the ICWA.693 "The re-
685. Id. at 764-65.
686. In re C.G., 637 P.2d 66, 71 (Okla. 1981); See also A.E. v. State, 743 P.2d
1041, 1042, n.I (collection of Oklahoma cases holding that termination must be based
on clear and convincing evidence).
687. C.G., 637 P.2d at 71 n.12.
688. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
689. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
368 (1970).
690. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755.
691. Id. at 769. See also H.R. 1386, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1978).
692. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912().
693. In re J.W., 742 P.2d 1171, 1175 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).
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quired expert testimony is to provide the court with knowledge
of the social and cultural aspects of Indian life to diminish the
risk of any cultural bias." 694
Circumstances in Which Parental Rights May be Terminated
Before exploring the eight statutory grounds for terminating
parental rights, it is important to note reasons that are not
sufficient. First, a finding that a child is delinquent, in need of
supervision or deprived does not terminate parental rights 95
Nor is a parent's incarceration, standing alone, sufficient to
terminate parental rights.696 Nor is a finding that a parent has
a mental illness or mental deficiency, standing alone, sufficient
to terminate parental rights.697 A parent's unemployment is not
a reasonable basis for terminating parental rights.6 9 Nor is
evidence that parents are poor and uneducated, have a dirty
house, are thought by the social worker to be very lazy and
lack initiative, and whose eldest child's school attendance is so
poor that she misses sixty-four percent of the school year suf-
ficient to terminate parental rights. 619
Termination of parental rights is not a means by which the
State of Oklahoma, through its district courts and the DHS,
may exact conformity from its citizen parents through the im-
position of an "acceptable" common value system and life-
style.7 0 Instead, the Juvenile Code authorizes district courts to
terminate parental rights only in the following situations:
Written Consent701
Parental rights may be terminated upon the written consent
of a parent, including a parent who is a minor, who desires to
terminate parental rights. The written consent must be acknowl-
edged as provided in title 10, section 60.5(4) of the Oklahoma
Statutes.7 '2 In addition the court must find that termination is
in the best interests of the child. The voluntary termination of
694. In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863, 867 (Okla. 1988); see also Guidelines, supra note
63, at D.3, D.4.
695. 10 OKU. STAT. § 1130(A) (Supp. 1987).
696. Id. § 1130(A)(7).
697. Id. § 1130(A)(8).
698. In re J.W., 742 P.2d 1171, 1174 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).
699. In re Cherol A.S., 581 P.2d 884 (Okla. 1978).
700. Id. at 888.
701. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1130(A)(1) (Supp. 1987).
702. 10 OxLA. STAT. 60.5(4) (Supp. 1986).
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parental rights by a parent or Indian custodian to an Indian
child must comply with the ICWA.703
Abandonment704
The court may terminate parental rights upon a finding that
the parent who is entitled to custody of the child has abandoned
it. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has construed this subsection
to mean that a parent who bears no custodial responsibility and
who has not failed to discharge any court-imposed obligation
or some well-defined legal duty does not come within the purview
of abandonment as a ground for terminating parental rights70 5
Failure to Correct Conditions Which Led
to the Child Being Adjudged DeprivedV6
The court may terminate parental rights upon a finding that:
(a) the child is deprived; and
(b) such condition is caused by or contributed to by acts or
omissions of the child's parent; and
(c) termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the
child; and
(d) the parent has failed to show that the condition which led
to the making of said finding has not been corrected, although
the parent has been given three months to correct the con-
dition.7o7
The parent must be given notice of any hearing to determine
whether the condition which led to the deprived-status adjudi-
cation has been corrected. 718 The court may extend the time in
which the parent may show the condition has been corrected if,
in the court's judgment, such extension of time would be in the
best interest of the child.7 9 During the period that the parent
has to correct the condition, the court may return the child to
the custody of a parent or guardian, subject to any conditions
which it may wish to impose, or the court may place the child
with an individual or agency. 710
703. Indian Child welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1913. See also Guidelines, supra
note 63, at E(1-4), G(1-4).
704. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1130(A)(2) (Supp. 1987).
705. In re McNeely, 734 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Okla. 1987).
706. 10 OKr.A. STAT. § 1130(A)(3) (Supp. 1987).
707. Id. § 1130(A)(3). "Deprived" is defined in 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1101(4) (Supp.
1988).
708. 10 Oa.. STAT. § 1130(A)(3)(d) (Supp. 1987).
709. Id.
710. Id.
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Any parent whose child is adjudged deprived must be judi-
cially advised of those conduct norms the parent is expected to
follow or eschew to recapture a legally unencumbered stand-
ing.711 The purpose of these norms of parental conduct is to
afford parents an opportunity to ameliorate their condition and
to effectively defend against termination efforts.7 12 "Judicial
notice cannot depend on inferences to be gathered from reports
of social workers or of medical doctors. 71 It can be found in
written judicially-prescribed norms of conduct to which the
parent is expected to conform. 714 "Once these norms have been
fashioned with clarity, the parent is entitled to the minimum
statutory period of three months to conform.1 715 In In re C. G.716
the Oldahoma Supreme Court described the purpose of the
norms of parental conduct:
Norms for parental conduct are designed to advise parents of
what is expected of them qua parents and to guide them in
avoiding patterns or a level of behavior that may trigger
official intervention. Without knowledge of the expected norms
of conduct-as balanced by community norms, and by the
socio-economic milieu of the parent-a parent would be un-
able to set in motion an effort of compliance with society's
expectation, i.e. to rectify the problems which caused the
child to become the subject of a public-law proceeding, and
to remove all residue of a clouded status. The approach is
clearly consistent with the general policy of the law against
needless family disruption.7 17
Judicial clarity in fashioning prescribed norms of parental
conduct is essential to the preservation of the procedural safe-
guards mandated by federal and state due process. A "fair
warning" requirement breathes life into these fundamental law
guarantees while lack of specificity make them meaningless.7 18




715. A.E., 743 P.2d at 1043 (quoting In re C.G., 637 P.2d 66, 69 (Okla. 1981)). A
Department of Human Services social worker's "contract" with the parents concerning
the standards of parental conduct is constitutionally infirm unless it bears a judicial
imprimatur and is communicated to both affected parties.
716. 637 P.2d 66 (Okla. 1981).
717. Id. at 69.
718. Id.; In re T.H.L., 636 P.2d 330, 333 (Okla. 1981); In re J.W., 742 P.2d 1171,
1174 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss1/2
PROTECTING ABUSED CHILDREN
The "fair warning" gives a person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is expected, and the min-
imum statutory three-month period of time provides a reasonable
opportunity to accomplish the task.719 Termination cannot occur
unless there has been a failure to correct the conduct which led
to the deprived-status adjudication. It is only when the parent
fails to correct the very conditions found in the deprived status
hearing that termination for these reasons may result.7 20 The
statute does not shift the burden of proof to the parent, but
does put the burden of persuasion on the parent as to correction
of conditions.721
The state must prove by clear and convincing evidence paren-
tal potential for harm to the child by abuse or neglect.m When-
ever a parent bears the burden of showing compliance with
previously prescribed norms of parental conduct, the parent need
not be held to the same standard as the termination-seeking
claimant. 72
Public policy mandates as much concern in guarding against
error at this stage as it does when a parental termination status
is sought. The risk of mistake remains balanced in favor of the
parent who may meet the onus cast on him by the "clear weight
of the evidence" standard rather than the "clear and convinc-
ing" standard.7 74 By the interplay of burdens in public law
litigation a heavier onus may be placed on the state when it
seeks to deprive a parent of parental rights than on the individual
who may have the burden of sustaining the affirmative as to
some other aspect of proof in the same case. The state is
required, as the moving party with the ongoing burden of proof,
to overcome the parent's burden of persuasion on the issue of
change of condition.72
Willful Failure to Support the Child 27
The court may terminate parental rights upon a finding that
the parent who does not have custody of the child has willfully
719. C.G., 637 P.2d at 69.
720. In re J.F.C., 577 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Okla. 1978).
721. Id.
722. C.G., 637 P.2d at 71.
723. Id.
724. Id.; see also T.H.L., 636 P.2d at 333; In re Christopher H., 577 P.2d 1292
(Okla. 1978); In re Moore, 558 P.2d 371 (Okla. 1976).
725. C.G., 637 P.2d at 71 n.14.
726. Christopher H., 577 P.2d at 1292; Moore, 558 P.2d at 371.
727. 10 OxaA. STAT. § 1130(A)(4) (Supp. 1987).
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failed to contribute to the support of the child as provided in
a decree of divorce or in some other court order during the
preceding year, or in the absence of such order, consistent with
the parent's means and earning capacity.72
Criminal Conviction of Child Abuse; a Finding in a
Deprived Child Action of Abuse that is Heinous or
Shocking; or a Finding in a Deprived Child Action of
Repeated Abusen9
The court may terminate parental rights if tile parent is
convicted of specified crimes that constitute child alibuse.7 ° Those
crimes are: (1) child abuse;731 (2) abuse and neglect;732 (3) sexual
abuse;733 (4) sexual exploitation;734 (5) child pornography; 715 (6)
rape, 736 and (7) lewd or indecent proposals or acts with a child
under sixteen. 737
728. Id.
729. Id. § 1130(A)(5).
730. Id.
731. 21 OmA. STAT. § 843 (Supp. 1982) describes "child abuse" as any parent or
other person who shall willfully or maliciously injure, torture, maim, or use unreasonable
force upon a child under the age of 18, or who shall cause, procure or permit any of
said acts to be done.
732. 21 OKIA. STAT. § 845(B)(1) (Supp. 1985) defines "abuse and neglect" as harm
or threatened harm to a child's health or welfare by a person responsible for the child's
health or welfare. Harm or threatened harm to a child's health or welfare can occur
through: non-accidental physical or mental injury; sexual abuse; sexual exploitation or
negligent treatment or maltreatment, including the failure to provide adequate food,
clothing, shelter, or medical care, except as provided in id. § 846.
733. Id. § 845(B)(3) defines "sexual abuse" to include rape, incest and lewd or
indecent acts or proposals, as defined by law, by a person responsible for the child's
welfare.
734. Id. § 84503)(4) defines "sexual exploitation" to include allowing, permitting,
or encouraging a child to engage in prostitution, as defined by law, by a person
responsible for the child's welfare, or allowing, permitting, encouraging, or engaging in
the lewd, obscene, or pornographic photographic filming, or depicting of a child in
those acts as defined by the state law, by a person responsible for the child's welfare.
735. 21 OKRA. STAT. § 1021.3 (Supp. 1986), defines "child pornography" as any
parent, guardian or individual having custody of a minor under age 18 years who
knowingly permits or consents to the participation of a minor in any film, motion
picture, video tape, photography, negative, slide, drawing, painting, play or performance
wherein the minor is engaged in or portrayed, depicted, or represented as engaging in
any act of sexual intercourse, in any act of fellatio or cunnilingus, in any act of excretion
in the context of sexual activity, or in any lewd exhibition of the uncovered genitals in
the context of masturbation or other sexual activity.
736. 21 OKr.A. STAT. § 1111 (Supp. 1984).
737. 21 OxLA. STAT. § 1123 (Supp. 1985), defines "lewd or indecent proposals as
acts with a child under sixteen" as any person who knowingly and intelligently makes
any oral or written lewd or indecent proposal to any child under 16 years of age for
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss1/2
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Absent a criminal conviction, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
has authorized termination of parental rights upon a finding of
a single act of extreme abuse.738 In Jerry L., Jerry was only
three years old when he was sexually molested by his parents.
As a result of the sex acts performed on the child, Jerry became
infected with anal gonorrhea. In interpreting the then-existing
statute,739 the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that the Okla-
homa Legislature could not have intended to allow a child to
suffer two acts of serious physical abuse before permitting the
state to terminate parental rights.74
After Jerry L., the Oklahoma Legislature amended the Ju-
venile Code to provide for the termination of parental rights on
a finding of a single incident of abuse that is "heinous or
shocking,"741 It now provides that the court may terminate
parental rights upon a finding in a deprived child action that:
the parent has physically or sexually abused the child or a
sibling of such child, or failed to protect the child or a sibling
of such child from physical or sexual abuse that is heinous
or shocking to the court, or that the child or sibling of such
child has suffered severe harm or injury as a result of such
physical or sexual abuse.742
The Juvenile Code also authorizes termination of parental
rights in the event of repeated child abuse.7 4 The court may
terminate parental rights upon a finding in a deprived child
action that the parent has physically or sexually abused the child
or the child's sibling, or failed to protect the child or sibling
the child to have unlawful sexual relations or sexual intercourse with any person, or
any such person who shall intentionally look upon, touch, maul, or feel the body or
private parts of any child under 16 years of age in any lewd or lascivious manner by
any acts not amounting to the commission of a crime against public decency and
morality, as defined by law; or any such person who shall designedly ask, invite, entice,
or persuade any child under 16 years of age to go alone with any person to a secluded,
remote, or secret place, with the unlawful and willful intent and purpose then and there
to commit any crime against public decency and morality, as defined by law, with the
child, or to in any manner lewdly or lasciviously look upon, touch, maul, or feel the
body or private parts of the child in any indecent manner or in any manner relating to
sexual matters or sexual interest.
738. In re Jerry L., 662 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Okda. 1983).
739. 10 OKRA. SrAT. § 1130(A)(5) (1981).
740. Jerry L.,, 662 P.2d at 1373-74.
741, 1983 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 291, § 1.
742, See also In re T.RW., 722 P.2d 1197, 1203 n.14.
743. 10 OjKA. STAT. § 1130(A)(5) (Supp. 1987).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1990
106 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
from abuse after a previous finding that the parent had abused
the child or sibling, or failed to protect the child or sibling from
abuse.744
Criminal Conviction of the Death of a Sibling45
The court may terminate parental rights upon a conviction in
a criminal action that the parent has caused the death of a
sibling of the child by physical or sexual abuse or chronic
neglect.
Lengthy Incarceration746
The court may terminate parental rights upon a finding that
all of the following exist:
(a) the child is deprived, and
(b) the custody of the child has been placed outside the home
of a natural or adoptive parent, guardian, or extended family
member, and
(c) the parent whose rights are sought to be terminated has
been sentenced to a period of incarceration of not less than
ten years, and
(d) the continuation of parental rights would result in harm
to the child based on consideration of the following factors,
among others: the duration of incarceration and its detrimen-
tal effect on the parent/child relationship; any previous in-
carceration; any history of criminal behavior, including crimes
against children; the age of the child; the evidence of abuse
or neglect of the child or siblings of the child by the parents;
and the current relationship between the parent and the child,
and the manner in which the parent has exercised parental
rights and duties in the past, and
(e) termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the
child.747
Mental Illness74s
The court may terminate parental rights upon a finding that
all of the following exist:
744. Id.
745. Id. § I130(A)(6).
746. Id. § 1130(A)(7).
747. Id. "Deprived" is defined in 10 O, .A. STAT. § 1101(4) (Supp. 1988). Of course,
incarceration of the parent alone is not sufficient to deprive a parent of parental rights.
748. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1130(A)(8) (Supp. 1987).
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(a) the child is deprived, and
(b) custody of the child has been placed outside the home of
a natural or adoptive parent, guardian or extended family
member, and
(c) the parent whose rights are sought to be terminated has
a mental illness or mental deficiency which renders the parent
incapable of adequately and appropriately exercising parental
rights, duties and responsibilities, and
(d) the continuation of parental rights would result in harm
or threatened harm to the child, and
(e) the mental illness or mental deficiency of the parent is
such that it will not respond to treatment, therapy or medi-
cation, and based upon competent medical opinion, the con-
dition will not substantially improve, and
(f) termination of parental rights is in the best interests of
the child. 749
Confinement of the parent in a mental hospital, while neces-
sitating custody of the child being placed elsewhere, does not,
standing alone, provide a basis for terminating parental rights.7 0
Oklahoma District Court Rule 8.2
Oklahoma District Court Rule 8.2751 provides that all orders
terminating parental rights must contain a finding of compliance
with the ICWA and the UCCJA.7 2 The trial court also must
make findings of fact as to the child's correct, full legal name
and date of birth, and all instruments memorializing the order
as required by title 12, section 32.2 of the Oklahoma Statutes,
and must recite the findings required in Rule 8.2.55
Post-Termination Placement of the Child
Once parental rights have been terminated, the court may
award custody of the child to any qualified person or agency.754
The child is emancipated from the offending parents' legal bond,
749. Id. "Deprived" is defined in 10 OrL. STAT.. § 1130(A)(8) (Supp. 1987).
"Mental illness" and "mental deficiency" are defined in 43A OIUA. STAT. § 6-201, art.
11(f), (g). As previously discussed, a finding that a parent has a mental illness or mental
deficiency alone is not sufficient to deprive the parent of parental rights. See also In
re J.N.M., 655 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Okla. 1982).
750. In re Baby Girl Williams, 602 P.2d 1036, 1040 (Okla. 1979).
751. OcmA. Disr. CT. R. 8.2.
752. Id.
753. Id.
754. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1133(A) (1981).
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and is set free for future adoption. 5 In committing the child
to an individual or agency, the court may invest in the individual
or agency authority-to consent to the addption of the child, 756
or the court in its discretion may reserve unto itself the authority
to consent to the adoption.7 57
If the court commits the child to DHS, the court must vest
it with authority to place the child, and upon notice to the court
that an adoption petition has been filed concerning the child,
the court must invest DHS with authority to consent to the
child's adoption and the jurisdiction of the committing court
terminates.75
In In re Jeffery S.,759 the court adjudged Jeffery S. and
Amanda S. deprived, and terminated parental rights .7 6 0 The court
awarded custody of the children to DHS, who in turn placed
the children for adoption with prospective adoptive parents
under a placement plan promulgated by DHS.
The Oldahoma Supreme Court held that the district court had
no power or authority to withdraw the placement of the children
for adoption made by the DHS or to order the children to be
placed with the district court's designee without a prior judicial
determination that the best interests of the children, upon con-
sideration of their temporal, mental, and moral welfare, under
the provisions of title 10, section 1116.1 of the Oklahoma
Statutes, required judicial incursion into the placement arrange-
mhents made by the DHS.76'
Placement Preference for Indian Children
ICWA and OICWA provide special "pre-adoptive place-
ments" for Indian children.7 62 ICWA provides that any Indian
755. Davis V. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1112 (Okla. 1985).
756. 10 OxLA. STAT. § 1116(C) (Supp, 1986).
757. 10 Oia. STAT. § 1133(A) (1981).
758. 10 OlaA. STAT. § 1116(C) (Supp. 1986).
759. 663 P.2d 1211 (Okla. 1983).
760. Id. at 1212.
761. For other statutes dealing with children placed in the custody of the Okla.
Department of Human Services, see 10 OxaA. STAT. § 1135 (placement determination);
id. § 1136 (DHS care for deprived children); id. § 1140 (children in custody becoming
unmanageable and uncontrollable); id. § 1142 (cooperative agreements for education
and training of children); id. § 1145 (Director of Public Welfare to serve as legal
guardian).
762. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(iii) defines pre-adoptive
placement to mean the temporary placement of an Indian child in a foster home or





child accepted for "pre-adoptive placement" must be placed in
the least restrictive setting which most approximates a family in
which the child's special needs, if any, may be met.763 The child
must also be placed within reasonable proximity of the home,
taking into account any special needs of the child.76 In any
"pre-adoptive placement," a preference is given, in the absence
of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with:
(1) a member of the Indian child's extended family;
(2) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the
Indian child's tribe;
(3) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an au-
thorized non-Indian licensing authority; or
(4) an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or
operated by an Indian organization which has a program
suitable to meet the Indian child's needs.765
The Indian child's tribe may establish a different order of
preference by resolution, and that order of preference must be
followed as long as the criteria of section 1915(b) of the ICWA
are met.76 ICWA also authorizes preference in "adoptive place-
ments" of Indian children. 67
Title 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) provides placement preferences for
Indian children. In any adoptive placement of an Indian child
under state law, a preference must be given, in the absence of
good cause to the contrary, to a placement with: (1) a member
of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian
child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families. 7 8 Again, the Indian
child's tribe may establish a different order of preference by
resolution. That order of preference must be followed as long
as placement is in the least restrictive setting appropriate to the
child's needs. 769
The standards applied in meeting the preference requirements
are the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian
763. Id. § 1915(b).
764. Id.
765. See also 10 OKLA. STAT. § 40.6 (Supp. 1982).
766. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c). See also Guidelines,
supra note 63, at F.2. For examples of good cause to modify the preference, see id. at
F.3.
767. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(l)(iv) defines adoptive placement to mean the permanent
placement of an Indian child for adoption, including any action resulting in a final
decree of adoption.
768. See also Guidelines, supra note 63, at F.1 (adoptive placements).
769. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c).
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community in which the parent or extended family resides or
with which the parent or extended family members maintain
social and cultural ties."0 ICWA further provides that under
state law a record of each such placement of an Indian child
must be maintained by the state in which the placement was
made, evidencing the efforts to comply with the order of pref-
erence. 7 The record must be made available at any time upon
the request of the Secretary of Interior or the Indian child's
tribe.772
Under the OICWA, 73 DHS has the responsibility of estab-
lishing a single location where all records of every involuntary
"foster care," "pre-adoptive placement" and "adoptive place-
ment" by Oklahoma courts of any Indian child in the custody
of the DHS or under DHS supervision will be available within
seven days of a request by the tribe or the Indian child or by
the Secretary of Interior."4 The records must include, at a
minimum, all reports of the state case worker, including a
summary of the efforts to rehabilitate the parents of the Indian
child, a list of the names and addresses of families and tribally-
approved homes contacted regarding placement, and a statement
of reasons for the final placement decision." 5
Return of Custody of the Indian Child
ICWA provides that whenever a final decree of adoption of
an Indian child has been'vacated or set aside, or the adoptive
parents voluntarily consent to the termination of their parental
rights to the child, a biological parent or prior Indian custodian
may petition for return of custody. The state court must grant
the petition unless there is a showing, in a proceeding which is
subject to the provisions of 25 U.S.C. § 1912, that such return
of custody is not in the best interests of the child.776 Further,
upon application by an Indian individual who has reached the
age of eighteen and who was the subject of an adoptive place-
ment, the state court which entered the final decree must inform
that individual of the tribal affiliation, if any, of the individual's
770. Id. § 1915(d).
771. Id. § 1915(e).
772. Id.; see also Guidelines, supra note 63, at G.4 (maintenance of records).
773. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 40.9 (Supp. 1982).
774. Id.
775. Id. For additional record keeping responsibilities, see Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1951; 25 C.F.R. § 23.81 (1978).




biological parents and provide such other information as may
be necessary to protect any rights flowing from the individual's
tribal relationship. n
It is crucial that state courts follow the mandate of the ICWA
concerning Indian children. Otherwise, the state court's decrees
and orders are subject to invalidation. Title 25 U.S.C. § 1914
provides that: (1) any Indian child who is the subject of any
action for foster care placement or termination of parental rights
under state law; (2) any parent or Indian custodian from whose
custody such child was removed; and (3) the Indian child's tribe
may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate
such action upon a showing that such action violated any pro-
visions of 25 U.S.C. § 1911-1913.778 Finally, the ICWA provides
that every state must give full faith and credit to the public
acts, records and judicial proceedings of Indian tribes. 79
Suggested Changes in the Law
The shroud of secrecy should be lifted from juvenile pro-
ceedings. Democracy works best when government is conducted
in public. Therefore, all juvenile hearings and records should be
open to the public unless closed by court order for good cause
shown. This would strike an appropriate balance between the
public's right to know and the individual's right to privacy.
The Juvenile Code should be revised to set forth a clear and
concise procedure for emergency removal of a child from home.
Notice requirements in the OICWA should be revised by lifting
the burden of giving notice from the court and placing that
responsibility on the petitioner, as required in the ICWA. Du-
plication between the federal and state Indian Child Welfare
Acts should be eliminated.
The summons should state on its face that each party is
entitled to be represented by counsel, and that if a party is
financially unable to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed by
777. 25 U.S.C. § 1917; see also Guidelines, supra note 63, at G.2 (adult adoptee
rights).
778. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held in In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742
P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985), that an unwed father whose paternity has not been acknowledged
or established does not have standing to invalidate state court actions under 25 U.S.C.
§ 1914.
779. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) states:
The United States, every state, every territory or possession of the United States,
and every Indian tribe shall give full faith and credit to the public acts, records and
judicial proceedings to the same extent that such entities give full faith and credit
to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any other entity.
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the court without charge. Oklahoma should implement a state-
wide public defender system to provide representation for chil-
dfen and indigent parents.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court should reconsider its decision
in A.E. v. State.780 The decision violates the doctrine of stare
decisis (to abide by decided cases) and fails to recognize that
the sole intent of the constitutional amendment was to incor-
porate the statutory right of jury trial at adjudicatory hearings
into Oklahoma's fundamental law. If Oklahoma intends to ex-
tend the right of jury trial to termination hearings, it should be
done by a vote of the people, not judicial fiat.
Finally, there should be created within the district court system
a special branch at the court to supervise juvenile and family
problems-a family court. Its sole function would be to adju-
dicate matters concerning marriage, divorce, adoption, and the
four Juvenile Code categories of deprived, delinquent, in need
of treatment, and children in need of supervision. Lawyers and
judges would be required to demonstrate expertise by education,
training or experience before being admitted into the proposed
family court.
Continuing legal and judicial education should be required,
for it is only by understanding our system of justice that we
may seek to improve it.
Summary
To understand proceedings to protect abused children, espe-
cially Indian children, one must have a working knowledge of
the United States Constitution, the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 (ICWA), the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Wel-
fare Act of 1980, the Secretary of Interior's mandatory rules
and regulations as codified in the Code of Federal Regulations,
the BIA-recommended guidelines for state courts as published
in the Federal Register, the Oklahoma Constitution, the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), the Oklahoma Juve-
nile Code, the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act (OICWA),
the general provisions of Title 10 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the
Rules for the District Courts of Oklahoma, and a plethora of
federal and state cases.
This article traces the origins of the juvenile court system, its
history, philosophy, and the need for public law proceedings to
protect abused children. Jurisdiction over child custody pro-
780. 743 P.2d 1041 (Okla. 1987).
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ceedings as between different nations and different states is
explored in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
The consequences of ignoring jurisdiction became graphically
evident in April, 1989, when the United States Supreme Court,
in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfeld, 7 invali-
dated an adoption approved by a state court involving Indian
children domiciled on the reservation. The article explains the
dual jurisdictional scheme established by Congress in which the
tribal court exercises exclusive jurisdiction over Indian children
who reside or are domiciled on the reservation, as well as wards
of the tribal court regardless of location. For state court pro-
ceedings involving Indian children who are not tribal wards, nor
residents or domiciliaries of the reservation, the tribe enjoys
concurrent but presumptive jurisdiction.
The article then discusses pretrial matters, such as pleadings,
summons, service of process, emergency proceedings, shelter care
and show cause hearings, reasonable efforts to prevent the need
to remove the child from the home, efforts to return the child
to the home, guardians ad litem, and CASA volunteers.
Having dispensed with pretrial matters, the article next ex-
amines the heart of deprived child proceedings, the adjudicatory
hearing. The hearing is held to determine whether the allegations
of the petition are true, whether the child should be adjudge
deprived, and whether the child should be made a ward of the
court. Issues addressed include the right to counsel, appointed
counsel for indigents, independent counsel for the child, the
right to jury trial, the rules of evidence, the allocation of the
burden of proof and the appropriate standard of proof, and
hearings before referees.
Discussed next is the dispositional hearing, including place-
ment of the child, efforts to alleviate the problems that caused
the child to be adjudged deprived, the rights and duties of the
person who receives custody of the child, the parent's financial
obligations, and review hearings.
The article then addresses terminating parental rights, the
most drastic of all public law remedies and considered the death
penalty in the family law context. Topics in this special pro-
ceeding include pleadings, notice, right to counsel, the reverse
in course by the Oklahoma Supreme Court concerning right to
jury trial, and higher standards of proof. The eight statutory
grounds for terminating parental rights are explored.
781. 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989).
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The article examines the special rights of Indian parents,
including notice, additional time to prepare for proceedings, the
indigent parent's right to court-appointed counsel, right to ex-
amine all reports and documents filed with the state court, right
to remedial services and rehabilitative programs, right to inter-
vene and petition the state court to transfer the case to tribal
court or to veto such transfer, ways to reduce the risk of cultural
bias, placement preferences for placing Indian children with
Indians, and procedural protections governing voluntary consent
to termination of parental rights. The Indian parent also has
the right to invalidate state court proceedings that violate certain
provisions of the ICWA.
The article also recognizes and discusses the tribe's interest in
its Indian children, which is equal to but distinct from the
interest of parents. In addition to the jurisdictional prerogatives,
the tribe is entitled to have notice, additional time to prepare,
examine reports, intervene, petition to transfer or decline to
accept transfer of cases from state court, negotiate and conclude
agreements with states, enjoy full faith and credit for tribal
court decisions, alter the presumptive placement preference pri-
orities of Indian children, and petition to invalidate certain state
court proceedings.
The article concludes with suggested changes in the law.
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